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More and more women are appointed to ministerial positions in Europe, across 
countries and political parties. Yet, there are significant gaps in our understanding 
of the factors which shape where and when women are appointed, and the 
impacts these appointments have on public policy. By considering the partisan 
dynamics and motivations of party leaders, I provide an insight into systematic 
variation in the number of women appointed to governments, the policy portfolios 
women are allocated, and the policy outcomes of women ministers on parental 
leave policy. This develops our understanding of women’s access to government 
positions, which has important implications for how women are represented in 
the most powerful policy-making positions. 
 
I develop a theoretical framework for the role of gender in ministerial selection 
and portfolio allocation by considering the policy, office and vote-seeking 
motivations of party leaders. Through a cross-national, time-series analysis over 
45 years of European governments, I find that more women are appointed to 
European cabinets by left-wing parties, and by female party leaders. Women are 
better represented in cabinets in gender-progressive countries, and where party 
supporters have more gender-equal social attitudes. When women are allocated 
to the government, they are significantly less likely to be appointed to the ‘core’ 
offices of state, and ‘masculine’ and ‘neutral’ policy areas, but this is moderated 
by party ideology. I find that women are more likely to be appointed to ‘masculine’ 
portfolios where a party’s voters have more progressive gender attitudes.  
 
Considering the policy implications of women's appointment to ministerial 
positions, I examine the circumstances under which government reforms of 
parental leave for fathers follow the ‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ model of family 
policy. I find that women’s active engagement in paid work is a necessary 
condition for the most gender-balanced forms of parental leave. The sufficiency 
pathways arising from a qualitative comparative analysis suggest that left-wing 
female ministers are ‘entrepreneurial’ in pursuing progressive family policy, while 
male right-wing ministers require pressure from public attitudes. The sufficiency 
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In this thesis, I explore the conditions under which women are appointed to 
government positions, which policy portfolios they are allocated, and the impact 
that women ministers can have on family policy. Women were appointed to 
government in Finland as early as 1926, where Miina Sillanpää was selected as 
Minister of Social Affairs by the Social Democratic Party. It wasn’t until 50 years 
later that Europe had its first democratically-elected female Foreign Minister, 
Swedish Centre Party leader Karin Söder. Even then, Söder was reportedly 
asked at a state banquet the capacity in which her husband was attending the 
event (Nyman 2017). Indeed, most European countries have never had a female 
defence or finance minister.  
 
Other countries were slower to appoint female ministers. Cyprus hadn’t had a 
female cabinet minister until Claire Angelidou of the Democratic Rally party was 
appointed to be Minister for Education in 1993. Until the 1990s, there had only 
ever been one woman sat around Malta’s cabinet table – Agatha Barbara, who 
went on to be the country’s first female president. British Labour Party Prime 
Minister, Ramsey MacDonald, appointed Margaret Bondfield to be the Minister of 
Labour in 1929. And yet there has never been a female Chancellor of the 
Exchequer (Finance Minister) in the UK. 
 
More and more women are being appointed to European governments, and yet 
the literature on government formation and executive politics has not considered 
how gender might shape on ministerial selection and portfolio allocation 
processes. Building on the seminal, early game-theoretic models of government 
appointments and portfolio allocation which assume that ministers are perfect 
agents of their parties (Laver and Shepsle 1996; Strøm 1990a), these bodies 
literature now recognises the importance of individual characteristics in of 
ministers in shaping policy preferences (Alexiadou 2015, 2016; Indriđason and 
Kam 2008; Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005). However, this literature does not 
consider how gendered decisions might play a role in ministerial selection, 
portfolio allocation and policy-making.  
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The story behind women's appointment to government positions isn’t always 
straightforward. Indeed, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson called ministerial 
selection a ‘nightmarish multi-dimensional jigsaw puzzle’ (Wilson 1976, 34). The 
first Prime Minister of the democratised Lithuania was female, Kazimiera 
Prunskienė, but she did not appoint any other women to her inaugural cabinet. 
Europe’s first majority-female cabinet was appointed in 2008 by male Spanish 
Prime Minister, José Zapatero. That government included the first ever Spanish 
female defence minister, who was at that time seven months’ pregnant. The move 
was not without criticism, though, one commentator in a Spanish national 
newspaper even called the ministers ‘a battalion of inexperienced seamstresses’ 
(Nash 2008).  
 
For decades, the emphasis of arguments about the presence of women in senior 
political positions was on the appointment of women themselves – the struggle 
was to get women around the table. Just ten years before the start of her eleven-
year tenure as British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher said ‘no woman in my 
time will be Prime Minister or Chancellor or Foreign Secretary – not the top jobs’ 
(BBC 2013). Now that some women are appointed to government, attention can 
turn to impacts senior women have in office. Evidence suggests that female 
legislators have different policy preferences to their male colleagues (Hyde, 
Essex, and Horton 1993; Poggione 2004). Yet, there has been little scholarly 
exploration of the impact of the appointment of female ministers on government 
policy.  
 
In this introduction, I provide an overview of the existing literature relevant to this 
thesis and discuss the contribution of each of the three articles. I then provide an 
overview of each of the three papers and their empirical strategy and methods. I 
then turn to a discussion of the central themes of the thesis. Finally, I consider 
the limitations of this thesis and areas for future research.  
 
Literature Overview and Contribution 
All three of the papers which form this thesis address original research questions 
relating to women's role in ministerial positions. These papers bridge gaps in the 
existing literature on gender in politics, executive politics, and government policy 
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making. While studies in the field of gender and politics provide insights into the 
informal institutions and socioeconomic factors which shape women's descriptive 
and substantive representation in policy making positions, they largely overlook 
the important political dynamics which forge these processes. On the other hand, 
analysts of executive politics have not considered how gender plays a role in 
ministerial selection and portfolio allocation processes. Studies of government 
policy making have begun to recognise how individual characteristics of ministers 
can affect public policy, but they have not considered how a minister’s gender 
might play a role in their policy preferences. Through developing original 
theoretical and analytical approaches which combine insights from these 
literatures, in this thesis, I provide an original insight into the causes and effects 
of women's appointment to ministerial positions.  
 
In this section, I outline four key areas of existing research relevant to this thesis: 
the appointment of women to government positions; the policy, office and vote-
seeking motivations of party leaders; how the individual characteristics of 
ministers shape policy making; and women and policy making on families. 
Throughout, I identify how the papers develop insights from these literatures to 
make an original contribution to the fields of gender and politics, executive politics 
and government policy making.  
 
Appointment of women to government positions  
 
While a small number of studies in the field of gender and politics turned to 
women's representation in ministerial positions, they are constrained by not 
giving due consideration to the partisan and political dynamics that drive the 
ministerial selection and portfolio allocation processes. In the first cross-national 
analysis which focusses solely on women’s appointment to cabinet, Davis (1997) 
found that women are disadvantaged in systems of government with generalist 
appointment norms, where cabinet ministers move between portfolios, due to 
their hierarchical nature and closed selection processes (Davis 1997:42). In 
specialist systems where ministers are selected because of their expertise in the 
policy area concerned, ministers are often appointed who are not 
parliamentarians so there is less emphasis on the political experience. Countries 
with specialist systems include Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
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Sweden where parliamentarians who become ministers must resign their 
Parliamentary seat. Generalist systems, where ministers regularly move between 
departments, place the most value on political experience. Therefore, ministers 
are almost always in the legislature and will have had to work their way up through 
the Parliamentary structures, for example Committees, as well as the party. This 
promotes a hierarchical attitude which disadvantages women, and the limited 
number of women in parliament means there is a smaller number of women in 
the ‘pool of eligibles’ for cabinet appointments (Davis 1997:59). Generalist 
systems include the Westminster-style democracies of Malta and United 
Kingdom. However, many countries fall between these categories of specialist 
and generalist recruitment. 
 
A number of analyses within the gender and politics tradition theorise the 
appointment of women ministers by drawing on the literature on women’s 
representation in Parliament.  These studies, therefore, focus on factors which 
are expected to lead to an increase in women's representation in parliament. In 
a cross-sectional analysis of 28 countries, Siaroff (2000) finds that more women 
are present under left-leaning parties and in Scandinavian nations. Bego (2014) 
finds that the appointment of women to ministerial positions in new post-
communist democracies is highly correlated with women's enrolment in higher 
education. Similar to the expected Europeanisation effects of women's 
representation in Central and Eastern European Parliaments, the author finds 
that more women are appointed to government positions over time, suggesting 
that this could be due to a desire for ‘legitimacy and leverage from international 
organisations’ (Bego 2014, 356). In an analyses of women’s representation in 
presidential Latin American governments, higher levels of human development 
are found to correlate with more women in government, and leftist presidents 
appoint more women than their right-wing counterparts (Escobar-Lemmon and 
Taylor-Robinson 2005). The authors theorise that measures of human 
development more broadly are a good indicator of the overall education level of 
a country (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005, 834).  
 
These analyses of women’s appointment to governments therefore overlook the 
vital differences between the dynamics of election to the legislature and selection 
for the executive. I contend that women's representation in political elites must 
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be considered in the context of the political dynamics which shape those elites. 
This is especially the case for government appointments, where there a small 
number of available positions, and an even smaller selectorate.  Annesley (2015) 
argues that ‘recruitment to executive office cannot be fully explained by the 
aggregate sociodemographic characteristics of ministers or by the general 
characteristics associated with the political systems’ (Annesley 2015, 619). The 
author argues that understanding the gendered nature of government 
appointments requires an understanding of the eligibility pool for government 
positions, how to qualify, and who selects ministers. Annesley (2015) concludes 
cross-national or time-series quantitative analysis of appointments cannot 
capture the informal institutions, norms and rules of ministerial appointments. 
However, by considering appointments at the party level and theorising the 
appointment of women from the perspective of party leaders, I am able to provide 
an insight into women's appointments over time and political contexts while also 
considering the political nature of appointments. In all three papers, I also analyse 
the impact of women's representation in the legislature. This enables me to 
consider how women's parliamentary representation might affect the dynamics 
of women's appointment to the executive. By studying the impact of the gendered 
nature of women's presence in the legislature, the papers which constitute this 
thesis also draw on and speak to this existing literature on executive 
appointments.  
  
Few analyses of women’s appointment to government positions have focused on 
the political factors which shape cabinet formation. In a cross-sectional analysis 
of women's representation in government positions across 117 countries, Krook 
& O’Brien (2012) use an index, the Gender Power Score, to identify when women 
are appointed to government and the portfolios they are allocated. This analysis 
identified how political, rather than social, factors have the strongest impact on 
gender parity in cabinets. In particular, Krook & O’Brien (2012) find that the 
representation of women among political elites is the strongest predictor of the 
appointment of women to government. Women's presence in political elites is 
measured through factors such as a female leader, a ministry of women’s affairs 
and the representation of women in the legislature. Claveria (2014) finds that 
across 23 advanced industrial democracies, left-wing governments appoint more 
women, and that more women are appointed in specialist (rather than generalist) 
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systems of government. In an in-depth analysis of women ministers in 
presidential cabinets in five countries, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
and the United States, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2016) find that 
presidents appoint men and women to the cabinet with similar political 
experience, professional and educational backgrounds and links to interest 
groups, and therefore women do ‘typically need to look like men’ to be appointed 
to government (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2016, 275). By analysing 
the background of 447 ministers at an individual level, of which 110 were women, 
the study finds that women are more likely to be appointed to the traditionally 
‘feminine’ portfolios. These analyses, however, do not take into consideration the 
role of party leaders in ministerial selection and portfolio allocation, which 
scholars of government have long considered a key factor in shaping government 
appointments.  
 
The effects of party leaders are explored in O’Brien et al.'s (2015) examination of 
the impacts of a female party leader on the appointment of women ministers, in 
which the authors theorise the incentives and constraints which face a female 
leader when they appoint the government. These include the view of women 
leaders as ‘tokens’ which relieve the sense of obligation on parties to appoint 
more women, and the role of women leaders in overcoming ‘outgroup biases’ 
against the appointment of women. Analysing government appointments in 15 
countries between 1980 and 2015, O’Brien et al. (2015) find that the presence of 
a female prime minister or a female-led coalition party is associated with fewer 
female ministers, when compared to exclusively male-led left governments. In 
this analysis, they also find that governments with female Prime Ministers or at 
least one coalition party leader are no more likely to appoint women to high-
prestige posts than governments with only male leaders. The authors suggest 
that female leaders ‘shut the door’ for their female colleagues because they must 
make efforts to present a more masculine image, so they ‘may be accused of 
“favouritism” and pursuing “identity politics”’ if they choose to appoint more 
women to the cabinet (O’Brien et al. 2015, 699).  
 
However, O’Brien et al.’s (2015) findings are based on an analysis of the 
appointment of women to the whole government, rather than the party level, and 
therefore the study overlooks the important party-level dynamics of ministerial 
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appointments.  While the authors theorise that the ‘spillover effects’ of 
appointments are strong enough for one female party leader to have an impact 
on appointments to the whole government (O’Brien et al. 2015, 696), other party-
level factors may be more influential: a leader of a conservative party may not 
appoint more women just because the leader of a social democratic party in the 
government does so. Indeed, the opposite could be true, they may reap the public 
benefits of having more women in the government without ‘cost’ of appointing a 
woman themselves. In this thesis, I analyse the appointment of women ministers 
at the party level across the whole of Europe over a 45-year timespan for 
government appointments and a 25-year period for portfolio allocation. I am, 
therefore, able to examine the important party characteristics which shape 
government appointments, especially in coalitions.  
 
Existing analyses of the appointment of women ministers do not consider the 
important party-level characteristics, such as party ideology and the party 
leader’s gender, which shape government formation and portfolio allocation. This 
gap in the literature is, in part, due to a gap in data on ministerial appointments 
at the party level. Papers One and Two provide the first analyses of the 
appointment of women to ministerial positions at the party level, and therefore 
evaluate how partisan dynamics really shape the appointment of women to 
governments. Accompanying these papers, I also contribute data on ministerial 
appointments at the party level, which will enable future analyses of the partisan 
dynamics of ministerial selection.  
 
Policy, office and vote-seeking motivations in ministerial selection and portfolio 
allocation 
 
Cabinet ministers have a high level of public, party and individual responsibility 
so ministerial selection is an important and calculated decision: poor judgement 
in the appointment of individual ministers can be a party leader’s downfall. Party 
leaders play a pivotal role in selecting cabinet ministers and parliamentary 
delegation to the cabinet (Carey 2007; Kam et al. 2010; Müller 2000). Modelling 
the interaction of different actors in the legislative system, political parties exist to 
reduce the transaction costs in the business of government and help to overcome 
the inherent collective action problems in political systems (Müller 2000, 309). 
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Therefore, ‘political parties are the central mechanism to make the constitutional 
chain of political delegation and accountability work’ (Müller 2000, 330). Due to 
their central role in policy-making processes in representative democracies, 
cabinet ministers are first and foremost accountable to their party (Carey 2007).   
 
Given the important role of political parties in the functioning of cabinet 
government in European democracies, I theorise and analyse the appointment of 
ministers from the perspective of the party leaders who make those 
appointments. Coalition government is the norm in Europe, so government 
appointments and portfolio allocation are shaped by the leaders of parties in 
government. Forming a government and the appointment ministers is a ‘torturous 
process’ (Dowding and Dumont 2009, 3), but the leader of each party 
participating in a coalition government will have a strong say in the selection of 
cabinet ministers representing their party (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008, 
171). In an analysis of the careers of all federal cabinet ministers in Germany 
between 1949 and 2008, Kaiser and Fischer (2009) find that parties in coalition 
are relatively autonomous in selecting ministers. The assumption that party 
leaders are responsible for selecting and allocating portfolio to their party’s 
ministers simplifies the issues of bargaining across and within parties in 
ministerial selection. However, this approach also provides leverage over the 
partisan dynamics of government formation, which enables me to analyse 
women's representation in appointment to cabinet than simply considering the 
government as a whole. Bargaining over portfolio allocation is explored further in 
by Bäck, Debus and Dumont (2011) who find that the policy emphasis of party 
manifestos effectively predicts their ministerial portfolio preferences.  
 
Party leaders are engaged in high-stakes, high-profile decision making when they 
appoint governments. I use Müller & Strøm's (1999) policy, office, votes 
framework of party leader decision making to theorise ministerial selection in 
Paper One and portfolio allocation in Paper Two. This falls within the tradition of 
non-cooperative models of government formation and portfolio allocation, where 
individuals (as the unit of analysis) are assumed to be concerned with doing as 




Within Müller & Strøm's (1999) seminal framework of party leader decision 
making, party leaders are understood to have three core motivations: policy, 
office, and votes. Each of these motivations is prioritised by party leaders on a 
situational basis, depending on the environmental factors affecting their options. 
This framework provides a clear means by which to interpret the motivations of 
party leaders in the context of political decision making.  
 
The policy-seeking motivations driving party leader behaviour are prioritised 
when decisions are made to maximise the party’s impact on public policy. Office-
seeking motivations are prioritised when party leaders seek to ‘maximise their 
control over political office benefits’, with a central focus on obtaining and 
securing political office (Müller and Strøm 1999b:5). When party leaders make 
decisions based on vote-seeking motivations, they are driven by the desire to 
maximise electoral support at the next election. While votes do not have any 
intrinsic value, unless converted into policy or office benefits, the prioritisation of 
this motivation enables the assessment of the ‘temporal discounts’ (time 
horizons) of party leaders (Müller and Strøm 1999a). This framework does not 
suggest that party leaders pursue any of these objectives in isolation, rather that 
all three of these motivations are considered in most important political decisions. 
Party leaders must make trade-offs between these motivations, based on the 
prevailing institutional and situational constraints. This framework provides an 
insight into how party leaders balance their priorities (Müller and Strøm 1999:12). 
In the context of the role of gender in the ministerial selection decision-making 
process, this framework is employed to demonstrate how the gender of 
ministerial candidates affects their selection whether party leaders prioritise 
policy, office, or vote-seeking motivations. These papers model the appointment 
of cabinet ministers within a decision-theoretic framework. In decision theory, the 
choices of individual agents are modelled based on the assumption that 
individuals are utility maximisers (Dreier 2004, 156).  
 
In this thesis, I therefore seek to bridge the gap between analyses of government 
appointments which focus on women's representation in government positions 
and the ‘mainstream’ analyses of ministerial selection and portfolio allocation 
which overlook the gendered factors which shape appointments. This is an 
innovative approach to considering ministerial appointments, which provides an 
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insight into how the political and partisan elements of government formation 
shape women's appointment to cabinet.  
 
In this thesis, I provide the first time-series, cross-sectional analysis of women's 
appointments at the party level. Two analyses have considered women's 
appointment to cabinet at the individual level within one country case study. 
Fleischer and Seyfried's (2015) analysis of ministerial appointments in Germany, 
which draws on media reports to consider which ‘ministerable’ candidates are 
eventually appointed government posts. As an aside to the main analysis, which 
considers how office holder preferences shape government formation, this 
analysis finds that over 80% of the ‘ministerable’ candidates are male, but that 
women are more likely to actually be appointed to government positions 
(Fleischer and Seyfried 2015). They suggest that this could be due to drives to 
create gender balance in the government or their ‘seemingly better qualification 
that supported their entry into the bargaining pool in the first place’ (Fleischer and 
Seyfried 2015, 8). In an analysis of ministerial appointments to six cabinets in 
Sweden, Baumann, Bäck and Davidsson (2018) find that women are less likely 
to be appointed to cabinet positions when they have been on parliamentary 
committees in ‘masculine’ policy areas. This analysis also identifies that female 
parliamentarians are penalised more than their male colleagues when they 
deviate from the party line in parliamentary speeches (Baumann, Bäck, and 
Davidsson 2018).  
 
In Papers One and Two, I draw together the literature from the fields of gender 
and politics and executive politics to develop a theory of women's appointment to 
ministerial positions and portfolio allocation which is informed by the political 
forces which shape these processes but does not overlook the gendered nature 
of appointments. In Paper One, I theorise and analyse how party leaders’ policy-
seeking motivations lead to their ideology shaping ministerial appointments. I 
discuss how office-seeking motivations mean that the party leader’s gender 
affects the number of women ministers they select; and how the cultural context 
and gender attitudes of a party’s voters might shape the number of women vote-
seeking ministers select for cabinet positions. This framework is extended to the 
allocation of policy portfolios to women ministers in Paper Two. I consider how 
party leaders’ office-seeking motivations mean that appointments to ‘core’ and 
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high-salience portfolios are less likely to be female, but that there will be less 
gender differentiation in portfolio allocation in left-wing parties than right-wing 
parties. I examine why policy-seeking motivations mean that ministers appointed 
to ‘feminine’ portfolios are more likely to be female, and how vote-seeking 
motivations mean that there is less gender differentiation in portfolio allocation by 
parties whose voters have more gender-equal attitudes.  
 
Ministerial characteristics and policy making  
 
Journalists and political commentators view ministerial appointments as highly 
important for government policy making, and there is much speculation around 
the time of government appointments and reshuffles about who will be assigned 
which portfolio and the impact that might have on government policy. One 
motivation for analysing the circumstances under which women are appointed to 
the cabinet and allocated government portfolios is the impact that these 
appointments have on policy outcomes. The question of individual ministers’ 
impact on policy making is beginning to be explored in the academic literature 
(Alexiadou 2015, 2016; Bäck, Debus, and Tosun 2015; Becher 2010; Goodhart 
2013). In this thesis, I contribute to this emerging area of research by exploring 
the impact of the appointment of women ministers on the development of policy 
on parental leave for fathers.  
 
Early game-theoretic studies of government formation operated on the simplifying 
assumption that ministers are perfect agents of their parties, and therefore act on 
behalf of their party regardless of their individual preferences and characteristics 
(Laver and Shepsle 1996; Strøm 1990b). This assumption was necessary for 
early formal models of government policy making and cabinet dynamics. 
However, the political executives literature has moved towards more nuanced 
assumptions about the nature of the relationship between party leaders and 
cabinet ministers through considering how ministers have incentives to pursue 
their own ideal policies, rather than those of the party. This concept of ‘ministerial 
drift’, recognises that individual cabinet ministers may have different policy 
preferences to their parties and each other.  
 
Studies of political executives have shown how coalition governments use 
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various mechanisms to monitor the activities of cabinet ministers to prevent 
ministerial drift. These include parliamentary scrutiny of 'hostile' ministerial 
proposals through parliamentary committees to overcome potential problems of 
delegation and enforce coalition bargains in the legislature (Martin and Vanberg 
2004, 2005, 2011). Parties also use junior ministers in attempts to prevent 
ministerial drift, by monitoring the work of cabinet ministers (Carroll and Cox 
2011). Evidence suggests that these mechanisms are used differently in different 
countries, and a comparative analysis of legislation shows how Italian, Dutch and 
Japanese coalitions seek to enforce coalition agreements through junior minister 
oversight, while coalition governments in Germany use institutional devices to 
constrain ministers (Thies 2001). Parties also use reshuffles, and the threat of 
reshuffles, as part of attempts to prevent ministers from taking different policy 
positions from the government (Indriđason and Kam 2008). This literature on 
cabinet governance has identified the steps that Prime Ministers and party 
leaders have taken to constrain ministers from ‘drifting’ towards their individual 
policy agenda.  
 
This leads to the question of how the policy preference of cabinet ministers as 
individuals may be shaped by their characteristics or background. However, the 
characteristics of ministers which may lead to them forming individual policy 
preferences and ‘drifting’ away from their party’s position remain under-explored.  
 
In a detailed analysis of the individual policy preferences of cabinet ministers in 
the Italian Prodi government, appointed in 1996, Giannetti and Laver (2005) find 
that there is a link between the policy positions of cabinet ministers and the 
evolution of departmental spending patterns. Challenging the assumption that 
cabinet ministers always follow the party line in their policy portfolio, Alexiadou 
(2015, 2016) argues that the appointment of different ministers will lead to 
different policy outcomes. The author identifies three types of ministers: ‘loyalists, 
who are loyal to their party leader and prioritise office over policy; partisans, who 
are party heavyweights and aspiring leaders; and ideologues, who have fixed 
policy ideas and are unwilling to compromise over office perks’ (Alexiadou 2015, 
1051). Alexiadou (2015, 2016) identifies how the professional backgrounds and 
partisanship of ministers interact to shape their ministerial type. For example, 
ideologues are social democrats who were formerly trade union officials, or 
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liberals or conservatives who were formerly economists, bankers, or business 
executives. Developing a model of the strategic interaction between key players 
in government policy making, including the Prime Minister and finance minister,  
Alexiadou (2015, 2016) theorises that ‘ideologues have stronger policy 
preferences than partisans or loyalists, but partisans are costlier to oppose. Thus, 
both ideologues and partisans should be more effective policy makers than 
loyalists’ (Alexiadou 2015, 1060). Though analysing social and labour policy 
development in 18 parliamentary democracies, supplemented with case studies 
of Greece, the Netherlands and Ireland, Alexiadou (2016) finds evidence that 
individual ministers can have an impact on government policy making. Through 
opening the black box of cabinet government, Alexiadou (2015, 2016) shows how 
some individual cabinet ministers do have an impact on government policy. 
Therefore, there is emerging evidence to suggest that the individual 
characteristics of ministers can and do shape policy outcomes. This motivates 
my analysis of women's appointment to government positions (Papers One and 
Two), and I build on this to examine the conditions under which governments 
choose to implement progressive models of leave for fathers.  
 
Female ministers and family policy  
 
Given that the individual characteristics of ministers have been found to shape 
policy outcomes, in this thesis I suggest that women ministers are likely to have 
different policy preferences to their male counterparts on some policy issues. 
These differences are linked to women’s lived-in experiences of gender, their 
experiences in public life and the electorate’s perceptions of women leaders 
(Childs and Krook 2008; Mackay 2008). Evidence from existing analysis across 
political life suggests that ‘gender gaps’ in policy preferences do exist. Amongst 
voters, gender-based differences in voter attitudes are persistently identified 
(Edlund and Pande 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003). There is an extensive body 
of literature which illustrates how increased numbers of women in the legislature 
leads to increased policy attention on issues of substantive importance to women 
(Dahlerup 2006a, 2006b; O’Regan 2000). For example, in the USA, female 
senators speak more about policy concerns with direct relevance to women, such 
as women's health and family issues, than their male colleagues (Osborn and 
Mendez 2010). Women’s legislative representation is also significantly correlated 
with the abolition of capital punishment worldwide (Moreland and Watson 2016). 
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Evidence suggests that an increase in women’s legislative representation leads 
to decreases in aggressive defence spending and conflict behaviour (Koch and 
Fulton 2011).  
 
While several studies have analysed the policy effects of the descriptive 
representation of women in parliament, the impact of the appointment of 
individual women to government has not been assessed. Theoretical and 
empirical work on the ‘substantive’ representation of women has focused on the 
impact of female legislators, rather than other, more powerful women in the 
political system (Celis and Childs 2008; Swers 2002, 2013). Initial analyses of the 
policy impacts of women in the cabinet as a whole find that countries with more 
women in the government have more female-friendly social policies (Atchison & 
Down, 2009) and labour environment (Atchison, 2015).  However, these studies 
focus on the overall gender balance of the government, rather than the policy 
impact of the appointment of women to particular cabinet portfolios.  
 
Given the differences in policy preferences between male and female voters and 
parliamentarians, it can be expected that female ministers will also have different 
policy preferences to male ministers. As political actors that are (at least to an 
extent) policy motivated, the inherent preferences of ministers, including any 
gender-based preferences, should lead to women exhibiting different policy 
making preferences in ministerial office than men. In Paper Three, I find that the 
gender and partisanship of the labour/employment minister shape policy making 
on leave for fathers. In the last 30 years, almost all governments in Europe have 
sought to introduce some form of statutory leave for new fathers. However, there 
are a wide range of complex and multidimensional policy options available to 
governments, including in the division of leave between parents, financing 
periods of leave, eligibility, and flexibility (Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010). There 
is substantial variation in how governments have sought to address this issue. 
Some have legislated for one or two days of mandatory leave for fathers, while 
others have sought to establish a model of shared parental leave which promotes 
a ‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ model of parenthood (Morgan 2008).  
 
While there has been extensive exploration of the effects of leave for fathers on 
the balance of responsibilities between parents (Kotsadam and Finseraas 2011; 
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O’Brien 2009; Rehel 2013), the factors which shape how governments address 
the issue of leave for new fathers have not been considered. I provide the first 
comparative analysis of how governments design family policy. In Paper Three, 
I find that the gender of the labour/employment minister does shape the design 
of systems of parental leave. This lends evidence to suggest that the appointment 
of women ministers and the government portfolios women are allocated can lead 




Each of the three papers in this thesis seeks to address these knowledge gaps 
by asking new research questions, developing an original theory to address those 
research questions, employing original data, and undertaking analysis which 
provides an insight into previously unexplored political phenomena.  
 
In Paper One, Examining the appointment of women to ministerial positions 
across Europe: 1970-2015, I investigate where and when women are appointed 
to ministerial positions across Europe. The core research question for this 
analysis is: under which circumstances do women get appointed to ministerial 
positions? Through considering the policy, office and vote-seeking motivations of 
party leaders, I theorise how gender shapes party leaders’ ministerial selection 
decisions. I theorise how the policy-seeking objectives of leftist leaders lead them 
to appoint more women ministers. I discuss how office-seeking motivations lead 
female ministers to appoint more women, and vote-seeking motivations mean 
women will be appointed to ministerial positions in more gender-equal cultural 
contexts including when the governing party has voters who have more gender-
equal attitudes.  
 
To investigate where and when women are appointed to government, I develop 
an original dataset which details the appointment of women ministers in 30 
European countries between 1970 and 2015 at the party level. I use negative 
binomial regression modelling to analyse trends in the appointment of 12,757 
ministers. I find that left-wing leaders appoint more women than right-wing 
leaders, and that female leaders appoint more women to their cabinets than male 
leaders. More women are present in the governments of countries with higher 
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levels of female engagement in the labour force, and analyses of public attitudes 
show that party leaders appoint more women when their voters have more 
progressive gender attitudes. This paper is the first analysis to take the approach 
of analysing the appointment of women ministers at the party level, and therefore 
demonstrates how party-specific factors shape the representation of women 
around European cabinet tables. Due to the prevalence of coalition governments 
in Europe, this party-level analysis provides an original contribution to our 
understanding of women's representation by investigating how the partisan 
factors which shape ministerial selection impact on the number of women 
selected. 
 
In Paper Two, Entering the men’s domain? Gender and portfolio allocation in 
European governments, I examine how gender shapes the allocation of 
ministerial portfolios to ministers. This paper has been published in the European 
Journal of Political Research (Goddard 2018). Building on the policy, office, and 
vote-seeking motivations of leaders, I set out expectations for circumstances 
under which there is expected to be more gender differentiation of portfolio 
allocation. By considering the motivations of party leaders, I hypothesise that 
appointments to ‘core’ and ‘masculine’ ministerial portfolios are less likely to be 
female. I also expect that there will be less gender differentiation in ministerial 
portfolio allocation by left-wing parties and by parties whose voters have more 
gender-equal attitudes. 
 
I have developed on an original dataset which details 7,005 cabinet appointments 
across 29 European countries from the late 1980s until 2014 to test these 
hypotheses. I examine the gender differentiation in portfolio allocation by 
categorising portfolios into core/non-core policy areas, 
masculine/neutral/feminine portfolios, and policy areas which are high/low 
salience to the party. To explore these hypotheses, I undertake a logit regression 
analysis with country fixed effects. I find that women are less likely to be 
appointed to the ‘core’ offices of state, and high-salience portfolios, and are most 
likely to be appointed to ‘feminine’ policy areas. Gender differences in portfolio 
allocation are greatest in right-wing parties, and where voters have less 
progressive gender attitudes. This in-depth analysis of the allocation of portfolios 
to women provides an original insight into the factors which shape where and 
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when women are allocated different policy areas. I investigate the ministerial 
appointments of European party leaders over a 25-year period and provides an 
original insight into how the motivations of party leaders affect the gender balance 
of the allocation of policy portfolios to cabinet ministers. 
 
The third paper of the thesis, Government policy making on leave for fathers: a 
qualitative comparative analysis, investigates the effects of women ministers on 
policy making on fathers’ leave. In this paper, I address the research question: 
when governments decide to reform leave for the fathers, under which 
circumstances do they opt for a ‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ model of family policy?  
Family policy provides a particularly interesting area of analysis where 
governments have a range of complex multidimensional policy options, and there 
is significant variation between otherwise similar countries. Recognising the 
complexities and contingencies involved in policy-making processes, I develop a 
combinatorial theory of the conditions which shape government approaches to 
leave for fathers.  
 
Based on this theory, I undertake a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(fsQCA) of all instances of policy reform of fathers’ leave in the 20 OECD 
European countries since 1990. This analysis is supplemented with further 
qualitative analyses of cases of reform. I find that women’s active engagement in 
paid work is a necessary condition for the most progressive forms of leave. There 
are two pathways which are sufficient for the progressive model of fathers’ leave, 
both of which require a context of high female labour force participation 1) a 
female, left-wing cabinet minister with a left-dominated parliament and 2) a male, 
right-wing minister in a context of progressive gender attitudes amongst voters. 
This paper is the first analysis of the factors which lead governments to introduce 
the most progressive forms of leave for fathers. This will provide a valuable 
addition to the existing literature on the impact of family policy on outcomes for 
children and families. This analysis also provides a motivation for future 
consideration of how women ministers can shape policy making, by indicating 




Data, Methodology and Empirical Contribution 
Each paper in this thesis takes a distinct empirical strategy, and therefore I 
employ three different methodologies. As each paper in this thesis asks a new 
research question, each paper draws on an original dataset and a distinct 
methodology. While drawing on a range of methods, all three papers in this thesis 
are driven by the theory and, therefore, the appropriate methodology has been 
selected to address the research questions in hand. Papers One and Two take a 
quantitative approach, while Paper Three is a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (fsQCA). In this section, I provide an overview of the original datasets 
for each analysis and the methodology I have employed to approach each 
research question.  
 
Each paper has an accompanying original dataset, which has been collected to 
address the research questions of this thesis. The data and replication materials 




The original dataset which accompanies Paper One details the appointment of 
women to cabinet positions in 30 European countries between 1970 and 2015. 
This data is at the party-within-government level and covers 12,757 cabinet 
ministers. I extracted this data from Lars Sonntag’s Politica online database of 
European cabinets, which is an online archive of government appointments and 
does not detail the gender of each minister (Sonntag 2016). I then identified the 
gender of each minister based on a first-name dataset, consultation with country 
specialists and searches for references to the minister. To explore the 
hypotheses arising from my theory of women's appointment to government 
positions, I have gathered this original dataset to combine data on the gender of 
ministerial appointments with data on party leaders, party manifestos, national 
economic indicators, and public attitudes survey data.  
 
This is the first dataset of women's appointment to government positions which 
 
1 All replication materials are available at:  
 https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/deegoddard.  
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enables an analysis of the appointment of women at the party level. As Figure 1 
shows, this data provides an overview of women's appointment to ministerial 
appointments across the whole of Europe. Taking a longitudinal view, this data 
shows a common trend of an increase in the appointment of women to 
government positions over time. In Figure 2, I show the trend of leftist parties 
appointing more women to government positions across Europe over almost half 
a century. Unlike the negative binomial regression analysis, these graphs use the 
percentage of ministerial appointments by each party that are female. Therefore, 
the values range from 0% (where none of the party’s appointments to ministerial 
positions are female) to 100% (where every minister for that party is female). 
 
This extensive and detailed dataset provides a contribution to the analysis of 
government formation and ministerial selection by identifying the parties that form 
governments and the number of women ministers they appoint. This data will also 
be of use to scholars of government formation more broadly, as it identifies the 
parties of government in 30 countries over 45 years. This data also provides 
opportunities for linkages with other datasets on party characteristics.  
 
In Paper One, I utilise negative binomial regression modelling, which uniquely 
provides a methodological means to analyse the number of women appointed by 
each party, with an exposure variable which indicates the number of 
appointments made. The dependent variable is the number of women appointed 
by the party within the government, and the exposure variable is the number of 
appointments made by the party. This approach enables me to address the 
integer problems of ministerial appointments (Hilbe 2011) where other studies 
have relied on the percentage of ministers that are female as the dependent 
variable. I use this method to examine the effect of the independent variables 
arising from the theory: the party’s left-right score, a female party leader, the 
country’s female labour force participation rate, the gender composition of party 
voters, the gender attitudes of party voters, and time. With this model, I also make 
predictions of the appointment of women under observed and hypothetical 
conditions. I also consider the impact of women’s representation in the legislature 






For Paper Two, I have built on and extended the Seki-Williams Government and 
Ministers data, which details the name, portfolio title and gender for cabinet 
ministers (Williams and Seki 2016). For this analysis, I drew on data on 29 
European countries from the late 1980s until 2014. I then coded the ministerial 
portfolio titles for all 7,005 observations to group them into policy areas. This data 
on ministerial policy areas provides a data contribution which may help to further 
to the emerging literature on portfolio allocation. I combined this data on portfolio 
allocations with manifesto data, expert surveys, and data on public attitudes to 
examine the hypotheses arising from the theory of portfolio allocation to male and 
female ministers. The data which may be used for a wide range of future studies 
which seek to consider the allocation of policy areas to cabinet ministers. 
 
Figure 3 shows the gender balance of appointments to 20 ministerial portfolios 
for all observations in this dataset. Even with this cursory analysis, there is an 
identifiable gendered pattern in the allocation of policy areas: more men are 
appointed to the traditionally ‘masculine’ areas of government, and more women 
are appointed to the traditionally ‘feminine’ policy areas. The finance, foreign 
affairs, and defence portfolios are heavily dominated by men. The only policy 
area which has had more female than male appointees is that of women and 
gender equality. The family/youth, health, culture and social affairs portfolios also 
have relatively more gender-balanced appointments. These descriptive statistics 
reveal a trend which is explored in depth in Paper Two.  
 
To address the research questions set out in Paper Two, I use logistic (logit) 
regression modelling with country fixed effects. In this analysis, the binary 
dependent variable is gender of the minister. Fixed effects enable the model to 
account for baseline differences between countries in their propensity to appoint 
women. The independent variables include the nature of the government 
portfolio, with policy areas being categorised as core/non-core, high-
salience/low-salience, and masculine/neutral/feminine. Other independent 
variables include the left-right score of the governing party, the gender of the 
prime minister, voter gender attitudes, the year, and whether the government is 
a coalition.  In the Appendix, I also consider the impact of women’s representation 
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in the legislature on portfolio allocation.    
 
Paper Three  
 
The accompanying data for Paper Three includes a summary of every instance 
of reform of leave for fathers between 1990 and 2016 in the 20 OECD European 
countries, drawing on information from the OECD (2016), amongst others. This 
includes the nature of the reform, as well as data on government actors, the 
national economic context and public attitudes. The full analytical process for the 
fsQCA, including the calibration of sets and full truth tables is available in the 
Appendix to the paper.   
 
Figure 4 provides an overview of the 49 reforms of leave for fathers identified in 
this analysis. Over the 26 years of reform covered in this data, different countries 
have taken different approaches to leave for fathers. This map shows that three 
countries have only made reforms which follow the traditional paternity leave 
model. Six countries have only made reforms which follow the more gender-
balanced father-specific leave model. Over this time period, ten countries have 
made reforms which take both these forms. Sweden did not have reforms which 
fall within the scope of this analysis. Slovakia and Switzerland have no statutory 
provision for leave for fathers, so are not included in this analysis.  
 
In Paper Three, I use the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) 
methodology to assess the combinations of conditions which are deemed 
necessary and/or sufficient for the introduction of progressive models of leave for 
fathers. Recognising the complex, often non-linear, nature of reforms, this 
method enables me to identify cases and causally-relevant conditions for the 
presence or absence of an outcome of interest (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009; Schneider 
& Wagemann, 2012). With this method, I identify conditions which are necessary 
to be in place for a reform of leave to follow the progressive father-specific leave 
model, as well as combinations of conditions which are sufficient for a reform of 
leave for fathers to follow this approach. These conditions include women’s 
engagement in the labour force, gender attitudes, the gender and partisanship of 
the social spending minister, the partisan composition of the parliament, and the 
economic context. I also use fsQCA to analyse the impact of women’s presence 
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in the legislature and the party family of the social spending/labour minister.  
 
There has been some debate within the discipline on the utility of fsQCA for 
empirical analysis, including criticisms of the methods’ assumptions in relation to 
missing variables and association as causation (Seawright 2005) and the 
epistemological basis of the assumptions of fsQCA (Lucas and Szatrowski 2014). 
However, many of these concerns can be overcome through ensuring that the 
analysis returns to consider the specific cases under consideration; transparency 
about the selection of cases and calibration of sets; and the publication of the raw 
data, truth tables and simplifying assumptions for the analysis (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2010). I include all of this information in the Appendix to the paper. 
The results of fsQCA should not be interpreted over-deterministically, but instead 
can suggest how combinations of relevant conditions are associated with an 
outcome. Further analyses, both qualitative and quantitative, can help explore 
the associations identified in the research.   
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Figure 1: Appointment of women to ministerial positions across Europe, 1970 - 2015 
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Figure 4: Parental leave for fathers, policy reforms across European OECD countries 1990 - 2016  
  
 27 
Key findings and themes   
While divided into three distinct papers, this thesis provides a unified body of 
analysis centring on female cabinet ministers. In this section, I identify three key 
themes arising throughout this thesis and related findings. These themes are the 
role of party ideology, the impacts of women's representation in positions of 
power, and the bottom-up effects of public attitudes.  
 
Role of party ideology  
 
Throughout each of the papers, party ideology is identified as an important 
feature which shapes political processes and policy making. Leftist governments 
are more likely to appoint female ministers and allocate those ministers core, 
high-salience and masculine and neutral portfolios. I find that leaders of left-wing 
parties (with a left-right score of -50) appoint twice as many women to cabinet as 
leaders of right-wing parties (with a left-right score of 50). Across Europe, leaders 
of left-wing parties are found to be more likely to appoint women to government 
positions than leaders of right-wing parties. This means that even when in 
coalition with rightist parties, left parties in government appoint more women. 
 
I find that for centre-right parties (with a left-right score of 20) the predicted 
probability of an appointment to a feminine portfolio being a woman is 0.36, but 
the prediction for neutral portfolios is half this (0.17). The predicted probability is 
over five times less for masculine portfolios (0.07). This shows that parties on the 
political right of the ideological spectrum are less likely than leftist parties to 
appoint women to masculine and neutral portfolios. In this analysis, I show 
significant and tangible differences in women's appointment to government and 
the portfolios women are allocated. While there is no statistically significant 
difference in the predicted gender of core and non-core appointments by parties 
at the farthest left of the political spectrum, only 15% of the 219 cases where 
women were appointed to a ‘core’ portfolio were appointed by the parties in the 
farthest right quartile of parties of this dataset. 
 
Through the sufficiency pathways identified in the fsQCA analysis, I find that left-
wing, female ministers are more likely to be ‘proactive’ in instituting more gender-
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equal policies when reforming leave for fathers. While the sufficiency pathway for 
their right-wing, male counterparts includes more progressive gender attitudes, 
the sufficiency pathway for leftist ministers suggests that they are more willing to 
make progressive family policy reforms without the pressure of public opinion. I 
theorise that this effect is due to rightist parties’ motivation to promote the positive 
labour market impacts of shared parental models of leave and offer more choice 
to parents.  
 
These findings show how the parties that form a government can have an impact 
on the face of that government and that partisanship remains an important factor 
in shaping women's representation in positions of policy-making power. These 
results demonstrate the advantages of taking a party-level approach to ministerial 
appointments and ministerial decision making. The papers which constitute this 
thesis demonstrate the importance of undertaking a party-level political analysis 
of phenomena which take place at the at a party level. Through examining 
ministerial appointments at the party level, I am able to identify the relationship 
between party ideology and the gender balance of ministerial appointments and 
portfolio allocations. In addition, through analysing the left-right ideology of the 
party which is responsible for the family policy portfolio, I identify the conditions 
under which different parties make progressive policy decisions about leave for 
fathers.  
 
Impacts of women's appointment to positions of power 
 
I also find tangible impacts of the representation of women in positions of political 
leadership. In Paper One I find that female party leaders appoint more women to 
cabinet positions than their male counterparts. Based on the predictions arising 
from the analysis of my data, I find that when party leaders are responsible for 
appointing eight ministers, women leaders appoint four women while male 
leaders only appoint two women (controlling for the other variables in the model). 
A simulation based on this data, can provide further insight into these effects. In 
2014, Poland’s Civic Platform leader, Ewa Kopacz, appointed 11 cabinet 
ministers, four of which were female. The model’s predicted value for a female 
leader is 5.17. However, if Kopacz had been a man, the expected number of 
women appointed to the cabinet is 2.55.  
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Again, by undertaking this analysis of the appointment of women by considering 
the party level, rather than considering the government as a whole, I am able to 
draw a conclusion on the question of whether female leaders have a positive 
impact on the representation of women in ministerial positions. In the words of 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, ‘a swallow does not a summer make’ (The 
Local DE 2018). However, the results of the analysis in Paper Two suggest that 
the presence of a female Prime Minister does not have a statistically significant 
impact on the gendered nature of ministerial portfolio allocations. Analysis for all 
three papers also suggests that women's representation in the legislature can 
play a role in the appointment of women to the government, the allocation of 
portfolios to women, and the shape of parental leave reforms.  
 
The findings of Paper Three suggest that gender plays a role in government 
policy making. The sufficiency pathways identify that female, leftist ministers are 
more entrepreneurial and proactive in instituting gender-progressive policy 
reforms. This provides additional evidence that the individual characteristics of 
ministers can shape policy outcomes. Moving away from game-theoretic 
analyses of government policy making which assumed that all cabinet ministers 
acted as agents of their party’s policy preferences, this analysis shows how the 
backgrounds and characteristics of ministers can have an impact on public policy. 
Paper Three, therefore, suggests that the appointment of women to ministerial 
positions can shape policy outcomes which relate to family policy and the role of 
women in the home and the workforce.  
 
Overall, this thesis demonstrates how considering the role gender plays in 
political decision making can inform our understanding of political processes and 
policy making. These analyses uncover systematic variation in the appointment 
of women to cabinet positions and portfolio allocation across countries, time and 
political contexts, and evidence of systematic differences in policy making 
between male and female ministers.  
 
Bottom-up effects of public attitudes 
 
Another innovative feature of this thesis is the analysis of ‘bottom-up’ pressures 
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for reform through public opinion survey data. My findings demonstrate the value 
of considering public attitudes on government processes and policy outcomes. 
The sub-disciplines of executive politics and public attitudes rarely combine 
approaches. I argue that executive policy decisions made by party leaders and 
cabinet ministers take place in a broader public political context, and that public 
attitudes are an important part of that. Throughout this thesis, therefore, I 
examine how public attitudes shape the bottom-up pressure on those in the 
highest echelons of political power.  
 
The analyses in all three papers in this thesis suggest that these bottom-up public 
pressures do have an impact on executive politics. I find that public attitudes 
toward women in work have an impact on ministerial appointments. In Paper 1, 
a 10% increase in the percentage of respondents who answer that ‘When jobs 
are scarce, men have more right to a job than women’, is expected to lead to a 
10% decrease in the rate of women appointed to the cabinet (holding all other 
variables constant).  
 
I also find that where 50% of party voters respond that men have more of a right 
to a job than women, the expected number of women appointed by parties with 
eight ministers is less than 1.5. In these parties, the predicted probability of 
appointments to masculine portfolios being female is just 0.05. Where only 10% 
of voters think that men have more of a right to work than women, parties with 
eight ministers are expected to appoint two women. For these parties, the 
probability of a masculine appointment being female is over three times greater 
than the group of less-progressive parties (0.17). Through combining analysis of 
public attitudes and the approach of considering appointments at the party level, 
I find that these effects are present even when controlling for party ideology. 
Despite partisanship, in political parties whose voters have more progressive 
gender attitudes, women are significantly more likely to be appointed to 
government and more likely to be allocated to masculine portfolios. This suggests 
a relationship between the symbolic act of appointing women to the government 
and the party’s perceptions about gender. 
 
In Paper Three I find that public attitudes towards the role of women in the 
workplace are part of a sufficiency pathway for more progressive systems of 
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leave for fathers, as cases with right-wing, male ministers introduce more gender-
balanced modes of father-specific leave where there are more progressive public 
attitudes to women in work. Left-wing ministers are found to be more 
entrepreneurial in introducing progressive policy reforms. By exploring the role of 
public attitudes in public policy making I demonstrate how the public political 
context can shape policy outcomes. I also find that women's active engagement 
in the paid workforce is a necessary condition for reforms of leave for fathers to 
follow the progressive, more gender-balanced model.  
 
Considering these bottom-up pressures enables my analysis to move beyond the 
expectation that some countries just are more progressive than others on issues 
relating to gender and politics towards examining how those differences manifest 
themselves. For example, there is the commonly held expectation that the 
Scandinavian countries are more gender equal than the rest of Europe, and that 
southern Europe is less progressive. However, my analysis suggests common 
patterns in public opinion shifts within all European countries by considering how 
public attitudes shape government appointments and policy outcomes.  
 
Areas for future research 
The analysis presented in these papers develops our understanding of the 
appointment and allocation of portfolios to women ministers and the impact 
female ministers have on family leave policy. Through considering the 
appointment of women ministers at the party level, I provide an approach to the 
analysis of cabinet government which can be applied to other questions in the 
field of gender and politics. I also demonstrate how considering the gendered 
nature of political processes can inform analysis of executive politics.   
 
Building on this analysis, future research could consider the strategic relations 
between multiple actors in the appointment of women and policy-making 
processes. For example, in Papers One and Two, I assume that ministerial 
selection is conducted by party leaders. This enables a more detailed 
examination of the party characteristics which affect women's appointment to 
government positions, but does not consider the strategic interaction between 
party leaders. Future analyses can unpack how the interactions between various 
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actors in the government formation, ministerial selection and portfolio allocation 
processes affect the representation of women in governments. Further detailed 
investigation of policy-making processes would help to illuminate the role of 
cabinet ministers. The data contribution of this thesis will aid this task.  
 
In addition, future analyses of women's representation in government positions 
and the role of female ministers could identify how the mechanisms identified in 
this thesis apply in different political contexts, for example authoritarian regimes 
or new democracies. Developing the arguments set out in these papers in 
alternative political contexts would help challenge and extend the hypotheses 
presented here. Further research could also turn to additional survey analysis or 
experimental methods to investigate further the effects of gender attitudes 
amongst the public on the appointment of women ministers and government 
policy. 
 
Future analysis of the effects of the appointment of women ministers on policy 
making could also extend to other policy areas. Policy development in the area 
of leave for fathers provides a case study of the impact of women ministers in a 
policy area where government has a range of multi-dimensional policy options 
which have a tangible impact on divisions of labour in the home. However, it is 
one small area of government activity, and therefore there is scope for wider 
analyses of the policy impacts of women ministers. Further studies of women's 
role in policy making could draw upon the theoretical and empirical contribution 
of this thesis to consider the policy effects of the appointment of women ministers 
in other policy domains.   
 
Many questions relating to the role of gender in government processes have 
previously been unanswerable due to a paucity of data on women's appointment 
to government positions. The two cross-national time-series datasets on the 
gender composition of ministerial appointments which accompany this research 
will enable others to address how gender might shape a whole range of 
government processes, including coalition bargaining, reshuffles, ministerial 
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Examining the appointment of women to ministerial positions 




Under which circumstances are women appointed to ministerial positions? In this 
article, I provide a theoretical framework for the role of gender in ministerial 
selection by considering the policy, office and vote-seeking motivations of party 
leaders. I present an original dataset which details, at the party level, the 
appointment of female cabinet ministers in 30 European countries between 1970 
and 2015. Using negative binomial regression models, I find that left-wing party 
leaders appoint more women than leaders of right-wing parties. Female party 
leaders appoint more women ministers than their male counterparts. Women are 
better represented in governments in gender-progressive countries, and survey 
data analysis shows that party leaders appoint more women when their 
supporters have more progressive gender attitudes. This analysis provides an 
original insight into how gender has shaped the partisan dynamics of ministerial 




One first impression of new cabinets is particularly stark: some governments 
have more women than others. Although there has been an upward trend in the 
appointment of women ministers over time (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor- 
Robinson 2005; Claveria 2014), women's representation in cabinet positions can 
fluctuate dramatically between governments, even within countries (Annesley 
and Gains 2010). The gender balance of the cabinet is one dimension of what 
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson called the ‘nightmarish multi-dimensional 
jigsaw puzzle’ of ministerial selection (Wilson 1976, p.34). In this paper, I examine 
when and where parties appoint women to ministerial positions by considering 
the motivations of party leaders. This provides an original insight into how parties 
in government approach and shape the gender balance of cabinet appointments.   
Women were previously so under-represented in these powerful political 
positions that their appointment was not understood as an important feature of 
forming a government. This is no longer the case, with party leaders across the 
political spectrum receiving intense media criticism for the ‘maleness’ of their 
cabinets, and even make pre-electoral pledges to appoint women to the cabinet 
(Heppell 2012). This analysis seeks to explain how party political motivations 
influence the representation of women in ministerial positions. Given the 
prevalence of coalition governments across Europe, the motivations and 
characteristics of parties play an important role in shaping government 
appointments.  
To conduct this analysis, I draw on an original dataset detailing the gender 
composition of cabinets across 30 European countries between 1970 and 2015. 
This data makes a significant contribution to further the debate on ministerial 
appointments. Using negative binomial regression models, I find that more 
women are appointed when the party’s electorate are supportive of gender 
equality, by female party leaders and by left parties. This has important 
implications for women’s substantive representation (Childs & Krook 2008; 
Atchison & Down 2009; Swers 2013; Atchison 2015), political participation (Liu & 
Banaszak 2016), and equality of access to some of the most powerful policy-
making offices in Europe (Krook & O’Brien 2012).  
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Appointing (Women) Ministers: The Existing Literature  
Scholarly analyses has turned to the ministerial selection process and its 
importance for the outputs of cabinet government (Dowding & Dumont 2009; 
Dewan & Hortala-Vallve 2011; Martinez-Gallardo & Schleiter 2015). Moving on 
from the early game-theoretic assumption that ministers are perfect agents of 
their parties (Strøm 1990; Laver & Shepsle 1996), this literature now recognises 
the importance of policy-relevant individual characteristics of ministers in shaping 
their policy preferences (Martin & Vanberg 2004; Martin & Vanberg 2005; 
Indriđason & Kam 2008; Alexiadou 2015; Alexiadou 2016). However, despite the 
media attention paid to the gender composition of the cabinet and debates 
surrounding the representation of women in policy-making positions (Pitkin 
1967), the role gender plays in this process has been overlooked.  
Literature in the field of gender and politics has addressed the question of 
women's representation in ministerial positions based on factors which are 
expected to lead to an increase in women's representation in parliament, such as 
women's engagement in tertiary-level education and traditionalist religious views 
(Davis 1997; Siaroff 2000; Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson 2005; Krook & 
O’Brien 2012; Claveria 2014; Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson 2016; Bego 
2014). These analyses of women’s appointment to governments, therefore do 
not consider the vital differences between the dynamics of election to the 
legislature and selection for the executive, such as the small selectorate 
(Annesley 2015). These analyses do not consider the political dynamics involved 
in the competitive process of making ministerial appointments, which are very 
different from those at elections, and are based on different informal appointment 
norms.  
By combining insights from the existing literature on ministerial selection and 
women’s representation, in this paper, I theorise the gendered dynamics of the 
appointment of women ministers through the decision-making processes of party 
leaders.  This approach provides an original insight into how appointments are 
shaped by political factors. 
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Policy, Office and Vote Seeking Motivations  
Theorizing ministerial selection as a high-risk political decision made by party 
leaders, I apply Müller & Strøm's (1999) ‘Policy, Office, or Votes’ framework of 
party leader decision making to the role of gender in the ministerial selection 
process. Party leaders are understood to have three core motivations: policy, 
office, and votes. Party leaders prioritise policy-seeking motivations when they 
seek to maximise the party’s impact on public policy. Office-seeking motivations 
are prioritised when party leaders seek to ‘maximise their control over political 
office benefits’ (Müller & Strøm 1999, p.5). Vote-seeking motivations are those 
driven by the desire to maximise electoral support at the next election. This 
theoretical framework does not suggest that party leaders pursue any of these 
objectives in isolation, rather that all three of these motivations are weighted and 
considered by party leaders when they make important decisions.  
Party leaders play a pivotal role in parliamentary delegation to cabinet ministers 
(Müller 2000; Carey 2007; Kam et al. 2010). To investigate the appointment of 
women to government, I assume that the leader of each governing party within a 
coalition government is primarily responsible for selecting the cabinet ministers 
that represent their party (De Winter 1995, p.130; Carey 2007; Kam et al. 2010). 
Even within one coalition government, this party-level difference can become 
clear. For example, in Angela Merkel’s third cabinet (December 2013) her 
Christian Democratic Union of Germany party appointed women to 60% of her 
party’s five ministerial portfolios. Whereas only 38% of the Social Democratic 
Party’s ministers were female, and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria 
appointed no women. The prevalence of coalition governments across Europe 
means that analysing ministerial selection at the party level can provide an insight 
into how the partisan dynamics of appointing the cabinet shape women's 
representation in these positions of power. 
Due to the high level of public, party, and individual responsibility granted to 
cabinet ministers, ministerial selection is an important decision for party leaders 
which shapes their policy priorities and outcomes (Giannetti & Laver 2005; Bäck 
et al. 2015; Alexiadou 2016; Alexiadou 2015) and public perceptions (Dewan & 
Myatt 2010). Although simplifying the strategic interaction between several actors 
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in the process of appointing cabinet ministers, this assumption enables a clear 
theorisation and empirical evaluation of the process of appointing of ministers.  
Policy-Seeking Motivations  
When considering the policy-seeking motivations of party leaders, party ideology 
matters. The ‘demand’ within parties for women ministers is shaped by their 
ideological orientation - party leaders are driven by the ideals that motivated them 
to select the political party they lead (Strøm 1990, p.574). Leaders of left-wing 
political parties are more likely to be driven by their ideal policy positions of equal 
opportunities and active role for women in society (Norris 2004). They will, 
therefore, be more likely to seek to appoint more women to ministerial positions 
than leaders of right-wing parties. For social conservatives in centre-right political 
parties, gender parity in ministerial appointments is less likely to be a priority. This 
is especially the case where rightist female members of parliament do not 
represent a feminist agenda, and there could be a perception that there is little 
policy difference between appointing a male or female minister (Celis & Childs 
2014).   
Left-wing party leaders are also more likely to have women in ‘supply’ for 
ministerial posts. Leftist parties are have been found to be more ‘woman friendly’ 
than rightist parties, and they  typically have a greater proportion of female 
members of parliament than their right-wing counterparts (Rule 1987; Norris & 
Lovenduski 1995; Matland 1998; Kenworthy & Malami 1999; Caul 1999; Siaroff 
2000; Chiva 2005). Intra-party mechanisms which promote women’s access to 
positions of power, such as parliamentary quotas and women’s networks, are 
more commonplace in left-wing parties, and increase the supply of women with 
the necessary capital to be promoted to powerful political positions (Davis 1997; 
Lovenduski & Norris 1993). Therefore, leaders of left-wing parties are more likely 
to have a range of female ministerial candidates at their disposal to appoint to 
ministerial positions.  
Studies of the representation of women in governments suggest cabinets led by 
Prime Ministers from left-wing parties appoint more women (Claveria 2014; 
Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson 2009; Krook & O’Brien 2012; Escobar-
Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson 2016). Others, however, have found that there is no 
 44 
difference between left and right-wing party leaders in the number of female 
appointees (Davis 1997; Reynolds 1999). However, these analyses have not 
been conducted at the party level, and therefore do not consider how party 
influences within coalition governments shape appointments. Through theorizing 
and analysing the appointment of women at the party level, this paper enables a 
full consideration of the partisan dynamics of the gendered appointment of 
ministers.  
H1: Left-wing political parties appoint more women to ministerial positions 
than right-wing political parties.  
Office-Seeking Motivations  
Party leaders are also office seeking; they are concerned with perpetuating their 
period in government (Müller & Strøm 1999, p.9). Cabinet ministers play a critical 
role in shaping the party’s image and agenda, party leaders seek to appoint 
competent, credible ministers. Party leaders can be subject to adverse selection 
problems, as they do not have complete information about the competence or 
policy positions of ministerial candidates prior to their selection (Strøm 2000, 
pp.270–271). Party leaders, therefore, screen ministerial candidates ex ante to 
identify their suitability for the role (Huber & Martinez-Gallardo 2008).   
This screening process is not gender-neutral. Feminist Institutionalist scholars 
have highlighted how the ‘gendered logic of appropriateness’ in political 
institutions affects which qualities are seen as desirable, and men’s and women’s 
competencies are judged against unchallenged masculine norms (Chappell 
2006). Due to the lack of formal rules surrounding ministerial recruitment, those 
who appoint the government can be particularly vulnerable to the biases against 
women encouraged by these norms (Annesley 2015). Due to these biases, 
women may be perceived to be too weak or non-confrontational to hold 
ministerial office. Men are more likely to hold these biases, as they have not had 
to overcome these norms to rise to positions of leadership. Therefore, female 
leaders will be more likely to appoint female colleagues than their male 
counterparts.  
Evidence across different fields of employment suggests that women are more 
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likely than men to promote women throughout organisations. By breaking this 
masculine ‘homosocial reproduction’ of appointments, female leaders promote 
more women in their path (Kanter 1977). This has been seen in executive 
management where women can act as important catalysts for change when they 
have the motivation and power to aid female subordinates in the workplace 
(Cohen & Huffman 2007). Women on boards of companies can help to promote 
female-friendly policies to accelerate women’s performance in companies 
(Davies 2011; Pletzer et al. 2015). In law firms, instability in the market increases 
the need for trust, so decision-makers are found to feel more comfortable 
promoting candidates of their own sex (Gorman 2006). Female parliamentary 
candidates are more likely to be nominated when the party gatekeeper is a 
woman (Cheng & Tavits 2011). If this effect is played out in the most powerful 
political positions, women will also appoint more female cabinet ministers than 
their male counterparts.  
H2: Female party leaders appoint more women to ministerial positions than 
male party leaders.  
On the other hand, O’Brien et al's (2015) analysis of women leaders in 
government finds support for the hypothesis that female leaders actually ‘shut the 
door’ for their female colleagues. Arguing that women at the top of political parties 
must make efforts to present a more masculine image, O’Brien et al (2015) 
suggest that female leaders ‘may be accused of “favouritism” and pursuing 
“identity politics”’ if they choose to appoint more women to the cabinet (O’Brien 
et al. 2015, 699). Therefore, the effect of women’s leadership may not operate as 
I anticipate.  
Vote-Seeking Motivations  
The high-profile process of announcing a new government is part of party leaders’ 
interaction with the public. Any governing party leader must be aware of ‘the 
picture – often a literal photo in the press – presented by their cabinet’ (Escobar-
Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson 2009, p.4). Some party leaders even make pre-
election pledges on the gender balance of their ministers. In 2008, the leader of 
the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, José Zapatero, pledged a gender parity 
 46 
cabinet, and in the 2005 newly-elected leader of the British Conservatives David 
Cameron, pledged that one-third of his ministers would be female by 2015 
(Heppell 2012). These pre-election pledges show how some party leaders 
attempt to appeal to their voters based on the gender balance of their ministerial 
appointments.  
Party leaders are concerned with vote maximization, and therefore some party 
leaders may consider using the gender balance of their ministerial appointments 
to appeal to some voters by ensuring that their party appears to represent 
women. Voters’ expectations about the representation of women in government 
positions is shaped by the cultural context (Norris & Inglehart 2001). In Malta, 
where only one woman had been allocated a ministerial position right up until the 
late 1990s, party leaders had little incentive to bring women amongst their cabinet 
team. In Scandinavia, however, there is a strong political culture of appointing 
women to the government, regardless of party ideology (Siaroff 2000). Where 
there is a pervasive culture of equal opportunities for women, party leaders will 
be more concerned with the gender-balance of their ministerial appointments.  
This is not to say that women voters will find a cabinet unsatisfactory based on 
gender imbalance alone, or that women are mobilised enough as a group to lobby 
for more representation. However, appointing women to the cabinet can still be 
an important signal from the government to the electorate in some circumstances.  
H3: More women will be appointed to ministerial positions in more gender-
equal cultural contexts.  
However, not all party leaders feel the same amount of pressure to appoint 
female ministers. Parties and governments are vote-seeking (Müller & Strøm 
1999), and therefore I suggest that the extent to which party leaders are receptive 
to these concerns is likely to be shaped by the attitudes of their electorate. Party 
leaders are concerned with balancing interests when they announce a 
government, and ministerial selection can be used as a tool to signal the interests 
of various geographical, intraparty or sectoral groups (Mershon 2001; Ono 2012). 
In this balancing act, parties will seek to be responsive to their voter’s attitudes, 
this is reflected in parties’ issue attention (Klüver & Sagarzazu 2016) and 
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responsiveness to voters’ policy priorities (Klüver & Spoon 2014).   
To a degree, motivations for party leaders to used gender-balanced 
appointments to appeal to voters may also map onto the traditional left-right 
political spectrum. However, traditional blue-collar voters for left-wing political 
parties may have less progressive gender attitudes than otherwise socially 
conservative elites which traditionally vote for centre-right parties. Therefore, 
independent of ideology, I expect voter attitudes to impact on the appointment of 
women to the government. 
H4: More women will be appointed to the cabinet by leaders of parties 
whose voters have more gender-equal attitudes about the role of women 
in society.  
Data and Methods  
To examine how the policy, office and vote-seeking motivations of party leaders 
play out in ministerial appointments, I have collected extensive data on cabinet 
ministers across Europe. Through analysing this data at the party level, I can 
investigate the motivations of each party within the government. In this cross-
national, time series analysis, I can consider each of these hypotheses based on 
an analysis of all ministerial appointments in Europe over a 45-year time period.  
As such, I have compiled an original dataset on the gender composition of 
ministerial appointments for all governments across 30 European countries - 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
The timeframe for this data is 1970 to 2015. The first government in this analysis 
is the Finnish Karjalainen cabinet (15/07/1970-29/10/1971), the most recent 
government is the Greek Thanou-Christophilou cabinet appointed on 27/08/2015. 
Only democratically elected governments are included. All data is available at: 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/deegoddard. 
There are 1,593 observations at the party-within-government level, which covers 
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12,757 cabinet ministers. This data was extracted from Lars Sonntag’s Politica 
online database of European cabinets which specifies the full name, start and 
end date, party and portfolio of each minister (Sonntag 2016).2 Where cabinets 
are reshuffled, the minister is included twice in the dataset (once in the original 
portfolio and once in the new portfolio). In this original dataset, the unit of analysis 
is the party-within-government level, so each party within a coalition governments 
is one observation. For example, for Austria’s government under Alfred 
Gusenbauer between January 2007 and December 2008, there is one 
observation for the Social Democratic Party of Austria (three women of nine 
ministers) and one for the Austrian People's Party (four women of eight 
ministers).  
To identify the gender of each cabinet minister, the names in the Politica dataset 
were checked against a first-name database
 
in consultation with language 
specialists and web searches for references to the minister. 3 To verify the 
accuracy of this data, samples were checked against the European Journal of 
Political Research Political Data Yearbooks.  
The first hypotheses (H1), that leaders of left-wing parties appoint more women 
to ministerial positions than leaders of right-wing parties, is operationalised 
through the left-right score of each governing party in the Comparative 
Manifestos Project (CMP).4 This measure is an additive left-right index, which 
serves as a summary indicator of the policy positions of political parties in their 
electoral manifestos (Budge et al. 2001). The measure ‘could in principle range 
from –100 (the whole manifesto is devoted to ‘left’ categories) to +100 (the whole 
manifesto is devoted to ‘right’ categories)’ (Mölder 2013, p.3). The range for 
governing parties is more limited: from -58 to 82. The left-right score of the most 
 
2 The Sonntag dataset has been described as ‘especially helpful, valuable and reliable’ (Manow 
& Döering 2008, p.1367).  
3 The dataset is available at: https://gender-api.com 
4 CMP data is advantageous as it enables the analysis of time-series party positions over time 
which are comparable both within and across countries. For an overview of criticism of the 
measure see Volkens (2007). However, there is no comparable data source that includes as 
many parties across countries and time. The results from all three regression analyses are also 
robust with the time-invariant ParlGov left-right measure of party ideology (Döring & Manow 
2015). 
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recently coded manifesto is considered for each observation. In 988 cases (48%), 
the government was formed less than a year after the manifesto publication date.  
To test whether female party leaders appoint more women ministers than male 
party leaders (H2), I collected data on party leaders from Zárate’s Political 
Collections (Zárate 2016). This source details the name, year of selection and 
year of deselection for European political party leaders. I identified the gender of 
these party leaders based on web searches and a first-name database. Where 
parties were missing from this data, I consulted country experts and conducted 
independent research to identify the historical leadership of the party. A value of 
1 represents observations in which the party was led by a woman in the year that 
the cabinet was appointed.  
The hypothesis that more women will be appointed to ministerial positions in more 
gender-equal cultural contexts (H3), is operationalised through the Organisation 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development’s (OECD) Labor Force Statistics. 
For this analysis, I use the annual labour force participation rate of women aged 
15-64, as a percentage of the female population over the age of 15, to measure 
the gender-equal cultural context in each country (International Labor 
Organization, 2018). This measure is regularly used to operationalise the cultural 
context in analyses of women’s participation and representation (see: Gray et al. 
2006).5  
Building on the consideration of the impact of the cultural context, I also examine 
the effect of women's presence in the parliament on the appointment of female 
ministers in the Appendix. I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to 
analyse the impact of women's representation in the legislature on government 
appointments.6 Data on the representation of women in parliament is from the 
 
5 Other measures are also commonly used to operationalise the role of women in society, such 
as gender parity in tertiary education enrolment and the United Nations Development Program 
Gender Empowerment Measure and Gender Inequality Index. Each of these measures has the 
same, statistically significant effect in all of the models used in this analysis, but cover fewer 
observations. 
6 Due to the limited number of observations of the gender composition of parliaments, a negative 
binomial regression analysis of this data does not converge for this subset of the data. Therefore, 
I use OLS regression for the analysis of the effect of women's representation in parliament. 
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Inter-Parliamentary Union (2018) and details the proportion of seats held by 
women in the single or lower chamber of the national parliament. Data is available 
for 1990 and 1995 to 2015. While data is not available on the gender composition 
of the legislature at a party level, the representation of women in the legislature 
provides an insight into the ‘supply’ of women in the pool of candidates for 
ministerial positions.  
I use survey data to operationalise the gender attitudes (H4) of party voters. I use 
the European Values Study to test the hypotheses that the composition and 
attitudes of the electorate affect the propensity of a party leader to appoint women 
ministers. From this survey’s longitudinal data set, I grouped responses based 
on the question ‘e179- If there was a general election tomorrow, which party 
would you vote for?’ (European Values Study 2015). Using these groupings, I 
calculated the percentage of respondents who agreed to the statement ‘c001- 
When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women’.  
Table 1: Summary statistics for all variables  
Variable Observations  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Left-Right Score 1,264 -1.15 18.57 -58.00 82.20 
Female Party Leader 1,593 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Year 1,593 1995.34 12.47 1970 2015 
Female Labour force 
Participation Rate 1,261 57.95 12.18 27.96 84.33 
Gender Attitudes 709 21.81 19.29 0.00 100.00 
Women in Parliament 810 21.86 10.18 1.80 47.30 
 
Drawing on this data, I use negative binomial regression models to examine 
these hypotheses.7 This model is particularly suited to the analysis of ministerial 
selection, as an exposure variable can be specified which indicates the number 
of times an event could have happened, i.e. the number of minister appointed 
 
Further information is provided in the Appendix. 
7 Negative binomial regression is an exponential function, and models the natural logarithm of the 
expected outcome on the predicted variable as a function of the predictor variables (Vandeviver 
et al. 2015).  
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(Hilbe 2011). The mean and variance of the dependent variable and a likelihood 
ratio test of the overdispersion parameter indicate that the dependent variable is 
overdispersed, rendering a negative binomial model more appropriate than a 
Poisson model. Simulations have been conducted using the CLARIFY software 
for Stata (King et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2001).  
 
The dependent variable in this analysis is the count of women ministers, and the 
exposure variable is the total number of ministers appointed by that party.
 
The 
standard errors are clustered by country, to recognise that although observations 
are independent across countries, they are not necessarily independent within 
countries. Coefficients can be interpreted as the expected difference in the logs 
of expected counts of the dependent variable for a one-unit change in the 
independent variable, holding the other variables constant. Incident rate ratios 
can be interpreted in a similar manner to odds ratios – a value above one 
Table 2: Negative binomial regression analysis (number of women ministers appointed 
as dependent variable) 
 
 Model 1  Model 2 






    








Office     








Votes     





Gender attitudes of party 
voters 




Controls     








Size Exposure Variable 
 
Exposure Variable 
N / Clusters 1,016 / 30  680 / 30  
Constant -42.086***  -65.160***  
Pseudo R2 0.152  0.077  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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indicates a positive effect (more women are likely to be appointed) and a value 
below one is a negative effect (fewer women are likely to be appointed). 
Analysis and Discussion 
Policy: Party Ideology 
The results of the negative binomial regression model show that left-wing parties 
appoint more female cabinet ministers than right-wing parties (H1), the negative 
coefficient reflects this as leftist parties have a negative left-right score. Left 
parties with a score of -50, such as Denmark’s Socialist People’s Party in 2011 
or the Social Democratic Party of Finland in 1972, appoint twice as many women 
as rightist parties with a score of 50, such as Italy’s Republican Liberal Party in 
1988 or the Austrian People’s party in 1956 (holding all other variables constant).  
Figure 1 plots the predicted number of female appointees for parties across the 
political spectrum when they appoint four, eight or 16 ministers (the average 
number of appointments per party is 7.9).  
Figure 1: Predicted number of female ministers by party left-right score (95% 
confidence intervals) 
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Simulating an example can help to demonstrate how party ideology can play an 
important role in the number of women expected to be appointed to the 
government. In 1994, Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, leader of the Christian 
Democratic Appeal party, formed a grand coalition with the Labour Party. The 
Christian Democrats had nine ministers and appointed one woman, and the 
Labour Party appointed three women to their twelve posts – so the government 
was 19% female. But what if the Labour Party had been responsible for 
appointing the whole government? The simulated expected number of women 
ministers for the 21 posts is 4.7. With five female ministers, the government would 
be 24% female. More women are expected to be appointed to the government if 
it was wholly appointed by the leftist Labour Party. 
This provides further evidence that left-wing parties are more ‘female friendly’ 
than right-wing parties (Tremblay & Pelletier 2000; Caul 2001; Norris 2004; Fox 
& Lawless 2014). Leaders of left-wing parties are more likely to appoint women 
to government positions than leaders of right-wing parties. This means that even 
when in coalition with rightist parties, left parties in government appoint more 
women. By collecting data on the appointment of women to the cabinet at the 
party level, this analysis shows that the impact of left-wing parties on women's 
representation is present for parties within government, not just the government 
as a whole. It is key, therefore, that analyses of women’s representation in 
cabinets are undertaken at the party (not government) level. Otherwise, the 
appointment of women by one party in government may be misattributed to the 
government is a whole.  
Of course, party ideology is not the only motivation driving the policy-seeking 
aspects of a party leader’s approach to the problem of ministerial selection. 
Leaders will also be looking for ministers who can effectively manage a 
government department and are close to their ideal policy positions (Laver & 
Shepsle 1990). Testing these factors, and the way in which men and women are 




Office: Female Leaders 
Do women leaders appoint more women to the cabinet (H2)? The results of this 
analysis show a significant difference between men and women in the gender of 
their cabinet appointments. Holding all other variables constant, women are 30% 
more likely to appoint a woman than their male counterparts.  
Figure 2: Predicted number of female ministers appointed by male and female 
leaders, over the total number of ministers appointed by the party (95% 
confidence intervals) 
Figure 2 shows that women leaders are significantly more likely to appoint women 
to the cabinet. Based on the predicted margins of this model, women leaders 
responsible for appointing eight ministers (the average number of ministers for 
parties in this dataset) appoint four women, while men appoint two women.  
Another simulated example can help to explain this effect. What if Ewa Kopacz, 
Poland’s Civic Platform leader, had been a man when she appointed her 11 
cabinet ministers in 2014? The results of a simulation show that the model 
predicts that fewer female Civic Platform ministers would have been in the 
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government under a male leader. Kopacz appointed four women to the 
government, and the model’s predicted value is 5.17 with a female leader. 
However, if Kopacz had been a man, the mean of the expected number of women 
appointed to the cabinet would be 2.55. This shows a statistically significant 
difference between the number of women appointed by the party where the 
simulated variation is just due to the party leader’s sex.  
This analysis shows that, when given the opportunity, women appoint more 
women than their male counterparts. However, women are also less likely to lead 
parties which hold the majority of seats in government. 9.6% of parties who 
appoint two ministers to government were led by women, yet only 6% of the 151 
cases where more than 20 ministers were appointed by a party had female 
leaders.  
Perhaps though, it is merely the case that parties which are more likely to select 
women for the leadership also appoint more women to the government. Or, as 
O’Brien et al. (2015) note, this variation may just be due to the woman leader 
herself being appointed to the cabinet. Therefore, I ran robustness checks to 
ensure that this effect remains significant when accounting for any unobserved 
party-specific sources of variation (fixed effects) and where the female leaders 
themselves were in the government. These findings are robust to these tests, and 
therefore suggest that women do appoint more women to the cabinet than men.  
This provides additional evidence to suggest that women across the political 
spectrum are taking steps to promote women to other powerful political positions. 
This is an important finding for those who advocate the representation of women 
in policy-making positions, as the promotion of women in political parties can 
have a positive effect on the number of women in policy-making positions.  
This is inconsistent with the findings of O’Brien et al (2015), so I suggest some 
methods and theory-based differences between these analyses which may lead 
to these contradictory conclusions. Primarily, in this analysis I break down the 
appointment of women to the party level, which reflects party leaders’ autonomy 
in appointing the ministers that represent their party. While O’Brien et al (2015) 
find that fewer women are appointed to the government when there is at least 
one woman leading one of the governing parties, in this analysis I am able to 
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identify which leader is responsible for appointing which ministers. Although the 
contagion argument (that there are more likely to be women appointed by all 
parties if one takes the lead in appointing women within the coalition) may be 
persuasive, other party-level factors may be more influential: a leader of a 
conservative party may not appoint more women just because the leader of a 
social democratic party in the government does so. Indeed, the opposite could 
be true, they may reap the public benefits of having more women in the 
government without the ‘cost’ of appointing a woman themselves. Breaking 
government appointments down to the party level also provides significantly more 
observations where women are responsible for appointing the cabinet (in this 
data, 112 as opposed to 32). While O’Brien et al (2015) make a valuable 
contribution in theorizing the incentives and constraints which face a female 
leader when they appoint the government, in this paper I provide additional 
empirical evidence towards this discussion.  
Votes: Labour Force Participation and Gender Attitudes 
Gender-equal cultural contexts (H3) are operationalised as the participation of 
women in the labour force. Again, these results are statistically significant and 
point to more women being appointed to government in circumstances where 
more women also have access to the workforce. Even when controlling for time, 
women are better represented in cabinets when more women are engaged in the 
labour force within a country. 
In 1994, the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s Go Italy party appointed 12 
ministers to the cabinet, none of which were female. At that time, the female 
labour force participation rate in Italy was 41.89%. But what if that female labour 
force participation rate had been the same as Germany in 1994 (60.89%)? The 
model’s expected number of female appointments under the German labour force 
participation rate is 6.50 women, rather than the 0.89 women expected with the 
Italian female labour participation. Therefore, for those who seek to see more 
women in political positions, improving women’s position in society more 
generally should also be a priority.  
To investigate these vote-seeking motivations further, I draw on survey data to 
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explore how the gender attitudes (H4) of party electorates may influence the 
number of women the party leader appoints to the government.8 As shown in 
Table 2, the gender attitudes of voters does have a statistically significant effect, 
when controlling for the other variables in the model. The results of this analysis 
show that when there is a 10% increase in the percentage of respondents who 
answer that ‘men have more right to a job than women’, the rate of women 
appointed to the cabinet is expected to decrease by 10% (holding all other 
variables constant).  
Figure 3: Predicted number of female ministers by voter gender attitudes (95% 
confidence intervals)  
These results are demonstrated in Figure 3, where the predicted number of 
female appointments by parties with four, eight and 16 ministers are plotted 
against the gender attitudes of voters at the party level. Where only 10% of voters 
think that men have more of a right to work than women, parties with eight 
ministers are expected to appoint two women. Where 50% of voters hold those 
 
8 Some parties in government have few EVS respondents which identified with the party, and 
therefore the attitudes and gender compositions of these parties may be unrepresentative. 
However, when these low-response cases are excluded, and where multiple robustness checks 
have been undertaken (including bootstrapping), the same, statistically significant effects are 
found, but the number of observations is reduced. 
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views, the expected number of women is less than 1.5 (holding all other variables 
constant). This includes controlling for the role of party ideology, and suggests 
that attitudes of party voters matter in shaping party leaders’ calculations about 
ministerial appointments.   
Through linking this data on the appointment of individuals at the very top of the 
political hierarchy to the attitudes of voters at the bottom, I have been able to 
probe the vote-seeking motivations of party leaders. While the gender 
composition of the party electorate itself is found to impact on the appointment of 
women ministers, the gender attitudes of voters does have an impact. Where a 
party’s electorate is in support of gender equality more broadly, leaders across 
the political spectrum appoint more women. I suggest this is part of the interaction 
between party leaders and their voters, where the party leaders seek to address 
the interests of voters by appealing to their attitudes and beliefs about women in 
leadership.  
In the Appendix, I analyse the relationship between women's representation in 
the legislature and the appointment of women to government. The results of this 
analysis indicate that an increased presence of women in the parliament has a 
positive impact on the appointment of women ministers (in the subset of this 
dataset for which data is available). These findings are discussed further in the 
Appendix.  
Control: Time  
More and more women are appointed to governments across Europe over the 
70-year timeframe of this analysis. While Clement Atlee appointed Ellen 
Wilkinson to the British cabinet as Minister of Education in 1945, no women were 
appointed to the Icelandic government until Auður Auðuns became Minister of 
Justice and Church in 1970. Between 1975 and 1985, there were no women 
selected in 64% of party appointments to government. Between 2005 and 2015, 
this had reduced to 31% of the party-level observations in this analysis.  
As Figure 4 shows, women are increasingly likely to be appointed to the cabinet 
over the timeframe of this analysis. While party leaders with 16 ministers were 
expected to appoint two women in 1970, this expected value increases to four. 
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These results provide an insight into the changing nature of women's 
appointment to ministerial appointments over time. This includes controlling for 
party ideology and public attitudes to gender issues.  
Figure 4: Predicted number of female ministers over time (95% confidence 
intervals) 
Conclusion  
In this paper, I explore how party leaders’ policy, office, and vote-seeking 
motivations lead to their ideology, gender, and the attitudes of their voters 
influencing the number of women they select for cabinet positions. By taking an 
empirically rigorous approach to analysing the gender composition of 
governments at the party level, drawing on data on nearly 13,000 appointments, 
this paper provides an insight into the conditions under which women are 
appointed to government positions. This is a step towards thinking about gender 
alongside other important features in the government formation process such as 
institutions, parties, and factions.  
I find that women appoint more women to government, which has been a 
contested  area in the literature:  female leaders are 30% more likely to appoint 
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a woman to a ministerial position than male leaders, holding all other variables 
constant. This analysis shows that, even when in coalition, left-wing leaders 
appoint more women to the government. Leaders of left-wing parties (left-right 
score of -50) are expected to appoint twice as many women as leaders of right-
wing parties (with a left-right score of 50). More women ministers are appointed 
in gender-equal cultural contexts, where more women are active in the labour 
force. Party leaders also appoint more women to the government when their 
voters have positive attitudes to the role of women in work.  
There are many potentially fruitful areas for future research drawing on this 
theoretical framework of ministerial selection and original data set on ministerial 
appointments. Case study analyses of the ministerial selection process would 
provide a more detailed picture of the factors weighed in these appointments and 
the role of individual actors in determining the number of women selected for 
ministerial positions. A further crucial question is whether having women in these 
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Paper One: Appendix 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of left-right score by party family (Volkens et al. 2016) 
 
 
Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Ecologist 25 -14.72 14.35 -36.11 35.67 
Socialist or other 
left 
52 -15.99 20.51 -52.23 28.81 
Social democratic 301 -11.68 17.40 -58.00 43.24 
Liberal 271 4.74 18.12 -44.50 64.71 
Christian democrat 239 2.51 14.95 -28.77 40.42 
Conservative 173 9.76 16.58 -33.15 51.70 
Nationalist 51 7.82 12.63 -18.07 48.19 
Agrarian 90 -3.00 16.54 -40.24 82.20 
Ethnic-regional 51 -6.29 11.63 -41.01 15.12 
Special issue 9 -8.82 10.38 -23.08 6.76 
 






Impact of women’s representation in the legislature  
 
Data and Methods  
 
Building on the consideration of the impact of the cultural context on the 
appointment of women to ministerial positions in the full paper, in this Appendix I 
also examine the effect of women's representation in the parliament on the 
appointment of female ministers.  
 
Data on women’s presence in parliament is from the Inter-Parliamentary Union 
(2018) and details the proportion of seats held by women in the single or lower 
chamber of the national parliament. Data is available for 1990 and 1995 to 2015. 
While data is not available on the gender composition of the legislature at a party 
level, the representation of women in the legislature provides an insight into the 
‘supply’ of women in the pool of candidates for ministerial positions.  
 
Due to the limited number of observations of the gender composition of 
parliaments, a negative binomial regression analysis of this data does not 
converge. Therefore, I use OLS regression for the analysis of the effect of 
women's representation in parliament on government appointments.   
 
The dependent variable is a party-level measure of the percentage of ministerial 
appointments which are female, except for where a female leader herself is the 





Table 2: Ordinary least squares regression analysis (women ministers 
as a percentage of those appointed to the cabinet, party level) 
 
 Model 1             Model 2  
 
Policy 
    





Office     






Votes     




   





Gender attitudes of 
party voters 
  -0.023 
(0.060) 
 
Controls     





N / Clusters 605 / 30  476 / 30  
Constant -407.283  -174.842***  
R2 0.223  0.263  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 




The results in Table 1 indicate that the representation of women in the parliament 
does indeed have an impact on the appointment of women ministers (in the 
subset of this dataset for which data is available). In both models, the factor of 
women’s representation in the legislature is statistically significant and has a 
positive effect on the percentage of women in the government at the party level.  
 
In Model 1, which does not control for gender attitudes, a 10-percentage point 
increase in the number of women in the parliament is expected to have a 7.22 
percentage point increase in the proportion of cabinet appointments which are 
female, controlling for the other variables in this model. In both Models 1 and 2, 
the left-right score also has a statistically significant impact on the appointment 
of women to ministerial positions. The negative coefficient suggests that leftist 
parties appoint more women to ministerial positions than rightist parties. The 
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results of Model 2 show that the impact of gender attitudes is not statistically 
significant on the number of women appointed the cabinet in this subset of the 
data.  
 
This analysis does not indicate a statistically significant relationship between the 
year in which the government is appointed and women's representation in the 
government. This contrasts with the main paper where the findings suggest more 
women are appointed to government over time. However, this may be due to the 
reduced timeframe for this subset of the data (1990, 1995-2015).  
 
This initial empirical analysis indicates a relationship between the appointment of 
women to the legislature and the appointment of women to the government. This 
is in line with existing analyses of women's representation in ministerial positions 
(Krook & O’Brien 2012; Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson 2005; Escobar-
Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson 2016). This suggests that the gender balance of the 
selection pool for ministerial appointments shapes how many women are 
allocated government portfolios. Future research could build on this initial 
research to investigate how women's legislative representation at the party level 
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While all government portfolios used to exclusively be the purview of men, more 
and more women are selected to sit around the cabinet table. But, under which 
circumstances do women get appointed to different ministerial portfolios? I 
propose a theoretical framework by which to consider how party leaders’ attitudes 
and motivations influence the allocation of portfolios to male and female 
ministers. These propositions are tested empirically by bringing together data on 
7,005 cabinet appointments across 29 European countries from the late 1980s 
until 2014. Through considering the key partisan dynamics of the ministerial 
selection process, I find that women are significantly less likely to be appointed 
to the ‘core’ offices of state, and ‘masculine’ and ‘neutral’ policy areas. However, 
these gender differences are moderated by the ideology of the party that 
allocates them. This analysis also suggests women are also more likely to be 
appointed to ‘masculine’ portfolios when a party’s voters have more progressive 
gender attitudes. This enhances our understanding of women’s access to the 
government, which has important implications for how ministers are selected, as 








Across countries, parties and time, the gender balance of the cabinet becomes 
one of the first assessments of the newly-appointed decision makers when the 
photos of the cabinet appear in the press. But these images do not reveal one of 
the most important features of the government formation process: which portfolio 
each of the ministers has. While in some contexts, women are being appointed 
to high-salience portfolios such as justice and finance, there are other 
circumstances where women are only allocated the traditionally ‘feminine’ policy 
areas such as health and family. 
 
Some cabinet posts are perceived as an important part of the traditional ‘core’ of 
government (Blondel and Thiebault 1991), while others are important to the party 
(Warwick and Druckman 2006). Some portfolio policy areas are seen as 
traditionally ‘masculine’ while others are traditionally ‘feminine’ (M. Krook and 
O’Brien 2012). Whether, when and where women are appointed to these posts 
is important for the representation of women’s views at the highest levels of 
government decision making.  
 
Most existing analyses of government appointments overlook these important 
gender dynamics, and analyses from the gender and politics literature overlook 
the important partisan features of ministerial appointment. By considering both 
the characteristics of political parties and government portfolios, this paper 
provides an analysis of how party characteristics influence where women sit 
around the ministerial table. These party characteristics include the salience of 
different policy areas, the party’s ideological orientation, and the gender attitudes 
of the party’s voters. 
 
This analysis addresses the research question: under what circumstances do 
women get appointed to different ministerial portfolios? The allocation of 
ministers to government portfolios is a complex, multi-dimensional problem faced 
by party leaders. Therefore, I develop a theoretical framework which examines 
the allocation of ministers to cabinet portfolios based on the policy-, office- and 
vote-seeking motivations of party leaders (Müller and Strøm 1999).  
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Based on this theoretical framework, the empirical analysis in this paper provides 
an insight into when women get allocated to different government portfolios. By 
combining datasets on 7,005 cabinet appointments across 29 European 
countries from the late 1980s until 2014, this paper provides a uniquely detailed 
time-series cross-sectional insight into the allocation of policy areas to women 
ministers.   
 
The findings of this party-level analysis have important implications for our 
understanding of women's representation in the most powerful political decision-
making positions across Europe. Firstly, voter attitudes about women’s role 
appear to have an impact on the gender composition of the cabinet. Secondly, 
party ideology is a moderating factor in the process of government appointments 
which plays an important part in determining which portfolios are allocated to men 
and women. Finally, women are less likely to be selected for ‘masculine’ cabinet 
positions, and therefore Prime Ministers and party leaders may be overlooking 
potential ministerial talent based on gendered biases. In the Appendix, I also 
examine the effect of women's representation in the parliament on the allocation 
of portfolios to female ministers. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
With the appointment of Sylvie Goulard as France’s Ministre des Armées in May 
2017, the defence minister in four of Europe’s five largest economies was a 
woman (Henley 2017). Yet, in the cabinet which met at the Elysée prior to the 
formation of the 2017 French government, there were no women in the core 
offices of state. This pattern is familiar across Europe, where the allocation of 
women to government portfolios fluctuates between and across governments and 
countries.  
 
The selection of ministers is a complex problem for party leaders, so a theoretical 
framework for the allocation of portfolios to ministers must consider these multiple 
and competing dimensions. Müller and Strøm’s (1999) classic framework of party 
leader decision making provides a theoretical framework through which to 
understand ministerial selection. Müller and Strøm (1999) argued that party 
leaders have three core motivations: policy, office, and votes. Leading a political 
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party requires decision making which is based on trading off these motivations, 
and deciding who to place in which ministry is a typical example of the need to 
balance these priorities. Ministers need to be effective and trustworthy in 
delivering policy objectives, they must not cause the party to lose political office, 
and they need to appeal to the electorate.  
 
Our understanding of the factors which lead to ministerial appointments has 
advanced in recent years, including intra-party politics (Kam et al. 2010; Mershon 
2001), policy issue salience (Greene and Jensen 2017), and individual policy 
positions (Giannetti and Laver 2005). There have also been further developments 
in the analysis of how the backgrounds of ministers influence whether they get 
appointed to government and which portfolio they get, as well as the impact that 
the individual characteristics of ministers can have on the policy decisions they 
make in office (Alexiadou 2015, 2016; Bäck, Debus, and Tosun 2015). However, 
these analyses do not take into consideration whether the ministers that are 
appointed to cabinet positions are male or female. And, therefore, they overlook 
a key aspect of the ministerial selection decision-making process.  
 
In this paper, I build on the existing analyses which have addressed the 
representation of women in ministerial potions at the government level (Claveria 
2014; Davis 1997; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; M. Krook and 
O’Brien 2012; O’Brien et al. 2015; Siaroff 2000). In the developing literature on 
‘who gets what’ in coalition governments, analyses have shown the importance 
of political parties and their characteristics for the appointment of ministers (Bäck, 
Debus, and Dumont 2011b; Greene and Jensen 2017; Raabe and Linhart 2014). 
This is particularly the case in the European context, where parliamentary and 
semi-presidential systems dominate the political landscape (Schleiter and 
Morgan-Jones 2009). The most detailed cross-national analysis of women’s 
appointment to cabinets considers party dynamics in presidential systems 
(Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson 2016). However, this is in a context where 
the separation of the executive and legislature leads to very different dynamics 
of cabinet appointments to European parliamentary democracies, especially in 
relation to the nature of party attachments, the selection pool and the ministerial 
appointment process. By considering the party-level factors which shape 
government appointments in a European context, this paper provides an 
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understanding of how we end up with the diverse range in the representation of 
women in ministerial positions we see across European democracies. 
This paper also develops our understanding of the process of allocating ministers 
and contributes to the existing literature on government appointments by 
demonstrating the importance of gender dynamics in who gets allocated which 
policy area. Without considering the important factor of the gender of ministers, 
these studies have overlooked a key factor shaping who is in government. By 
examining the allocation of ministerial portfolios through the gendered 
motivations of party leaders in this paper, I am able to hypothesise when we see 
women appointed to different portfolios across governments and start to consider 
why this may be.  
 
Three important aspects of the ministerial selection process mean that it is 
particularly difficult to examine why ministers get appointed. Firstly, ministerial 
selection discussions and decisions take place in secret, behind closed doors, 
between a small number of high-level individuals (Annesley 2015). Secondly, is 
not possible to make a realistic assessment of the ministerial selection pool. 
Therefore, this paper considers the output of this decision-making process: the 
final allocation of portfolios which is announced to the electorate. Finally, this 
‘jigsaw puzzle’ has a large number of counterfactuals, with a wide range of 
dimensions. Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that because an individual 
is not deemed suitable for a particular ministry, that they are not suitable for 
government positions in any area. For example, the fact that a woman is not 
appointed to a ‘core’ portfolio does not mean that she will definitely get a ‘non-
core’ portfolio, or having a woman in a masculine portfolio doesn’t necessarily 
mean you are more likely to have a man in feminine portfolios. These effects are 
further complicated in coalition governments, where parties must also consider 
their coalition partners’ reactions to any ministerial appointments.  
 
Therefore, this paper considers how the characteristics of portfolios, parties and 
governments, as opposed to an individual’s characteristics, shape the allocation 
of women to government. While this approach has some costs in terms of the 
depth of analysis of party leader considerations, it enables an analysis of trends 
in women’s appointment. Understanding these trends provides a large-scale 
understanding of where and when party leaders decide to appoint women to 
 78 
different portfolios and a Europe-wide insight into which factors can lead to more 
or fewer women in the government. After all, it is these decisions which have an 
impact on how government departments are run and, as such, public policy. 
 
Office   
 
“For the most important portfolios, I need to pick ministers that are loyal to me”  
 
When considering office-seeking motivations, party leaders are concerned with 
holding on to government portfolios (Müller and Strøm 1999, 9) so seek to appoint 
credible ministers who maintain a high level of loyalty to the party leader. As 
cabinet ministers have a very high level of autonomy over their portfolio, they 
have the capability to undermine their principal in the formation and 
implementation of policy in the areas under their jurisdiction. Party leaders as 
principals can be subject to adverse selection problems with ministers as their 
agents, since leaders do not have complete information on the competence or 
policy positions of ministerial candidates prior to their selection (Strøm 2000, 
270–71). Therefore, party leaders screen ministerial candidates ex-ante in order 
to identify whether they are suitably experienced for the role (Huber and Martinez-
Gallardo 2008). 
 
While part of this ex-ante screening for important political portfolios will be based 
on the ministerial candidate’s views, voting record and policy positions (Rose 
1987), this pre-appointment screening process will also be based on less tangible 
informal links and relationships of trust. These close ties constitute a protection 
against personal unreliability as they provide incentives for members of the 
government to act openly, and form a sense of allegiance to the leader (Blondel 
and Manning 2002, 463). Consequently, the process of ministerial selection is 
functionally dependent on social networks which are built on trusting relationships 
(Moury 2011). For many reasons, these high-trust networks are relatively closed 
to women (Annesley and Gains 2010, 463). For example, Feminist Institutionalist 
scholars have highlighted how the rules and practices that shape formal and 
informal institutions lead to different outcomes for men and women (Chappell and 
Waylen 2013). Chappell (2006) suggests there is a ‘gendered logic of 
appropriateness’ which operates in political institutions and excludes women as 
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an ‘other’ in the close social networks which govern political institutions (Chappell 
2006). This is coupled with the fact that women are often prohibited, as carers, 
from engaging in the activities which build trusting relationships such as social 
events and networking activities. This ‘homosocial reproduction’ can prevent 
women from entering the close networks which become the selection pool for the 
most important offices of state (Kanter 1977).  
 
When allocating ministers to the prestigious ‘core’ ministries of state, these 
informal networks become particularly important. In the most visible, powerful and 
influential portfolios, party leaders who seek to hold onto political office need to 
assure themselves that they will not be betrayed or let down by their ministers. A 
public betrayal through a ministerial coup could be a party leader’s downfall. As 
such, this ex-ante screening through existing political networks is especially 
rigorous in the case of the most prestigious and powerful ministerial portfolios, 
such as finance and defence (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008).  
 
Therefore, the gendered effects of women’s limited access to high-trust political 
networks will have the most significant effect for the highly important and 
prestigious ‘inner circle’ positions within the government.  Existing analyses of 
ministerial allocations at the government level find that women are less likely to 
be appointed to the most important and highly-trusted positions within the 
government (Claveria 2013; M. Krook and O’Brien 2012).  
 
H1: Appointments to ‘core’ ministerial portfolios are less likely to be female.   
 
However, it is not just the ‘core’ portfolios which are of importance to party leaders 
and political parties more broadly. Even party leaders themselves have contested 
such categorisations. After receiving criticism for the gendered allocations of 
portfolios to his shadow cabinet, British opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn sought 
to emphasise that women had been appointed to the real ‘top jobs’ - the policy 
areas which mattered most to his party which included health, education and 
social care (Dathan 2015).  
 
When party leaders appoint their cabinet, they are very aware of the fact that 
some cabinet portfolios are of a higher issue salience than others (Druckman and 
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Roberts 2007; Warwick and Druckman 2006). However, this salience may be 
quite distinct from the ‘inner circle’ prestigious government positions. Parties do 
have commitments to policy areas which are particularly salient for them, and 
analyses of the portfolio allocation process suggest that in coalitions, parties are 
more likely to be allocated policy areas which are particularly salient for them 
(Bäck, Debus, and Dumont 2011a; Greene and Jensen 2017). For example, 
green parties are more likely to be allocated to environmental or climate change 
portfolios (Poguntke 2002). To those green parties, the environmental portfolio is 
equivalent to the ‘core’ offices of state.  
 
Therefore, the same informal and formal network dynamics will be in operation 
for high salience portfolios as there are for ‘inner circle’ or ‘core positions. 
Consequently, fewer women are likely to be appointed to these high salience 
ministerial portfolios.   
 
H2: Ministers appointed to portfolios where the policy areas are of high 
salience to political parties are less likely to be female. 
 
“I am from a left-wing political party, and have more women in my ministerial 
candidate pool”  
  
However, the intra-party gender politics varies within and between European 
political parties. Analyses which begin to lift the lid on the black box of decision 
making within parties identify a complex picture of multiple competing actors and 
interests (Greene and Jensen 2014, 2017). Yet, within this complex picture of 
decision making at the party level, the dynamics of gender in appointing ministers 
have received little attention. In the European context, these party-level 
characteristics are particularly important, as most governments are not single 
party. Therefore, the overall allocation of women to ministerial positions across 
the government depends on multiple parties, each with different ideological 
perspectives, policy agendas and policy preferences.  
 
Left-wing political parties are aligned with the values of egalitarianism, and this 
means that these parties are more likely to have an ideological commitment to 
gender equality than right-wing political parties.  For this reason, especially since 
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the ‘second wave’ of feminism, leftist political parties are seen to be more ‘female 
friendly’ than their right-wing counterparts. Existing analyses of women’s 
representation in parliament find that left-wing parties typically exhibit a greater 
representation of women than right-wing parties (Caul 2001; Chiva 2005; 
Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Matland 1998; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Rule 
1987; Siaroff 2000).  
 
Left-wing parties are likely to have stronger connections to feminism and feminist 
movements, and left-wing parties are more likely to implement party quotas 
(Dahlerup 2006; Freidenvall 2013; M. L. Krook 2007). Women are more likely to 
be appointed to ministerial positions where governing parties have adopted 
gender quotas (Claveria 2014). Therefore, although party quotas do not directly 
stipulate which policy areas women ministers should be allocated, they can have 
an indirect impact on the number of women in the selection pool for ministerial 
portfolios. Therefore, left-wing parties are more likely to have more women high 
in their party hierarchy which are suitable for appointment to a ministerial position 
than right-wing parties.  
 
Empirical studies of the representation of women in the cabinet governments at 
the government level suggest that this is the case. Cabinets led by Prime 
Ministers from left-wing have more women ministers than those led by Prime 
Ministers from right-wing parties (Claveria 2014; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-
Robinson 2005; Reynolds 1999; Siaroff 2000). 
 
Additionally, leaders of left-wing parties are more likely to hold feminist views than 
their right-wing counterparts (Bashevkin 2014; Campbell and Childs 2015). 
Therefore, both male and female leaders of these parties are less likely to adhere 
to the traditional public/private divide when considering the allocation of roles and 
competencies of female ministerial candidates. For these reasons, it is 
anticipated that leftist parties within the government will be more gender-
balanced in their allocation of portfolios than right-wing political parties. 
 
H3: Less gender differentiation in portfolio allocation in left-wing parties 
than right-wing parties. 
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Policy   
 
“She’s a woman so will know about that kind of thing” 
 
Over the last 30 years, there has become an increasingly pervasive norm of 
women gaining access to powerful fora of decision making; what Jacob et al 
(2014) call the ‘gender-balanced decision-making norm’ (Jacob, Scherpereel, 
and Adams 2014). This norm has set expectations that women will be appointed 
to decision-making bodies across the public and private sector to represent and 
defend the interests of women. This ‘substantive representation’ relies on women 
as political actors to represent the interests of women across the country (Pitkin 
1967), so party leaders may seek to appoint women to the government to 
represent ‘women’s interests’ (Celis and Childs 2008; Mansbridge 1999).  
 
Consequently, party leaders will evaluate the skills and expertise of women 
against their view of how they will best represent women in the policy areas which 
matter to women. As women continue to be associated with policy areas related 
to the home, children, health and the elderly, they will be more likely to be 
appointed to these policy areas than the ‘masculine’ portfolios which are 
concerned with the public sphere of the economy and national security. Women 
will be more likely to be appointed to policy areas which pertain to the ‘private’ 
sphere of life, such as children and family portfolios, women’s affairs, education, 
welfare, and health and social care (Krook and O’Brien 2012). Therefore, we will 
observe more women in the ‘feminine’ policy areas than traditionally ‘masculine’ 
areas such as agriculture, construction, military and foreign affairs (Mackay 
2008).  
 
Further, some women with successful political careers may well have 
championed their personal knowledge and experience of the feminine policy 
areas such as health and education. Therefore, when party leaders are assessing 
who will be best placed to lead a government department in one policy area, they 
may be more likely to select an individual who has carried out their politics as a 
clear advocate of ‘women's issues’ in that policy area (Beckwith 2011).  
 
Divisions in the gendered nature of policy areas are not necessarily linked to the 
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prestige of the ministry, as some traditionally feminine areas can command large 
budgets and have a high public profile. However, the gendered view of policy 
effectiveness, as well as the skills, experience and areas of interest to female 
ministerial candidates can lead to more women in the ‘feminine’ ministerial 
portfolios.  
 
H4: Ministers appointed to ‘feminine’ portfolios are more likely to be female.  
 
Votes   
 
“My appearance as a non-sexist party leader depends on this” 
 
The high-profile process of announcing a new government is part of the 
government’s calculated interaction with the public and sends an important 
message about the party’s image and intention. Some voters are more concerned 
with the gender balance of their preferred party’s ministers. Any governing party 
leader must be aware of ‘the picture – often a literal photo in the press – 
presented by their cabinet’ (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009, 4). For 
example, the leader of the British Liberal Democrats, Nick Clegg, was widely 
criticised in the British media for failing to appoint any women to the cabinet 
during the party’s time in government (Leftly 2014). On the other hand, the leader 
of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, José Zapatero, pledged a gender parity 
cabinet before the 2008 Spanish general election, and in the 2005 the newly-
elected leader of the British Conservatives David Cameron, pledged that one-
third of his ministers would be female by 2015 (Heppell 2012). These pre-election 
pledges show how some party leaders attempt to appeal to their voters based on 
their appointments to the government.  
 
Party leaders are concerned with balancing interests when they announce a 
government, and ministerial selection can be used as a tool to signal the interests 
of various geographical, intraparty or sectorial groups (Mershon 2001; Ono 
2012). Since women constitute half of the population, some party leaders are 
incentivised to gender balance their ministerial appointments in order to maximise 
votes by ensuring that the government (and the party) appears to represent the 
electorate. Others party leaders are motivated to use their ministerial 
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appointments to convey the party’s commitment to ‘masculinist’ values.  
 
This is not to say that women voters will find a cabinet unsatisfactory on the basis 
of a gender imbalance alone, or that women are mobilised enough as a group to 
lobby for more representation. However, appointing women to the cabinet can 
still become an important signal from the government to the electorate. 
 
Not all party leaders across time and contexts feel the same amount of pressure 
to appoint female ministers, or to appoint them to the most influential portfolios. 
To a degree, these concerns may also map onto the traditional left-right political 
partisan spectrum, however, these attitudes may also vary across other 
dimensions of political competition, such as socially conservative or liberal 
political attitudes (Kitschelt 1994). For example, the traditional blue-collar voters 
for left-wing political parties may have less progressive gender attitudes than 
otherwise socially conservative elites which traditionally vote for centre-right 
parties. Therefore, individual-level voter attitudes aggregated at the party 
electorate level can have an important effect on the relative pressure to appoint 
women to diverse portfolios across the government.  
 
H5: Less gender differentiation in portfolio allocation by parties whose 
voters have more gender-equal attitudes. 
 
Data and Methods 
In order to test these hypotheses, I combine multiple datasets on governments, 
parties and voter attitudes.  
 
For the composition of European cabinets, I use the Seki-Williams Government 
and Ministers data (Williams and Seki 2016), which extends and digitises the 
Woldendorp, Keman and Budge government composition data from the early 
1990s through to 2014 (Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge 2000). This dataset 
details the name, gender, party, duration, and other features for all government 
ministers, and also links their membership to other comparative datasets (Seki 
and Williams 2014).  
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For this analysis, I draw on data on 29 European countries from the late 1980s 
until 2014.9 The earliest government in this dataset is the Maltese Adami 
government which was appointed on 14th May 1987. The most recent 
government in the dataset is the Romanian Ponta government appointed on 17th 
December 2014. Within this dataset, an observation is the appointment of an 
individual to a portfolio within a government. In total, this dataset has 7,005 
observations, and 3,657 unique ministers. Just over a quarter (26.5%) of the 
ministerial appointees in the dataset are female.  
 
The dependent variable in this analysis is the gender of the cabinet minister, as 
identified in the Seki-Williams ministers data. As the unit of analysis is the 
individual minister, the party-level characteristics in this analysis (such as left-
right score and portfolio salience) are assigned to an individual based on the party 
the minister represents in government and the year in which they are appointed.  
 
This categorisation of ‘inner circle’ portfolios (H1) is based on Claveria’s (2013) 
inner/outer typology of portfolios. The ‘inner’ portfolios are the closest advisors to 
the Prime Minister and have regular access to the government leader. These are 
Vice-president/Deputy Prime Minister, Defence, Finance, Economy, Home 
Office, and Foreign Affairs. All other portfolio areas are seen as specialised areas 
which may not have regular access to the Prime Minister.  
 
For the salience of the portfolios to the political party (H2), I have used the Chapel 
Hill Expert Survey trend file data, which provides an annual expert evaluation of 
the salience of a range of substantive policy issues to political parties (Bakker et 
al. 2015; Polk et al. 2017). This dataset uniquely provides a time-variant party-
specific evaluation of policy area salience. An issue has been graded as high-
salience if it scores higher than nine on the ten-point salience score. A portfolio 
is high salience when it maps onto the high-salience policy area, or is the Prime 
Minister of Deputy/Vice Prime Minister. Of the 6,095 ministerial allocations with 
available data on salience in this dataset, 2,927 (48%) are of high salience. 
 
9 The countries in this analysis are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. 
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To test the party-level hypotheses that there is less gender differentiation in the 
portfolio allocation of left-wing parties (H3), the left-right score is operationalised 
through the ‘rile’ score of each governing party in the Comparative Manifestos 
Project (CMP).10 This measure is an additive left-right index, which serves as a 
summary indicator of the policy positions of political parties in their electoral 
manifestos (Budge et al. 2001). The measure ‘could in principle range from –100 
(the whole manifesto is devoted to ‘left’ categories) to +100 (the whole manifesto 
is devoted to ‘right’ categories)’ (Mölder 2013, 3). The range for governing parties 
is more limited: from -58 to 82. The left-right score of the last manifesto coded 
before the appointment of the government is considered for each observation.  
 
Policy areas have been identified as traditionally masculine, neutral or feminine 
(H4) based on their affiliations with the public or private sphere of politics and/or 
a historical association with men or women (Krook and O’Brien 2012:844). Based 
on Krook and O’Brien’s (2012) typology, I have categorised the ministries based 
on at least one policy area in the minister’s title being from the masculine, 
feminine or neutral group.  
  
 
10 The CMP data is advantageous as it enables the analysis of time-series party positions over 
time which are comparable both within and across countries. For an overview of criticism of the 
measure see Volkens (2007). However, there is no comparable data source that includes as 
many parties across countries and time. The results from all three regression analyses are also 




Table 1: Gender categorisations of portfolios (Krook & O’Brien 2012) 
Gender Policy Area 
Masculine Agriculture, Food, Safety, Fisheries & Livestock, 
Communication & Information, Construction & 
Public Works, Correctional Services, Police, 
Defence, Military & National/Public Security, 
Enterprise, Finance & Economy, Foreign Affairs, 
Government/Interior/Home Affairs, Industry & 
Commerce, Labour, Religious Affairs, Science & 
Technology, Transportation 
(Concerns tied to the public 
sphere of politics and the 
economy, and historically 
associated with men) 
Neutral Civil Service, Displaced Persons & Expatriates, 
Energy, Environment & Natural Resources, 
Housing, Justice, Minority Affairs, 
Parliamentary Affairs, Public Works, Planning & 
Development, Regional Reform, Sports, 
Tourism 
(Not clearly conforming to 
either criterion, or not linked 
to one sex) 
Feminine  Aging/Elderly, Children and Family, Culture, 
Education, Health and Social, Welfare, 
Heritage, Women’s Affairs, Youth 
(Private sphere of home and 
the family, have been linked 
closely to women) 
 
I use survey data to examine the effects of the gender attitudes of the voters of 
each party (H5). I use the European Values Study (EVS) longitudinal dataset and 
grouped the responses based on responses to the question ‘e179- If there was a 
general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?’ (European Values 
Study 2015). As a measure of gender attitudes within each party’s voter base, I 
use these groups to calculate the percentage of respondents who agreed to the 
statement ‘c001- When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than 
women’. This measure of gender attitudes provides a point of comparison 
between the voters of political parties. 
 
The gender of the government’s Prime Minister has also been included as a 
control variable, as the government being led by a woman may moderate some 
of the earlier hypothesised effects. For example, a woman may be more likely to 
have women in her close, trusting networks than a man. Further, the year in which 
the government is appointed is included as a control variable, as there is a 
general trend towards increased women's representation over time.  
 
I also include whether a government is a coalition government as a control 
variable in this analysis, as governments with more than one party involved in 
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portfolio allocation and ministerial selection may behave differently to single-party 
governments. While parties in coalitions can be relatively autonomous in 
selecting ministers, they may have to consider the reaction of other parties in 
government (Debus 2008; Kaiser and Fischer 2009). This could have an impact 
on the allocation of women to ministerial portfolios through constraining choices 
of plausible ministerial candidates, as well as parties’ and voters’ perception of 
the overall gender balance of the government. Table 2 provides an overview of 
all these data sources and some descriptive statistics. In the Appendix, I also 
examine how women's representation in the parliament might shape the 
allocation of portfolios to female ministers, I provide an overview of the data used 
in this analysis in that Appendix. 
 
Table 2: Data overview and descriptive statistics 
 
Data Data Source n Min Max Mean 
Minister ID Seki-Williams Ministers 
Data 
7,005 1 4685   
Portfolio Code  Own analysis 6,841 1 53   
Minister Gender (DV) Seki-Williams Ministers 
Data 
7,005 0 1   
Core (H1) Own analysis 7,005 0 1   
Salience (H2) Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey  
3,489 0 1   





Portfolio 'Gender' (H4)  Own analysis 7,005 0 3   
Voter Attitudes (H5) European Values Study  1,670 0 59.2 24.6 
Prime Minister Gender 
(Control) 
Own analysis 7,005 0 1   
Coalition (Control) Own analysis 7,005 0 1   
Year (Control) Seki-Williams Ministers 
Data 
7,005 1987 2014   
 
The results in this paper are based on logistic (logit) regression modelling with 
country fixed effects. Country fixed effects are applied because, across the 29 
counties in this analysis, there may be baseline differences in the propensity to 
appoint women to government positions, as well as the overall equality of 
opportunities for women. While incurring some costs in terms of identifying 
potential causal relationships across countries, fixed-effects modelling enables 
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this analysis to account for unobserved country-specific sources of variation.11 
 
The dependent variable in this analysis is the gender of the cabinet minister, 
where a female minister is coded as 1, and a male minister as 0. The logistic 
formula is stated in terms of the probability that the gender of the minister (Y) = 1 





) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡−𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑋𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑀
+ 𝛽4𝑋𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝜀 
 
For ease of interpretation, odds ratios are presented in this paper in Table 3. An 
odds radio coefficient above one indicates a positive effect (the appointment is 
more likely to be a woman) and a coefficient below on ea negative effect (the 
appointment is less likely to be a woman). The predicted margins and point 
predictions discussed are the probability of a positive outcome (a female 
appointee) assuming that the random effect is zero.  
 
The logit coefficients for this analysis are provided in the Appendix, and should 
be interpreted as the log odds increase of the probability of the minister being 
female predicted by a 1 unit increase in the covariate, holding all other 




11 A random-effects model, and random-effects model with country-clustered standard errors 
were employed to test the robustness of these findings. The substantive implications were 
consistent with the analysis presented in this paper.   
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Table 3: Logit regression analysis, odds ratios (gender of minister appointed as dependent variable) 
  Baseline  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7  
    Core Portfolios Salience  Gendered Portfolios 
Core                               0.361*** 0.338***   
 
      
    (reference:non-core)   (-0.03) (-0.03)   
 
      
Core X Right-Left Score      0.987*           
    (reference:non-core)     (-0.01)           




      




      
High Salience Portfolio        0.464***         
    (reference:low salience)       (-0.08)         
Neutral Portfolio     
 
  2.009*** 2.105*** 2.660*** 1.474 
    (reference:masculine)     
 
  (-0.18) (-0.20) (0.45) (0.46) 
Feminine Portfolio         4.825*** 5.158*** 6.524*** 2.928*** 
    (reference:masculine)         (-0.42) (-0.47) (1.08) (0.90) 
Neutral Portfolio X Right-Left 
Score 














Feminine Portfolio X Right-
Left Score 
          1.015**     
    (reference:masculine)           (-0.01)     




  0.984* 0.958***  
  
  
            (0.01) (-0.01) 
Neutral Portfolio X Gender 
attitudes 




    1.031* 
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    (0.01) 
Feminine Portfolio X Gender 
attitudes 
              1.039** 







Right-left party ideology  0.989*** 0.990*** 0.992** 0.988*** 0.992** 0.983*** 0.995 0.995 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female Prime Minister 1.194 1.22 1.208 1.358 1.026 1.003 1.424 1.366 
    (reference:male PM) (-0.15) (-0.16) (-0.16) (-0.26) (-0.14) (-0.14) (0.37) (0.35) 
Coalition   0.938 0.895 0.896 0.693 0.854 0.853 0.72 0.699 
    (reference:single-party 
government) 
(-0.14) (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.14) (0.16) (0.16) 
Start year of minister's 
appointment 
 1.042*** 1.042*** 1.042*** 1.014 1.042*** 1.042*** 1.023 1.024*  
  (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 6095 6095 6095 3058 5370 5370 1462 1462 
bic 5936.531 5780.628 5783.016 2839.819 5061.064 5069.467 1525.28 1529.83 




Are women less likely to be appointed to the core ministries of state than their 
male counterparts (H1)? A descriptive overview of the data suggests so. Between 
1987 and 2014, no women were appointed to any of the core ministries in Malta. 
While Sweden has the most women appointed to these roles between 1989 and 
2014, women are still in a significant minority, with only 10% of appointments to 
core portfolios being allocated to women. Model 1 in Table 3 shows that an 
appointment to a ‘core’ portfolio is almost three times more likely to be a man 
than a woman (the odds ratio is 0.361), controlling for all other variables in the 
analysis. There is a stark gender difference between core and non-core ministers: 
women are much less likely to be found in the most powerful and ‘inner circle’ 
political offices. 
 
Gender differences in appointments to core portfolios are moderated by party 
ideology (H3). Only 15% of the 219 cases where women were appointed to a 
‘core’ portfolio were appointed by the parties in the farthest right quartile of parties 
of this dataset (where the left-right score is greater than 7.21). The interaction 
term between whether a portfolio is in the ministerial core, and the left-right score 
for a party shows that appointments to core portfolios by right-wing parties are 






Figure 1: Predicted probability of ministers of core and non-core portfolios being 
female, with core-ideology interaction (95% confidence intervals)  
 
This is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the predicted margins of a minister 
being a female from Model 2, with the interaction between party ideology and 
core portfolios. There is no statistically significant difference in the predicted 
gender of core and non-core appointments by parties at the farthest left of the 
political spectrum, where the left-right score is less than -30. These parties 
include the Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP) in 1990, the French 
Socialist Party (PS) in 2012 and 2014, and the Belgian Socialist Party (PS) 
between 2007 and 2010, amongst others.  
 
However, there is a significant difference in the gender of appointments to core 
portfolios for the majority (96.74%) of governing parties in this dataset. Where the 
left-right score is 30, as it was for the British Conservatives (C) or Greek New 
Democracy (ND) in the 1990s, the probability of a core appointment being female 
is 0.05. For a non-core appointment the probability is nearly three times that 
(0.19). This demonstrates the importance of considering party-level factors when 
addressing the gendered nature of portfolio allocation in European governments, 
as the allocation of women to core portfolios varies significantly across the left-
right political spectrum. 
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Time is also an important driver of this effect, as appointments in more recent 
years are more likely to be female. For example, this model predicts that the 
likelihood of a German Free Democratic Party (FDP) appointment to a core 
ministry being female in 1991 is 0.06, but twenty years later in 2011 this had more 
than doubled to 0.13, despite a very minor rightwards shift in the right-left score 
of the party (from 1.89 to 4.27). 
 
In each of the models presented in this analysis, I have controlled for the gender 
of the Prime Minister. It could be expected that female Prime Ministers are more 
likely to have more women in their close social networks, and therefore be more 
likely to appoint women to core, high salience and ‘masculine’ or ‘neutral’ 
portfolios. The gender of the Prime Minister is not a statistically significant factor 
in the allocation of portfolios to women in any of the models presented in this 
analysis. 
 
This analysis provides a unique insight into the importance and salience of 
ministerial appointments for political parties by drawing on expert surveys (H2). 
Model 3 shows that appointments to high-salience portfolios are significantly less 
likely to be female. Indeed, appointments to high-salience portfolios are over half 
as likely to be female than appointments to low salience portfolios (the odds ratio 





Figure 2: Predicted probability of ministers of high and low salience portfolios 
being female (95% confidence intervals)  
 
 
Party ideology does have a significant impact on the likelihood of a high-salience 
appointment being female. Figure 2 unpacks this further, and demonstrates a 
statistically significant difference in the predicted probability of a woman being 
appointed to high and low salience portfolios in the political centre (when the left-
right score is between -35 and 25). This accounts for 92% of the observations in 
the dataset. 
 
For example, the Dutch portfolio of the ‘Minister of Home Affairs and Relations 
with the Dutch Antilles’ was of high salience to the both the right-wing People's 
Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) which has a left-right score of 28.08 
and the left-wing Labour Party (PvdA) which has a left-right score of 0.84. Yet the 
model’s prediction of the likelihood of the Labour appointment to the post being 
female in 2007 (0.10) was almost twice that of the People's Party’s appointment 
in 2006 (0.06). 
 
The interaction between party ideology and the salience of portfolios is not 
statistically significant. This means that the relationship between the salience of 
appointments and the gender of ministers is not moderated by the partisanship 
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of those appointing the government.  
 
Ministers allocated to ‘feminine’ portfolios, such as women’s affairs, children and 
family, or health and social care, are much more likely to be female than those 
appointed to masculine portfolios such as military and foreign affairs, finance and 
the economy, or science and technology (H4). Only 15.65% of all appointments 
to masculine portfolios in this dataset are female, as opposed to 37.37% of 
appointments to feminine portfolios.  
 
As the results of Model 4 in Table 3 shows, ministers appointed to feminine 
portfolios are 4.8 times more likely to be female than those appointed to 
masculine portfolios, holding the other variables in this model constant. 
 
The effect of the gendered nature of ministerial portfolios on the likelihood of 
appointees being female is even stronger in right-wing parties than left-wing 
parties, as shown in Model 5, which includes an interaction between party 
ideology and the gendered nature of portfolios. Parties on the political right of the 
ideological spectrum are less likely than leftist parties to appoint women to 
masculine and neutral portfolios. 
 
This relationship is explored further in Figure 3, which plots the predicted margins 
of Model 5. As this figure shows, for parties at the far left of the political spectrum 
with a (left-right score less than -27), there is no statistically significant difference 
between the likelihood of appointments to masculine and feminine portfolios 
being female. However, this only accounts for 4.3% of the observations in this 
dataset. There is no statistically significant difference between the likelihood of 
appointments to feminine, neutral and masculine portfolios being female for the 
most left-wing third of the parties in this data (when the left-right score is less than 
-10). As an example, the Portuguese Socialist Party (PS) had a score of -10.22 
in 2005. However, this effect largely arises because the appointment of women 
to both masculine and neutral portfolios is very unlikely. When the left-right score 
is -10, the model’s predicted probability of an appointment to a masculine portfolio 
being a female is 0.12, and 0.20 for a neutral portfolio. 
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Figure 3: Predicted probability of ministers of masculine, neutral and feminine 
portfolios being female, with portfolio-ideology interaction (95% confidence 
intervals)  
 
For parties on the political right, this effect is exacerbated. For centre-right parties 
(with a left-right score of 20) the predicted probability of an appointment to a 
feminine portfolio being female is 0.36. The prediction for a neutral portfolio is 
half this (0.17) and for a masculine portfolio is over five times less (0.07). 
Therefore, the model accurately predicts that the British Conservatives (left-right 
score of 17.54), when appointing their 2014 reshuffle cabinet selected female 
Nicky Morgan as Secretary of State for Education, and male Michael Fallon as 
Secretary of State for Defence. Across the political spectrum, the likelihood of 
appointees to feminine portfolios being female remains relatively consistent, 
dropping from 0.38 to 0.35 from the very left (-50) to the very right (50) 
respectively, when controlling for the other variables in the model.  
 
This analysis reveals a gendered divide in portfolio allocation across most 
governing parties across the political spectrum. Where women are appointed to 
ministerial positions, it is most likely to be in feminine policy areas, and on the 
political right women are unlikely to be appointed to masculine portfolios.  
 
Over time, all appointments are marginally more likely to be female. For example, 
based on Model 5, the probability of the Hungarian Socialist Party’s (MSZP) 
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appointment to the Ministry of Finance in 1994 being female was 0.06. By 2014, 
this had doubled to 0.14 (the party had also moved five points to the left in that 
time).  Another illustrative example is Ireland’s Fianna Fáil’s appointments to the 
‘Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform’ position. The probability of a 
woman being appointed to that position increased from 0.30 in June 1997 to 0.41 
in May 2008 (the party also moved leftwards by 15 points in that time).  
 
Figure 4: Predicted probability of ministers of masculine, neutral and feminine 




To what extent do the gender attitudes of a party’s voters impact on the 
appointment of women ministers to government portfolios (H5)? The results from 
Model 6 in Table 3 suggest that parties whose voters have less progressive social 
attitudes are less likely to appoint women to neutral and masculine portfolios even 
when controlling for party ideology and time. The results from Model 7, which 
include an interaction between party ideology and the gendered nature of policy 
areas, demonstrate that this effect is particularly substantial on the political right. 
Figure 4 plots the marginal effects of this analysis, and shows that the gender 
attitudes of voters does have a statistically significant effect on the appointment 
of women to ministerial portfolios, especially in the allocation of masculine 
portfolios to women.  
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For parties whose voters have less progressive gender attitudes, there is a large, 
statistically significant difference between the likelihood of appointments to 
masculine, feminine and neutral portfolios being female. In 15.7% of cases in this 
data, more than 40% of respondents voting for a party answered that ‘When jobs 
are scarce, men have more right to a job than women’. These include the Italian 
Christian Democracy (DC) party and Ireland’s Fianna Fáil (FF) in the early 1990s, 
and Greek New Democracy (ND) in 2012. For this group of parties, whose voters 
have less progressive gender attitudes, the predicted probability of appointments 
to masculine portfolios being female is 0.05.  
 
Parties with voters with more progressive gender attitudes (where less than 10% 
of voters answered that ‘When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than 
women’) include the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) in the late 1980s, 
and Danish Social Democracy (S) in the mid-2010s. For these parties, the 
probability of a masculine appointment being female is over three times greater 
than the group of less-progressive parties (0.17).  
 
As Figure 4 shows, for parties whose voters have more gender-equal social 
attitudes there is no statistically significant difference in the likelihood of 
appointments to masculine, neutral and feminine portfolios being female. This 
stands in marked difference to the group of parties whose voters have less 
progressive social attitudes towards women, where the predicted margins 
indicate that the probability of a woman being appointed to a feminine portfolio 
(0.42) is over eight times greater than appointments to masculine portfolios 
(0.05). 
 
This lends evidence to suggest that party leaders are considering their voters’ 
views when appointing the cabinet, and that voter attitudes have a significant 
effect on the appointment of women to the cabinet. This indicates that changing 
perceptions of women’s role in society may lead to a change in the policy areas 
women are allocated to in government.    
 
In all except Models 3 and 6, time has a statistically significant impact on the 
allocation of portfolios to women: women are more likely to be appointed core, 
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high salience, and masculine portfolios over time. This reflects the results of 
existing analyses of the representation of women in elected and appointed 
political positions whereby women's representation increases over time 
(Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2016; M. Krook and O’Brien 2012; 
O’Brien et al. 2015). 
 
This analysis of the impact of coalition governments suggests that there is no 
statistically significant difference between coalition and single-party governments 
in the allocation of portfolios to women ministers, including in the baseline model. 
That parties behave similarly in single party and coalition governments suggests 
that while coalition dynamics may play an important part in the allocation of 
parties to portfolios (Bäck, Debus, and Dumont 2011a), they do not necessarily 
have an impact on parties’ allocation of portfolios to women ministers. How 
coalition dynamics influence the allocation of women to ministerial portfolios 
could provide a fruitful area for future analysis. The analysis of the impact of 
women's representation in the Parliament (presented in the Appendix) also 
suggests that the presence of women in the legislature has an impact on the 
appointment of women ministers (in the subset of this dataset for which data is 
available). In all seven models, the factor of women’s representation in the 
legislature is statistically significant and has a positive effect on the likelihood of 
a ministerial appointment being female (holding all other variables constant).  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Under which circumstances do women get appointed to different ministerial 
portfolios? In this paper, I have addressed this question by considering how the 
policy, office and vote-seeking motivations of party leaders influence the 
allocation of women to ministerial portfolios across Europe. This analysis of 7,005 
ministerial appointments across 29 European countries builds upon existing 
analyses of women’s appointment to government positions (Escobar-Lemmon 
and Taylor-Robinson 2009, 2016; M. Krook and O’Brien 2012) to provide an 
examination of how party and portfolio characteristics influence the allocation of 
appointment of women ministers. Both empirically and in terms of our theoretical 
understanding, I provide an approach by which to assess how the motivations we 




To the extent that party leaders are office-motivated, they seek to ensure the 
ministers they appoint are loyal to them; in particular those they allocate to the 
most important portfolios. The motivation to have loyal ministers has a 
disproportionately detrimental effect on women, who are less likely to have 
access to the high-trust networks which promote and engender these trusting 
relationships.  This effect is played out across European governments: ministers 
appointed to both high salience and ‘core’ portfolios are less likely to be female.  
For the ‘core’ portfolios, this effect is moderated by party ideology, as the gender 
gap in appointments is not present in left-wing parties. 
 
The effect of ideology in moderating the gendered nature of ministerial 
appointments is a consistent theme throughout this analysis. This suggests that 
a more gender-balanced talent pool in left-wing parties impacts the appointment 
of women to ministerial portfolios.  These party-level differences highlight the 
importance of looking beyond the representation of women in the government as 
a whole and considering trends in the characteristics of ministerial appointments 
at the individual level.  
 
This analysis suggests that party leaders’ perceptions of the competencies of 
female ministerial appointments do influence their portfolio allocation decisions. 
Women are significantly more likely to be appointed to ‘feminine’ portfolios than 
their male counterparts and are also less likely to be appointed to lead ‘neutral’ 
policy areas. The effect of these gender dynamics is moderated by party ideology, 
where women are over twice less likely to be allocated a ‘masculine’ portfolio in 
a right-wing party than a left-wing one.  This shows how important the party 
ideology of governing parties can be influencing the appointment of women 
ministers -  the effect of which is not necessarily so prevalent in other elected and 
appointed political offices.  
 
Winning votes matters to party leaders and this analysis of the appointment of 
women to the cabinet suggests that the attitudes of a party’s electorate play a 
role in who they appoint to their top posts. In political parties whose voters have 
more progressive gender attitudes, women are significantly more likely to be 
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allocated to masculine portfolios, even when controlling for party ideology. This 
significant effect indicates that the symbolic act of appointing women to the 
government can act as a means to communicate the party’s perceptions about 
gender to voters. Where voters are receptive to women’s presence in different 
policy areas, the political parties meet this expectation.  
 
Based on this analysis, which emphasises the importance of party-level factors, 
future research could turn to exploring how other party-level factors, such as party 
selection pools and intra-party groups and networks, impact on the appointment 
of women to public office. Building on this theoretical framework, as well as 
O’Brien et al.’s (2015) study of female party leaders and Escobar-Lemmon and 
Taylor-Robinson’s (2016) detailed investigation of the allocation of women to 
presidential cabinets, future research could consider how political parties and 
their leaders play a role in who is appointed to the government.  
 
The findings of this analysis also have important implications for those who seek 
to see more women around the cabinet table, and less gender differentiation in 
the allocation of portfolios. Firstly, voter attitudes about women’s role in society 
and the economy appear to have an impact on the gender composition of the 
cabinet. Therefore, working to change societal attitudes towards women leaders 
and politicians can influence who gets represented in the top jobs. Secondly, 
party ideology is a moderating factor in the process of government appointments 
which plays an important part in determining which portfolios women are 
allocated. This evidence suggests that in general, there is less gender 
differentiation in portfolio allocation in left-wing parties than right-wing parties. 
Thirdly, across the political spectrum, women’s competencies and interest in the 
more ‘masculine’ areas of government may be overlooked due to gendered 
conceptions of ‘who is good at that kind of thing’. By not appointing competent 
women who may be interested in ‘masculine’ policy areas, and men who have 
experience and interest in the ‘feminine’ areas of government, party leaders are 
not maximising the policy competence of their top appointments. Due to the 
importance of ministers for the government’s successful implementation of their 
policy program (Laver and Shepsle 1996), all party leaders should be interested 
in ways in which to maximise the experience of their government appointments. 
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Paper Two: Appendix 
 
Table 1: : Logit regression analysis, logit coefficients  (gender of minister appointed as dependent variable)  
 Baseline  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7  
    Core Portfolios Salience  Gendered Portfolios 
Core                               -1.016 *** -1.083***           
    (reference:non-core)   (-0.08) (-0.09)           
Core X Right-Left Score      -0.013*           
    (reference:non-core)     (0.00)           
Medium Salience Portfolio     
 
-0.236         
    (reference:low salience)     
 
(-0.2)         
High Salience Portfolio        -0.770***         
    (reference:low salience)       (-0.17)         
Neutral Portfolio     
 
   0.697***  0.744*** 0.793*** 0.392* 
    (reference:masculine)     
 
  (-0.09) (-0.10) (-0.12) (-0.2) 
Feminine Portfolio          1.572***  1.638*** 1.672*** 1.249*** 
    (reference:masculine)         (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.12) (-0.19) 




0.011     




(-0.01)     
Feminine Portfolio X Right-Left Score           0.015**      
    (reference:masculine)           (-0.01)     




  -0.007 -0.026**  
              (-0.01) (-0.01) 
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    0.024**  




    (-0.01) 
Feminine Portfolio X Gender attitudes               0.025**  
    (reference:masculine)               (-0.01) 
Right-left party ideology -0.011***  -0.010*** -0.008** -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.017*** -0.009** -0.009**  
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female Prime Minister 0.182 0.206 0.196 0.337 0.037 0.015 -0.017 -0.028 
    (reference:male PM) -0.13 (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.19) -0.14 -0.14 (-0.18) (-0.18) 
Start year of minister's appointment 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.01 0.039***   0.040*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
Constant                        -81.802*** -80.748*** -81.521*** -20.544  -80.638*** -81.395*** -55.091*** -52.803*** 
  -9.65 (-9.79) (-9.79) (-16.47) (-10.50) (-10.48)  (-16.09) (-16.00) 
lnsig2u Constant -0.872**  -0.826** -0.822** -1.148***  -0.606*  -0.603*   -0.726* -0.742*   
  -0.29 (-0.29) (-0.29) (-0.33) (-0.29)  (-0.29) (-0.34) (-0.34) 
N 6095 6095 6095 3058 5370 5370 2883 2883 
bic 5928.011 5772.48 5774.86 2835.154 5053.464 5061.889 2858.29 2878.868 






Table 2: Summary statistics of left-right score by party family (Volkens et al. 2016) 
 
 Party Family Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Ecologist 71 -15.37 10.32 -36.11 1.39 
Socialist or other 
left 
93 -13.40 25.57 -45.42 16.82 
Social democratic 2,044 -11.11 13.65 -45.46 35.29 
Liberal 850 3.75 12.84 -29.64 45.76 
Christian democrat 1,045 6.41 15.08 -26.76 40.42 
Conservative 1,352 3.76 15.55 -30.50 48.19 
Nationalist 167 7.31 13.61 -18.03 48.19 
Agrarian 273 -3.99 10.50 -21.09 35.90 
Ethnic-regional 90 -5.37 10.84 -29.53 14.52 
Special issue 35 -3.49 8.72 -20.70 9.65 




Impact of women’s representation in the legislature  
 
Data and Methods  
 
In this Appendix, I examine the effect of women's representation in the parliament 
on the allocation of portfolios to female ministers.  Data on women’s presence in 
parliament is from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2018) and details the proportion 
of seats held by women in the single or lower chamber of the national parliament. 
Data is available for 1990 and 1995 to 2015. While data is not available on the 
gender composition of the legislature at a party level, the representation of 
women in the legislature provides an insight into the ‘supply’ of women in the pool 
of candidates for ministerial positions.  
 
 The results presented here are based on the same models as in the full paper: 
logistic (logit) regression models with country fixed effects. The outcome variable 
is the gender of the ministerial appointment. Due to the limited availability of data 
on women's representation in parliament, the number of observations is 






The results in Table 3 indicate that the representation of women in parliament 
does indeed have an impact on the appointment of women ministers (in the 
subset of this dataset for which data is available). In all seven models, the factor 
of women’s representation in the legislature is statistically significant and has a 
positive effect on the likelihood of a ministerial appointment being female (holding 
all other variables constant).  
 
Figure 1 shows the predicted margins for Model 8, which demonstrates the 
predicted increase in the probability of appointments to both core and non-core 
portfolios being female when the representation of women in parliament 
increases. Where 10% of MPs are women, the model’s predicted probability of a 
core appointment being a woman is 0.07 and for non-core appointments it is 0.16. 
Where the legislature is 30% female, this increases to 0.15 for core appointments 
and 0.31 for non-core appointments.   
 
Figure 1: Predicted probability of ministers being female, core portfolios with 





In all models except Model 14, the substantive effects of this analysis are the 
same as in the full paper. This suggests that the findings presented in the main 
paper are robust – ministerial appointees are more likely to be women if they are 
appointed to feminine, neutral or non-core portfolios. Appointees are also more 
likely to be female if they are appointed by a left-wing government or by a party 
whose voters have more progressive gender attitudes. Unlike the analysis in the 
full paper, the interaction between the neutral portfolio and gender attitudes does 
not achieve statistical significance (Model 14).  
 
In all models which include the representation of women in the legislature, the 
year the government is appointed is not significantly significant (unlike in the full 
paper). This suggests that women's representation in the legislature is a more 
effective predictor of women's appointment to the government than the year the 
government is appointed. The correlation between the year of appointment and 
the percentage of women in parliament is only 0.309. However, this finding may 
be influenced by this analysis only being conducted on a subset of the full data 
(for the year 1990, and 1995 to 2015). This, therefore, excludes most data from 
1980 to 1995 from the full analysis.  
 
This analysis suggests that the representation of women in the legislature does 
have an impact on the gendered allocation of ministerial portfolios. Future 
analyses could build on this finding to undertake an analysis of the impact of the 




Volkens, A. et al., 2016. The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project 
(MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2016a, Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin 






Table 3: : Logit regression analysis, odds ratios (gender of minister appointed as dependent variable) Logit coefficients 
  Baseline  Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14  
    Core Portfolios Salience  Gendered Portfolios 




    
    (reference:non-core)   (-0.03) (-0.03)           






    






    
Medium Salience Portfolio       0.839         
    (reference:low salience)       (-0.16)         
High Salience Portfolio    
 
  0.472***   
 
    
    (reference:low salience)   
 
  (-0.08)   
 
    
Neutral Portfolio         1.837*** 1.948*** 2.438*** 1.68 
    (reference:masculine)         (-0.18) (-0.20) (-0.44) (-0.60) 




4.441*** 4.896*** 5.980*** 2.640**  




(-0.41) (-0.48) (-1.07) (-0.92) 
Neutral Portfolio X Right-Left Score           1.012     
    (reference:masculine)           (-0.01)     






  1.020***     




  (-0.01)     
Voter Gender Attitudes             0.988 0.965*   
                (-0.01) (-0.01) 






  1.021 






  (-0.02) 
Feminine Portfolio X Gender 
attitudes 
              1.042**  
    (reference:masculine)               (-0.02) 
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Women in Parliament 1.043*** 1.044*** 1.044*** 1.047*** 1.045*** 1.045*** 1.039*** 1.038*** 
  (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
Right-left party ideology 0.989*** 0.989*** 0.992** 0.987*** 0.992** 0.981*** 0.990* 0.990*   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female Prime Minister 1.158 1.167 1.156 1.26 1.011 0.978 1.21 1.184 
    (reference:male PM) (-0.16) (-0.16) (-0.16) (-0.24) (-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.28) (-0.27) 
Coalition   1.062 1.035 1.034 0.786 0.967 0.967 0.755 0.726 
    (reference:single-party government) -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.13 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 
Start year of minister's appointment 1.008 1.007 1.008 0.977* 1.006 1.007 0.998 1.001 
  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
N   4945 4945 4945 2496 4371 4371 1157 1157 
bic   5039.250 4918.101 4921.355 2419.668 4336.716 4341.898 1261.378 1268.241 














There is significant variation in fathers’ entitlements to parental leave across 
Europe. While extensive research into parental leave has concluded that the 
duration and gender balance of leave can impact a broad range of outcomes, the 
government policy-making which shapes leave entitlements has been 
overlooked. When governments decide to reform leave for fathers, under which 
circumstances do they introduce or extend a more gender-balanced ‘dual-
earner/dual-carer’ model of family policy? In this paper, I set out a theory of 
government policy making on leave for fathers which informs a fuzzy-set 
qualitative comparative analysis of all instances of policy reform of fathers’ leave 
in the 20 OECD European countries since 1990. I find women’s active 
engagement in paid work to be a necessary condition for a family policy reform 
to follow the ‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ model. I find two pathways which are 
sufficient for a reform of fathers’ leave to follow the more gender-balanced model: 
1) a female, left-wing cabinet minister in a context of high female labour force 
participation and a left-dominated parliament; and 2) a male, right-wing minister 
in a context of positive public attitudes about women’s role in the workplace and 





All governments face the question of how to design policies for new parents, 
including the duration, flexibility and balance of leave between mothers and 
fathers12 While there is extensive research on the implications of parental leave 
for fathers on various policy outcomes, there has not been cross-national analysis 
of the conditions under which governments decide to introduce leave policies 
which promote balance between parents in work and home life. In this paper, I 
examine the conditions under which governments introduce and extend models 
of parental leave which balance responsibilities between parents.  
 
Depending on the European country they live in, new fathers may be entitled to 
over a years’ leave (Sweden, Spain and France) or no statutory entitlement 
whatsoever (Slovakia and Switzerland). The design of family policy can have a 
very tangible impact on the care of babies and young children, and has even 
been dubbed a ‘state intervention in the battle of the sexes’ which, with an 
appropriately stipulated provision, can lead to a shift in household divisions of 
labour for new parents (Kotsadam & Finseraas 2011). There is also evidence to 
suggest that men taking paternity leave at the start of their children’s lives can 
encourage fathers to develop the parenting skills and sense of responsibility that 
then enables them to be active co-parents rather than helpers to their female 
partners (Rehel 2013). Some argue that statuary leave for fathers ‘raises the 
possibility of a new polarisation for infants: being born into either a parental-leave-
rich or -poor household and, indeed, country’ (O’Brien 2009, 190). How 
governments chose to structure family policy, therefore, can have important 
impacts on families.   
 
In this paper, I consider all reforms of leave for fathers, and theorise the 
conditions under which these reforms take the most progressive forms, which are 
targeted at promoting balance in caring responsibilities between parents.  I ask: 
When governments decide to reform leave for fathers, under which 
circumstances do they introduce or extend a more gender-balanced ‘dual-
 
12 This analysis considers family policy through the lenses of motherhood and fatherhood given 
that these are the prevailing models of approaches to family policy. However, many of the policies 
available for fathers are also available for the ‘other parent’ in same-sex relationships.  
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earner/dual-carer’ model of family policy? Based on data on all reforms of all 
cases of leave for fathers across 20 European OECD countries since 1990, I use 
a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), guided by theory, to 
identify causally-relevant conditions for instances of progressive reforms of 
father-specific leave. These cases are also explored in detail throughout the 
analysis.  
 
Parental leave policies 
Parental leave policy packages vary dramatically over time and across otherwise 
similar countries. In this section, I provide some background on the evolution of 
family policy reforms. A wide range of complicated and multidimensional family 
policy options are available, including the division of leave between parents, 
financing periods of leave, eligibility, and flexibility (Ray et al. 2010).  
 
A brief history of parental leave policies 
 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many countries introduced 
maternity leave policies to recognise the importance of working women taking 
time to recover from childbirth and to care for young children (Kelly & Dobbin 
1999). Maternity leave became a foundational part of the welfare state, with 
around four weeks of low-paid protected leave becoming the norm. These 
provisions were largely established to ‘protect’ the mother and child, in the 
interests of their physical wellbeing.  
 
Following this ‘foundational phase’, many governments sought to build on 
existing maternity leave policies entitlements (Daly & Ferragina 2017). From the 
1960s to the 1980s, maternity leave policies were redesigned to extend the 
duration and payments for mothers.  
 
From the 1980s onwards, governments took new approaches to providing a 
statutory basis for care for children in the first weeks of their lives. Many of these 
policy reforms were motivated by calls for increased gender equality, especially 
in terms of providing choice for women in their approach to managing child 
rearing and work (Daly & Ferragina 2017). Between 1980 and 2010 across the 
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OECD countries, the average duration of paid parental leave increased from 18 
to 54.2 weeks, and the average salary replacement rate almost trebled (from 
11.3% to 33.2% of the average production worker’s wage) (Daly & Ferragina 
2017, p.9).  
 
Leave for fathers 
 
To all intents and purposes, paid father-specific leave did not exist in OECD 
countries in 1970, with only three countries (Spain, Luxembourg and Belgium) 
providing any kind of paid entitlement for fathers (for one, two and three days 
respectively) (OECD 2017b).  In the 1990s, many countries began to allocate 
‘paternity leave’ to fathers - one or two days on the birth of the child. Some then 
made those paternity days compulsory, and some extended this protected leave 
of absence to one or two weeks.  
 
However, governments then faced the challenge that these policies weren’t 
necessarily meeting their objective of more equalised relations between new 
fathers and mothers. Enabling new fathers to have short periods of paternity 
leave was not effectively promoting the objective of gender balance in care and 
work between parents. Therefore, some governments tried to address this 
challenge by promoting a ‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ model of leave.  
 
The ‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ model of parenthood seeks to resolve the underlying 
tension between the importance of women's access to paid work in the labour 
market, and recognising the importance of caregiving in the home (Crompton, 
1999; Gornick & Meyers, 2005; Gornick & Meyers, 2008; Pfau-Effinger, 2005; 
Ray et al., 2010). Following early pioneers of this model of shared parental leave, 
such as Germany and Sweden, others sought to make leave more flexible for 
mothers and fathers and introduced shared periods of paid leave. For example, 
under the German ‘Elternziet’, mothers and fathers can share the parental 
allowance, receiving around two-thirds of their salary for a maximum of 14 
months. Each parent can draw a minimum of two and a maximum of twelve 
months' parental allowance. Some systems also guarantee fathers a period of 
leave within the overall leave allocation on a ‘use it or lose it’ basis (Daly & 
Ferragina 2017, p.9). These father-targeted schemes of shared parental leave 
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increase their usage (O’Brien 2009). This paper investigates the introduction and 
extension of this ‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ model.  
 
Theory: Family policy reform  
When governments decide to reform leave for fathers, under which 
circumstances do they opt for a ‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ model of family policy? 
In this paper, I explore how the conditions under which governments make 
decisions about parental leave policies shape what form those policies take. To 
capture the complexities of policy change and policy-making processes, I develop 
a combinatorial model of policy making. Rather than a deterministic consideration 
of which factors shape policy outcomes (i.e. X causes Y), this approach sets out 
how multiple factors interact in shaping the policy outcome (i.e. in most cases 
where X, A and B are all present, Y is also present). Throughout, I use the fsQCA 
terminology of necessity and sufficiency. Necessary conditions are those where 
the condition must be in place for the outcome to be observed. Sufficient 
conditions (or combinations of conditions) are adequate to draw the conclusion 
that the outcome is true, although there may be cases in which the outcome 
occurs under other conditions.  
 
This theoretical framework is based on three stages, I theorise that all three of 
these stages should be met for a reform of leave for fathers to follow the ‘dual-
earner/dual-carer’ model. The first stage is a progressive social context, which is 
important for the ‘demand’ for more gender egalitarian parental leave policy. I 
argue that this stage will be necessary for a reform to follow the ‘dual-earner/dual-
carer’ model. The second stage of this theoretical model is for political actors to 
be in place to respond to this demand for reform. As cabinet ministers act as 
important gatekeepers for policy reform, I propose that either a female or left-
wing minister will be in the relevant portfolio for a reform of leave to follow the 
‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ model. The third stage is that these policy initiatives must 
pass the ‘hurdles’ of the legislature and economic context, which shape policy 
outcomes. An overview of these theoretical expectations is provided in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Theoretical expectations 
 
 
Social context: women's labour force participation and gender attitudes  
 
Family policy is a social issue - it shapes the structure of families, the balance of 
responsibilities between parents, and the relationship between parents and 
children. Government policy making on family leave entitlements is, therefore, 
driven by the social context in which decision making takes place. I suggest that 
governments will seek to introduce more gender-balanced leave reforms 
following the ‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ model where women are actively engaged 
in the workforce and voters hold more positive attitudes towards women in work. 
I argue that both of these conditions are necessary for a reform of leave for 
fathers to follow the gender-balanced model. 
 
Women's labour force participation 
 
Women’s role in the workplace has changed dramatically over the last 30 years, 
with more women engaging in paid work in a more diverse range of roles and 
sectors (Crompton 2007). This has had a significant impact on the role of women 
in work, and therefore their role as carer in the home. As of 2016, more men 
participated in paid work than women in all European OECD countries. The most 
gender-equal context was Iceland, where the ratio of female to male engagement 
in the labour market was 91%, meaning that 91 women out of 100 men were in 
paid work. Norway was the second most-equal context with a ratio of 89%. The 
least equal country was Italy, where 68 women per 100 men were economically 
active, and in Greece this was 73% (Ortiz-Ospina & Tzvetkova 2017). In all 
European OCED countries, there was a rapid increase in women’s engagement 
in paid work between 1970 and 2000, but since the turn of the century there has 
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been a plateau in some countries. This has been attributed to a broad reduction 
in the number of hours per worker, which has paralleled the increased supply of 
women in the labour force (Fortin 2015; Ortiz-Ospina & Tzvetkova 2017).   
 
All workers have limited time resources, and are required to balance the 
competing demands of paid and unpaid work. When families and children are 
involved, this means balancing childcare at home with paid work, so parents’ 
involvement in paid work inevitably impacts on their involvement in work in the 
household. In 2015, the European Working Condition Survey identified a gender 
gap of over 14 hours per week spent on unpaid household work in Cyprus, 
Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands and Slovenia, amongst others. In comparison, 
the gap in Denmark, Finland and Sweden was under eight hours (Eurofound 
2015). These gendered differences in time spent in the home are reflective of 
gendered differences of women’s engagement in the workforces.  
 
In contexts where more women are involved in the labour force, I suggest that 
there will be increased demand for a greater balance of responsibilities between 
mothers and fathers in the care of young children. Where women are actively 
engaging in paid work, there will be demand for government to enact policies 
which enable women to return to work after the birth of their children, and for 
fathers to also participate in child rearing.   
 
One of the aims of ‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ family policies are to promote 
mothers’ return to the workforce, so they can lead to increases in women’s labour 
force participation (Lefebvre & Merrigan 2008). So, to an extent, the explanatory 
factor of women's workforce engagement may be endogenous to the outcome of 
dual-earner/dual-carer leave for fathers. However, trends in women’s 
engagement in paid work are also driven by a range of factors including maternal 
health, the number of children per family, the cost and availability of childcare, 
labour-saving consumer durables (washing machines, vacuum cleaners, etc.), 
and other social and cultural factors (Ortiz-Ospina & Tzvetkova 2017). Therefore, 
female labour force participation remains an effective measure of the broad 
cultural context in relation to gender equality.  
 
Women's role in the workforce also provides a more relevant indication of socio-
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economic context than traditional welfare regime typologies, on which studies of 
welfare policies have traditionally relied. These typologies are based on Esping-
Andersen's (1990) seminal work categorising welfare states as liberal, 
conservative/corporatist, or social democratic. They were identified to categorise 
how socio-economic dynamics shape approaches to welfarism. Feminist 
scholars of welfare states have, however, criticised this approach for neglecting 
to consider women’s access to paid work (Orloff 1993). Feminist scholars have 
also raised related concerns that scholars of the welfare state have failed to 
recognise the connection of care as work, or view the welfare state from the 




Public attitudes towards women’s role in the workplace also shape the social 
context for the introduction of family leave reforms. Parties and governments are 
vote-seeking (Müller & Strøm 1999), I therefore expect that progressive gender 
attitudes towards women in work will be a necessary condition for the introduction 
of the progressive ‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ model of family policy.   
 
Some studies suggest that public, societal attitudes toward women's role in the 
home and the workplace are deeply historical. People from countries which 
historically relied on men’s physical strength for plough-based agriculture are 
found to hold less equal beliefs about gender roles (Alesina et al. 2013).  Dyble 
et al. (2015) suggest that levels of sex egalitarianism during human evolutionary 
history shape views about social organisation, and roles of cohabiting men and 
women in particular. In more recent history, views towards women’s role in the 
workplace have been shaped by religiosity, education and politics (Price 2015).  
 
Where voters hold gender-progressive attitudes towards women’s role in the 
workforce, governments may seek to respond by designing welfare reforms in a 
way which promotes mothers’ ability to return to the workforce and more equally 
distribute caring responsibilities between parents. This does not mean that voters 
will lobby for progressive family policy in particular, but rather that governments 
will be inclined to make progressive leave reforms where there is a general 
cultural context of women’s engagement in the workforce, and positive gender 
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attitudes towards women in work.  
 
Government actors: female and left-wing cabinet ministers 
 
While social attitudes and women’s engagement in paid employment shapes the 
demand for progressive family policy, government is responsible for recognising 
this demand and deciding how to respond to it. Policy change is often driven by 
key political actors taking steps to move public policy on an issue. ‘Punctuated 
equilibrium’ models of policy change (Kay 2006) similar to ‘stick-slip’ models of 
public budgets (Jones et al. 2009), suggest that the policy-making process is 
characterised by periods of no change interrupted by bursts of rapid 
transformation. These periods of policy change are initiated by political actors 
who advocate for policy reform – and can include party leaders, parliamentary 
committees, Parliamentarians, civil society groups, and other policy 
entrepreneurs (Mintrom 1997; Béland & Cox 2016).  
 
Cabinet ministers are uniquely placed to act as gatekeepers for policy reform, as 
they have responsibility for overseeing all policy making within their portfolio’s 
jurisdiction. ‘Policy is ultimately made by governments, even if the ideas come 
from outside government or through the interaction of government and 
nongovernmental actors’ (Birkland 2016, p.8).  Ministers do not have complete 
autonomy due to collective responsibility (Rose 1971), coalition agreements 
(Moury 2011), and a number of veto players cabinet decision making including 
the Prime Minister (Tsebelis 2002). However, government ministers have 
responsibility for oversight of all policy made within their department’s remit, and 
therefore play an important role in shaping the policy agenda. There is evidence 
of the partisanship and background of ministers shaping spending patterns 
(Giannetti & Laver 2005) and social welfare policy (Alexiadou 2015; Alexiadou 
2016).  
 
For these reasons, I propose that the combination of conditions for a progressive 
reform of fathers’ leave will include the presence of either a leftist or female 





Leftist parties have stronger connections to feminism and feminist movements 
both inside and outside of Parliament than their right-wing counterparts 
(Dahlerup, 2006; Freidenvall, 2013; Krook, 2007). This can play an important role 
in setting policy agendas and setting agendas of policy reform (Allen & Childs 
2018). At the individual level, attitudes towards welfare state responsibilities and 
gender inequality more broadly are seen to influence support for statutory paid 
maternity leave (Staerklé et al. 2003). Therefore, left-wing ministers who favour 
a strong welfare state and advocate for a more active role for the state in 
addressing gender inequalities will also be more likely to introduce progressive 
leave policies.  
 
This is evidenced by a long history of left-wing parties initiating social policy 
reforms to equalise gender relations in the home. Alliances between left-wing and 
liberal political parties have been identified in a number of case studies as critical 
factors shaping reforms of family policy and childcare infrastructure (Daguerre & 
Taylor-Gooby 2003; Kuebler 2007). Furthermore, in a seminal study of party 
competition, Kitschelt (1994) found that in order to appeal to an electorate which 
has shifted away from more authoritarian models of socialism, leftist parties have 
sought to pivot towards more libertarian and capitalist policy positions. In line with 
this, and given the importance of progressive policy reforms for women’s role in 
work, signalling a commitment to gender equality in the workplace may play a 




Family policy is also identified as a ‘feminine’ policy area, as it pertains the to the 
private sphere of home and the family (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 
2005; Krook & O’Brien, 2012, p. 846). Parenthood affects women’s employment 
more than men’s (Craig & Mullan 2010). The ‘self-interest theory’ of welfare 
attitudes suggests that there is a direct relationship between individuals’ position 
in social structures and their attitudes to welfare reform, and therefore that 
women’s role in society shapes their attitudes to parental leave policy (Valarino 
et al. 2018). Analyses of policy preferences suggest that women have different 
social policy preferences to men (Shapiro & Mahajan 1986; Caughell 2016). For 
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example, in US’ governors’ speeches, female governors devote more attention 
to social welfare policy than their male colleagues (Heidbreder & Scheurer 2013). 
Also in the US, female legislators express significantly more liberal welfare policy 
preferences than men (Poggione 2004).  
 
Female political actors are found to be more supportive of progressive parental 
leave policies than their male counterparts. Studies of attitudes to parental leave 
reforms find that women are significantly more supportive than men of parental 
leave in the United States (Grover 1991), and of father-friendly leave in the United 
Kingdom and the United States (Hyde et al. 1993; Warren et al. 2008). Atchison 
and Down (2009) and Atchison (2015) find that across 18 European countries 
from 1980 to 2003, the percentage of women in the cabinet has a positive effect 
on a ‘female friendly’ labour environment (Atchison & Down 2009; Atchison 
2015).  
 
Passing the hurdles: parliament and economic context  
 
In the third stage of this model, I identify the ‘hurdles’ that reform of family policy 
will need to pass to become government policy. These are the ideological 
composition of Parliament and the economic context. I theorise that both of these 
conditions will form part of a sufficiency pathway for reform of leave for fathers to 




While government has the advantage of setting the agenda for policy making, 
parliaments can also play an important role in shaping legislation and responses 
to the executive’s policy agendas (Martin & Vanberg, 2011). Government makes 
policy in anticipation of parliament’s response, parliament can amend legislation 
(Martin & Vanberg, 2004, 2005), and even act as a veto to the government’s 
agendas. Therefore, government policy making and the policy agendas of 
ministers are shaped by the composition of the legislature.  
 
There are, of course, varying numbers of veto players within parliamentary 
institutions. Bicameral parliaments have more institutional vetoes than 
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unicameral parliaments, and in some presidential and semi-presidential systems 
presidents must also give assent to legislation (Tsebelis 2002; Tsebelis 2000; 
Zubek 2011). Parties, however, provide an important means by which legislators 
coordinate their policy preferences. Therefore, the partisan composition of 
parliament provides a useful indicator of legislators’ willingness to pass legislation 
on some policy issues.  
 
As elaborated above, left-wing political actors address issues of welfare and 
family policy differently to their right-wing counterparts. They have an ideological 
commitment to egalitarianism, closer ties to feminist organisations and 
institutions, and more positive attitudes towards welfare interventions more 
broadly. The dominance of left-wing parties in legislatures has shaped welfare 
policy making (for a full discussion see: Schmidt 1996). Left-dominated 
parliaments can generate the construction of an imperative for welfare reform 
(Cox 2001), and shape approaches to welfare state retrenchment (Starke 2006).  
 
Therefore, I expect that a left-dominated parliament will form part of the 
sufficiency pathway for a reform of father’s leave to follow the progressive model. 
It is important to note that this explanatory factor is not coterminous with the 
labour/employment minister being left-wing, as many European governments are 
coalitions, and often leftist parties can be in government with a right-dominated 




The economic context shapes all policy decisions which incur a cost to the public 
(Pollitt 2013). The range and complexity of options available to governments in 
family policy mean that proposals can vary widely in their costs to the public 
purse. Some policy options require the private sector to shoulder the cost of 
parental leave, while others require more state resources. The average public 
expenditure on maternity, paternity and parental leave across the European 
OECD countries between 1980 and 2013 was 0.32% of GDP, with a standard 
deviation of 0.26 percentage points (OECD 2017b). This variation is shown where 
Finland’s expenditure was over 1% of GDP between 1991 and 1994, before 
settling between 0.6 and 0.7% of GDP between 1997 and 2013 (OECD 2017b). 
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Whereas public expenditure on maternity, paternity and parental leave was less 
than 0.1% of GDP in Switzerland between 1980 and 2004.  
 
Given considerations of the cost to the public, governments will need to be aware 
of the economic context in which they are making family policy, as this can shape 
government spending. I suggest, therefore, that governments in a context of 
economic growth (rather than recession) are more likely to enact more gender-
balanced, progressive family policy reform.  Due to the influence of budgetary 
considerations, the treasury department and finance minister can also have a 
veto over policy making (Bäck et al. 2015; Hallerberg & von Hagen 1999). 
Therefore, the autonomy of cabinet ministers in their policy jurisdiction is greater 
for policies that are not costly (Becher 2010). However, finance ministers’ control 
of the purse strings can influence which policy options become law. Finance 
ministers will, however, also be influenced by the economic context in which 
family policy reforms take place. Therefore, the context of economic growth or 
recession is a useful proxy for this treasury veto.  
 
Akin to the role of leftist parliaments in the process of policy making, overcoming 
the hurdle of the economic context is expected to be part of a sufficiency pathway 




Policy making is a complex process, and is dependent on a range of factors and 
contingencies. In this combinatorial theory, I simplify these processes into three 
stages. I theorise that meeting the combination of conditions for all three stages 
will be sufficient for the implementation of the more gender egalitarian model of 
father-specific leave. However, I theorise that the first stage – the social context 
of women’s engagement in the workforce and gender attitudes – will be 
necessary (but not sufficient) for governments to choose to implement the more 
progressive model of leave for fathers. The second stage of this theory is that 
government actors will need to be proactive in leading a progressive reform; and 
therefore, that a left-wing or female minister will be responsible for labour policy 
where progressive reforms are implemented. Thirdly, the ‘hurdles’ of the 
economic context and leftist Parliament will also need to be passed. I expect that 
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meeting the combination of these conditions for the three stages will form the 
sufficiency pathway for governments who reform leave to choose a more 
progressive model for fathers.  
 
Data and Methods 
Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) 
 
There are significant methodological difficulties with analysing policy change, 
especially in a comparative context. Analyses often view policy change 
homeostatically, and therefore neglect the influence of historical patterns and 
exogenous shocks (Howlett & Cashore 2009). Reforms are often non-linear in 
nature (Capano 2009), and attempts to measure multi-dimensionality can be 
complex. There are also a number of veto players in policy making, which can 
vary within and between countries (Tsebelis 2000; Tsebelis 2002).  
 
FsQCA can address some of these issues when there are a medium number of 
cases by drawing on Boolean algebra and set theory to make comparisons 
between cases and identify causally-relevant conditions for the presence or 
absence of an outcome of interest (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009; Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012). Due to the method’s scope for untangling causal complexity, 
fsQCA is a useful tool in the analysis of a range of public policy outcomes. FsQCA 
has been used to analyse policy reform of child protection measures (Svevo-
Cianci et al. 2010), active labour market policies (Vis 2011), welfare 
recommodification (Shahidi 2015), the independence of fiscal councils (Belling 
2018), and the absorption of EU funds (Hagemann 2019). For an extensive 
systematic review of the use of the method in public policy analysis, see Rihoux 
et al. (2011). 
 
There has been some debate within the discipline on the utility of fsQCA for 
empirical analysis, including criticisms of the methods’ assumptions in relation to 
missing variables and association as causation (Seawright 2005) and the 
epistemological basis of the assumptions of fsQCA (Lucas & Szatrowski 2014). 
However, many of these concerns can be overcome through ensuring that the 
analysis returns to consider the specific cases under consideration; transparency 
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about the selection of cases and calibration of sets; and the publication of the raw 
data, truth tables and simplifying assumptions for the analysis (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2010). The results of fsQCA should not be interpreted over-
deterministically, but instead can suggest how combinations of relevant 
conditions are associated with an outcome. Further analyses, both qualitative and 
quantitative, can help explore the associations identified in this research.   
 
The procedure of fsQCA is based on each case being represented 
configurationally as a combination of causally relevant conditions, where the 
presence or absence of these conditions is linked to the presence or absence of 
the outcome. The method assumes that the combination of conditions, rather 
than individual factors, shape outcomes (causal complexity), and that multiple 
paths or solutions may lead to the same outcome (equifinality). Set relations are 
also assumed to be asymmetric, in that the factors shaping the outcome are not 
the same as those which shape the negation of the outcome (Schneider & Eggert, 
2014).  
 
In the fsQCA method, cases are systematically compared to identify patterns in 
the combination of factors which contribute to the outcome. Through logical 
comparisons and simplifications based on Boolean algebra, complex data 
structures undergo a process of logical minimisation to identify the necessary and 
sufficient conditions and combinations of conditions for the presence or absence 
of an outcome of interest (for further information on the fsQCA method see: 
Ragin, 2008a). In this analysis, I use a fuzzy-set approach to QCA. Crisp-set QCA 
uses Boolean sets, so conditions must be dichotomised. Fuzzy sets extend crisp 
sets by permitting membership scores in the interval between 0 and 1. 
Continuous fuzzy set scores are assigned to cases to identify the extent to which 
the case is a member of a set. This analysis was performed using the Fuzzy-
Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis 3.0 software (Ragin & Davey, 2016).  
 
In fsQCA, the evaluation of results is based on two parameters of fit. Consistency 
indicates the degree to which the solution or result is sufficient for producing the 
outcome. Coverage gives an indication of the degree to which cases correspond 
to the (combination of) conditions. 
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Outcome: reform of father-specific parental leave 
 
In this analysis, I consider all instances of an increase in the leave entitlement for 
fathers between January 1990 and April 2016 in 20 European OECD countries.13 
The countries included in this analysis are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom.  
 
The scope of this analysis is every case of the introduction or expansion of leave 
for fathers. The online appendix to this paper provides a summary detail of all of 
these reforms. I have identified instances of reform using longitudinal data on 
parental leave policies from the OECD Family Policy Database (OECD 2017b), 
details of each introduction or extension of fathers’ leave entitlements are 
provided in the Annex to that dataset (OECD 2016). In this time period, there are 
49 instances of expansions to the duration of leave for fathers.  There are two 
European OECD countries – Slovakia and Switzerland – which have no father-
specific parental leave entitlement, and are therefore do not appear in this 
analysis.  
 
The outcome in this analysis is whether the extension of leave for fathers is the 
introduction or expansion of father-specific parental leave (FS). This is defined 
as ‘any weeks of employment-protected parental or home care leave that can be 
used only by the father or “other parent”’ (OECD 2017a, p.2). This includes both 
a) individual non-transferable entitlements for the father, and b) any sharable 
leave which is effectively reserved because they must be taken to qualify for any 
bonus weeks.  
 
Father-specific parental leave is a more gender-balanced approach to fathers’ 
leave than traditional paternity leave, which is defined as leave of absence for 
 
13 Due to data availability, the scope of this analysis is for all reforms since 1990. The end date of 
April 2016 is set by the OECD’s data collection. Prior to 1990, eight countries had some form of 
leave for fathers: Belgium (3.5 days), Denmark (two weeks), France (156 weeks), Greece (13 
weeks), Luxembourg (four days), Norway (54 weeks), Spain (52.4 weeks), and Sweden (78 
weeks).  
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employed fathers at or in the first few months after childbirth (OECD 2017a, p.1).  
Father-specific parental leave sets up incentives for mothers and fathers to 
balance their leave and childrearing responsibilities more equitably. The 
traditional approach of paternity leave is based on encouraging fathers to take 
(often unpaid) leave with mothers in the first few days of their child’s life, which is 
not found to have the long-lasting positive effects of parents sharing leave more 
equitably. Table 1 provides an overview of father-specific entitlements in the 
European OECD countries between 1980 and 2015 (OECD 2017b).   
 
Table 1: Father-specific leave entitlements in weeks, 1980 – 2015 (OECD 2017b) 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Austria 0 0 0 0 26 26 8.6 8.6 
Belgium 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 13.6 15 15 19.3 
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 156 156 
Denmark 0 2 2 15 17 34 34 34 
Finland 0 0 0 3 3 7 7 9 
France 0 104 156 156 156 156 156 156 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.6 8.6 
Greece 0 13 13 15.1 15.6 15.6 15.6 17.7 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Iceland 0 0 0 0 2 26 26 30.3 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 14 14 14 18 
Italy 0 0 0 0 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.9 
Luxembourg 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 26.4 26.4 26.4 26.4 
Netherlands 0 0 0 13 13 13.4 26.4 26.4 
Norway 54 54 54 58 58 59 64 64 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6.33 
Portugal 0 0 0 0.4 17 17 21.3 21.3 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 0.4 0.4 52.4 52.4 52.4 52.4 54.1 54.1 
Sweden 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 13 15 15 20 
 
The OECD Family Policy Database identifies whether extensions in weeks of 
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leave available to fathers take the form of father-specific parental leave or more 
traditional paternity leave (OECD 2017a). Throughout, I supplement the 




The social context of the policy change is operationalised through two conditions. 
Women’s engagement in the workplace (WL) is measured through the 
International Labour Organisation’s ILOSTAT database, which details women’s 
labour force participation (International Labour Organization 2018). The measure 
is the percentage of women over the age of 15 who engage in paid work.  
 
I use survey data to examine the effects of gender attitudes (GA). Using the 
combined World Values Survey and European Values Study longitudinal dataset, 
I calculated an annual measure of the weighted percentage of respondents within 
each country who agreed to the statement ‘c001- When jobs are scarce, men 
have more right to a job than women’ (European Values Study 2015; World 
Values Survey Association 2015). This measure provides an indication of the 
acceptance or hostility of public attitudes to women's engagement in the 
workplace. In this measure, a score of 0.99 means that 1% of respondents in that 
country in that survey wave responded that men should have more of a right to a 
job than women.  
I also compile data on government actors which identifies the gender (WM) and 
partisanship (LM) of the minister responsible for the employment/labour portfolio. 
Data on which party holds the labour/employment ministry is based on the 
Williams & Seki (2016) Governments and Ministers dataset. Identifying the party 
with control of the employment/labour portfolio, I matched this data with the 
Comparative Manifestos Project’s (Lehmann et al. 2018) left-right score to 
calculate the left-right score of the minister responsible for the employment/labour 
portfolio. In the Comparative Manifestos Project, the time-variant ‘rile’ indicator 
ranges from –100 (the whole manifesto is devoted to ‘left’ categories) to +100 
(the whole manifesto is devoted to ‘right’ categories)’ (Mölder 2013, p.3). The 
gender of the minister appointed to the social affairs/labour government portfolio 
has been calculated based on the Williams & Seki (2016) Governments and 
Ministers dataset. I also undertake an analysis using the party family 
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categorisations (PF) from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Lehmann et al. 
2018).  
To operationalise ‘hurdles’ to reform, data on the complexion of parliament (LP) 
is drawn from the Williams & Seki (2016) Governments and Ministers dataset. 
Years in which a country’s government and parliament have a left-centre 
complexion (share of seats of left and centre parties in government and 
supporting parties in parliament between 33.3 and 66.6% each) and left-wing 
dominance (share of seats in government and supporting parties in parliament 
larger than 66.6%) are coded as a one (Seki & Williams 2016).  The broad 
economic context (EC) is measured through GDP  per capita (annual %) growth, 
this data is from the World Bank§ (World Bank 2018). In the Appendix, I also 
present an analysis including the factor of the representation of women in 
parliament (WP). Data on the proportion of seats held by women in the single or 
lower chamber of the national parliament is from the Inter-Parliamentary Union 
(2018).  
The logarithmic calibration of the fuzzy-set thresholds for this analysis is set out 
in Table 2. Fuzzy sets are calibrated based on the three theoretically-informed 
anchor points of full membership (fuzzy score = 0.95), full non-membership (fuzzy 
score = 0.05), and the cross-over point (fuzzy score = 0.5) (Ragin, 2008b).  
 
For example, the calibration of the female labour force participation rate (WL) is 
based on conditions set out by non-governmental organisations as targets for 
women's engagement in paid work (OECD 2015). The threshold for full 
membership is 50% of women over aged 15 engaged in paid work, which is seen 
as an international standard for women's engagement in the labour force. The 
threshold for full non-membership is 30%, which is significantly behind 
international targets. Further details about the calibration of conditions is 
available in the appendix.  
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Table 2: Variable calibration and data sources 
Variable Description Calibration Data Source 











      
 
    
Father-specific parental 
leave (FS)  
Any weeks of employment-protected parental or 
home care leave that can be used only by the 
father (or ‘other parent’) 
0 - 1 OECD Family Database  
            
Female labour force 
participation rate (WL) 
Labour force participation rate, female (% of 
female population ages 15+) (modelled ILO 
estimate) 
30 40 50 International Labour 
Organization, ILOSTAT 
database 
Economic context  (EC)   GDP per capita growth (annual %) 0 1 3 International Labour 
Organization, ILOSTAT 
database 
Gender attitudes (GA) 1 - (Weighted score of respondents who agree 
with the statement that 'when jobs are scarce, 
men should have more right to a job than 
women'.)  
0.7 0.8 0.9 European Values Study and 








minister (LM)  
CMP rile score of party of social spending/labour 
minister  
5 0 -5 Seki-Williams Government 
Data, Comparative Manifestos 
Project 
Left-wing complexion of 
government and 
parliament (LP) 
Left-center complexion or left-wing dominance in 
Parliament and Government 




Throughout this analysis, I consider the core research question of this paper: when 
governments decide to reform leave for fathers, under which circumstances do they 
introduce or extend a ‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ model of family policy? I present both 
the results of the fsQCA and detail of the cases of policy reform. An overview of 
fsQCA notation is provided in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Notation  
Boolean notation and operators  
 
• Upper case letters e.g. [WM] represent the 1 value for a given condition.  
• Lower case letters e.g. [wm] represent the 0 value for a given condition.  
• Logical ‘AND’ is represented by the [•] symbol.  
• Logical ‘OR’ is represented by the [+] symbol.  
     
 
The analysis of necessary conditions is concerned with determining whether any 
condition (or combination of conditions) is necessary for an outcome to occur. This 
means that the condition must be in place for the outcome to be observed. Sufficient 
conditions (or combinations of conditions) are adequate to draw the conclusion that 
the outcome is true, although there may be cases in which the outcome occurs under 




Women’s engagement in the labour force  
 
Women’s engagement in the labour force (WL) is the only condition which meets the 
thresholds of necessity (consistency 0.9 and coverage 0.6). As Table 4 shows, 69% 
of the 33 cases with the more progressive form of fathers’ leave have high women’s 
labour force participation. This suggests that the socio-economic factor of women’s 
role in the workforce, and the likely impacts this has on women’s role in home and 
family life, play an important role in how governments approach the issue of the 
balance of responsibilities for childcare between parents. As mentioned above, to an 
extent, women's engagement in the labour force is an outcome of more progressive 
models of reform. However, due to the number of factors shaping women's role in the 
 136 
workplace, this factor is still an effective indicator of women's role in society more 
broadly.  
 








Examples of this include Norway, which first introduced a four-week ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ 
father-specific parental leave (FS) entitlement in 1993, to promote men’s take-up of 
shared parental leave. Four years later, 75% of fathers entitled to the leave took it, 
up from 2.4% who took paternity leave in 1992 (Chemin 2011). At that time, Norway’s 
female labour force participation rate (55.08%) was 8.6 percentage points above the 
European average (46.52%) (International Labour Organization 2018). As the 
Norwegian Labour Party’s Minister for Childhood and Family at the time, Grete 
Berget, commented ‘we lived in a society where the distribution of roles was clear-
cut: the men worked and the women took care of the family. Now that women have 
entered the labour market the men must take on their share of the family 
responsibilities. That's equality’ (Chemin 2011).  
 
On the other hand, in countries where women's engagement in the workplace is still 
lagging, we see very modest reforms to father’s access to parental leave. Italy has a 
serious problem of women's participation in the workforce (Del Boca 2002). Women’s 
engagement in the Labour force in Italy has consistently fallen ten percentage points 
short of European averages since 1990, peaking at a meagre 39.64% in 2017. In 
Italy, there has been limited reform to men’s entitlement to parental leave. While 
reforms in 2000 meant fathers could take six months leave, and were incentivised to 
take over three months by a ‘bonus’ month leave, this was only paid in cases where 
the mother was ill or deceased. By 2015, the take-up of this scheme was only 11% 
(van Belle 2016). In this context, in 2013 the Italian government introduced one day 
of compulsory paid paternity leave for fathers, and this limited provision was extended 
to two days in 2016. In the Italian case, women have had limited engagement in the 
workforce, and there are very modest father-specific parental leave entitlements.  
These factors may, however, be mutually constitutive, in that women may face 
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greater barriers to the paid labour market where there are not sufficient options for 




The ‘complex solution’ of this fsQCA analysis provides two sufficiency pathways for 
the leave reforms to follow the progressive model.14 The outcomes of the fsQCA 
analysis are presented in Table 5 and Figure 2.  While some elements of this model 
match the theoretical expectations, others do not. In this section, I discuss the two 
pathways identified in the analysis, drawing on the details of individual cases.   
 
Due to the number of conditions in this analysis, some combinations of cases which 
have no observations, these are known as logical remainders (Ragin, 2008a). There 
have been some debates amongst fsQCA scholars regarding the handling of logical 
remainders, with some scholars drawing on the qualitative analysis of cases to 
supplement the analysis with additional fictive cases to address contradictory 
simplifying assumptions (Delreux & Hesters 2010). In this analysis, I have set the 
frequency cut-off to one case, so combinations of conditions with no empirical 
observations are excluded. For this analysis, all conditions are assumed to have an 
impact on the outcome when they are present.  
 
The consistency cut-off, which determines the threshold at which a combination of 
conditions is coded as contributing to the outcome, is set at 0.9 (Braumoeller & Goertz 
2000; Legewie 2013). This means that for a combination of conditions to be 
considered to be sufficient for the outcome, over 90% of the cases with that 
combination of conditions must lead to a positive outcome (FS).  
  
 
14 The fsQCA parsimonious and intermediate solutions are also presented in the online appendix.  
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Table 5: Analysis of sufficient conditions for the presence of father-specific parental 
leave reform 
 
Complex Solution WL•WM•LM•LP + WL•wm•lm•GA•lp ⇒ FS 
Cases Norway 2009, Norway 
2011, Portugal 2009, 
Finland 2003, Finland 
2011, Norway 1993, 
Denmark 1998, Belgium 
1998 
 Denmark 1992, 
United Kingdom 
2013, Netherlands 




Consistency 1.00  0.96  
Raw coverage 0.23  0.19  
Unique coverage 0.23  0.19  
Solution consistency 0.98  
  
Solution coverage 0.43  
  
 
Figure 2: Analysis of sufficient conditions (fsQCA results) 
 
Government actors: left-wing, female ministers  
 
The first solution pathway is the combination of the presence of a left-wing, female 
minister with a left-dominated parliament, with the necessary condition of women’s 
active engagement in the paid workforce (WL•WM•LM•LP). This pathway covers 
23% of the cases of policy reform, and all of the cases which follow this pathway fall 
into the more gender-balanced category of parental leave (father-specific leave).  
This combination of conditions is similar to the theoretical expectation, but combines 
the expectations in relation to government actors, finding that in contexts where 
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women are actively engaged in the labour force, female left-wing government actors 
introduce or extend a more progressive system of leave for fathers. This suggests 
that left-wing, female ministers are entrepreneurial in introducing gender-balanced 
parental leave. This pathway also suggests ministers must also pass the ‘hurdle’ of 
the partisanship of the Parliament (LP), and contrary to theoretical expectations, the 
economic context (EC), is not part of either sufficiency pathway. I discuss these 
findings further at the end of this section. 
 
In Portugal in 2009, wholesale reform of parental leave policies was brought forward 
to a left-dominated Parliament by the female Socialist Party Minister for Labour and 
Social Solidarity, Helena André. This reform saw the initial ‘maternity’ section of leave 
replaced by the ‘Initial Parental Leave’. While 45 days of leave were for the exclusive 
use of the mother, fathers have ten obligatory working days to be taken during the 
first month after birth with an option for a further ten days. There is then the 
opportunity for parents to divide the 150 days of leave paid at 100% of earnings, or 
180 days at 80% of earnings, between themselves. This led to a strong initial increase 
in fathers’ take-up of leave (from 596 fathers sharing maternity leave in 2008 to 
16,426 fathers sharing Initial Parental leave in 2010) (Wall & Leitão 2017). This was 
followed by a steady increase, with 31% of Portuguese fathers taking at least 30 days 
of leave without the mother in 2016 (Wall & Leitão 2017). 
 
Belgium’s early introduction of a three-month parental leave for fathers in 1996 was 
brought forwards by female Minister for Social Affairs for the Socialist Party - Magda 
De Galan. One of the few women around cabinet tables in Europe at that time, De 
Galan oversaw an extension fathers’ entitlement from three working days to three 
months of paid leave, which was available to both parents.  
 
Fifteen years later, in 2001, the extension of Norway’s shared parental leave was 
introduced by the female, left-wing Minister of Labour and Social Inclusion Anniken 
Huitfeldt of the Norwegian Labour Party. The extension saw the ‘father quota’ 
increase to 12 weeks, paid at 100% of earnings. At that time, both the male justice 
minister and male family affairs minister were themselves on paternity leave (Gibbs 
2011). These examples show how individual female ministers from leftist parties, 
supported by a left-dominated parliament, can introduce reforms which transform 
caring responsibilities in the home.  
 
 140 
Reflecting this, the discussions introduced to the debate of family reform by female 
left-wing ministers can be significantly different to those employed by right-wing or 
male ministers. In 2014, legislative reforms in France combined increases in fathers’ 
leave with other measures such as access to abortions and street harassment. At the 
time, the minister for women's rights, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, set out her proactive 
approach to this issue: ‘I don't believe that history is going to spontaneously take us 
forward, so going towards more equality needs us to be politically proactive’ (Willsher 
2014). On the other hand, when the EU was debating introducing three months’ 
unpaid leave for fathers in 1994, the UK’s Conservative Party Employment Secretary, 
Michael Portillo, was in active opposition to the proposals. The then Conservative 
Prime Minister, John Major, said ‘We have unemployment falling - most of our 
European partners don't. I want to keep unemployment falling. I don't want to pile 
further costs on employers so that they are less likely to employ people’ (Ritchie 
1994). 
 
This pathway suggests that where governments do choose to reform father’s leave, 
they promote more equal shared parental leave where there is of a female left-wing 
minister, in the context of a left-dominated Parliament and the active engagement of 
women in the workforce. This combines the two theoretical expectations about 
government actors.  
 
Government actors: right-wing, male ministers and public attitudes 
 
The second pathway arising from this analysis provides a particularly interesting 
insight into the role of government actors involved in family policy making. Here, the 
absence of a left-wing female minister (i.e. a male, right-wing minister) is expected to 
be sufficient for the introduction of progressive reforms of leave for fathers, but only 
when in combination with more progressive gender attitudes among voters. This is 
alongside women’s active engagement in work, as in the previous pathway, but not 
the presence of a leftist Parliament (WL•wm•lm•GA•lp). This pathway accounts for 
19% of the cases in this dataset, and 96% of reforms which fall in this combination 
take the form of the more progressive father-specific leave (FS).   
 
These findings are contrary to my theoretical expectations and suggest that even 
right-wing male ministers, whom I theorise will be less inclined to introduce 
progressive reforms, can introduce such reforms in contexts where there are positive 
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attitudes towards women’s role in work.  Several examples following this pathway 
include those in the social democratic, Scandinavian models of welfare systems such 
as Denmark and Norway, which have a political culture of progressive gender 
attitudes (Borchorst & Siim 2008). This ‘egalitarian tradition’ influences how policies 
are made and framed (Inglehart & Norris 2003). Danish reform of father-specific leave 
in 2002 saw the provision of 32 weeks of paid leave allocated per family, in addition 
to two weeks of paternity leave and 18 weeks of maternity leave. The male Minister 
for Employment from the conservative-liberal Venstre party at the time, Claus Hjort 
Frederiksen, introduced the measure as an opportunity for 'individual freedom of 
choice’ (Jørgensen 2002), and the reform was brought about with an Act of 
Parliament entitled ‘Equal Treatment of Men and Women as regards Access to 
Employment and Maternity Leave, etc’ (Anon 2002). Quite distinct from the 
egalitarian narratives of left-wing ministers, right or centre-right ministers have 
chosen to introduce greater flexibility in leave for fathers when there is a context of 
gender-equal public attitudes and women have a more active role in the workplace.  
 
Another example in a context with more egalitarian gender attitudes, is the 
Netherlands where the entitlement of both parents to parental leave was doubled 
from 13 to 26 weeks under a male minister for the Dutch Christian Democratic Appeal 
party, Piet Hein Donner. The leave was previously unpaid, but a tax incentive meant 
that parental leave was reformed to be paid at a low level (around €690 a month for 
parents on full-time leave) (Moss 2009). This progressive reform was introduced 
under a right-wing, male minister. This pathway also includes the UK’s 2013 
extension of unpaid parental leave for fathers from 13 weeks to 18 weeks, in addition 
to two weeks of paternity leave. This reform was, in part, driven by the EU Parental 
Leave Directive (see discussion below) but was brought about under the 
Conservative Work and Pensions Minister, Iain Duncan Smith.  
 
In a qualitative analysis of leave reforms in Western Europe, Morgan & Zippel (2003) 
also find that centrist and conservative parties introduce and advocate for more 
progressive parental leave policies, but do so in terms of offering parents more choice 
in how they undertake childcare. Right-wing parties have also been seen to 
undertake parental leave reforms which have beneficial labour market effects, even 
if this is in tension with more traditional family values or gender values. With the aim 
of positive labour market outcomes and introducing more choice for parents, rightist 
governments can be motivated to introduce more progressive models of shared 
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parental leave.  
 
Extensions of entitlements to parental leave in France by centre-right governments 
in the 1990s were justified by opportunities for job creation (Morgan & Zippel 2003, 
p.60). The most vocal champions of care leave in Austria have been centre-right or 
right-wing parties, who do so as a means to promote employment (Ditch et al. 1996). 
This pattern of Conservative and centre parties introducing progressive leave reforms 
has also been a driving factor in the creation of paid long-term care leaves in both 
Finland and Norway (Morgan & Zippel 2003). The Norwegian leave reform of 2014 
introduced by the neoliberal Progress Party falls within this fsQCA pathway. The 
neoliberal Labour Minister extended the shared period of leave to 26 weeks at 80% 
of salary or 36 weeks at 100% of salary (Brandth & Kvande 2018).   
 
This trend of rightist parties introducing more progressive leave reforms is reflected 
in the narratives around expenditure on family leave policies, where support can 
come from political quarters which are not usually in favour of increased welfare 
budgets. The female German Christian Democratic Family Affairs Minister, Ursula 
von der Leyen, said of the overspend on Germany’s 2007 shared parental leave 
reform – ‘Fathers blew the budget for 2007 [...] I think it's the best thing that could 
have happened to our country’ (Deutsche Welle 2007). 
 
These two pathways provide an insight into patterns of reform of men’s access to 
paternity leave entitlements – this analysis suggests there are more progressive 
reforms in cases with either a proactive female left-wing minister to lead reforms, or 
gender attitudes amongst the public which shift policy impetus towards progressive 
leave reforms. However, the coverage score for these pathways (0.44) shows that a 
number of cases fall outside of the fsQCA solution. While these two pathways are 
highly consistent, meaning that the cases which belong to each pathway almost all 
lead to a more flexible system for both parents, not all cases of such reform follow 
one of these sufficiency pathways.  
 
In the Appendix, I show how this finding is robust where the partisanship of social 
spending ministers is coded by party family rather than the party’s left-right score. 
Here, minsters are coded as either being a member or non-member of a socialist or 
social democratic party. The complex solution for this analysis includes three terms 
for more progressive leave reforms. The first term is the presence of a leftist female 
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minister in a context with women’s engagement in the labour force and a left-
dominated Parliament (WL•WM•PF•LP). This is akin to the findings of the analysis 
presented above. The second term is the presence of a female, leftist minister in a 
context with progressive gender attitudes and economic context with high levels of 
women's representation in the labour force (WL•EC•GA•WM•PF). The final term for 
a more progressive model of leave reform is the presence of a male minister from a 
non-leftist party in a context of women’s active engagement in the labour force, 
positive gender attitudes, a positive economic context and a right- or centre-
dominated Parliament (WL•EC•GA•wm•pf•lp).  
 
These pathways account for 40% of cases in the analysis, with a consistency score 
of 0.96. While the results of this analysis do not exactly mirror the full analysis 
presented in the main paper, it does lend evidence towards the finding of more 
progressive reforms where there is a female leftist minister or a male rightist minister 
in a context with more gender-equal public attitudes.  
 
Leftist parliament  
 
For the first sufficiency pathway, the introduction or extension of the most progressive 
forms of leave for fathers is dependent on reforms passing the ‘hurdle’ of the 
legislature. In the European context, coalition governments are the norm (Müller & 
Strøm 2000). While a party sympathetic to more progressive parental leave may have 
control of the employment/labour portfolio, they may not command a majority in 
Parliament. Parliament has also been found to be an important factor shaping policy 
congruence with women’s policy preferences (Dingler et al. 2019).  Therefore, the 
ideological composition of Parliament can play an important role in shaping policy 
outcomes.  
  
In Denmark in 2013, the left-wing government was forced to pull back on proposals 
to equalise access to leave between parents, due to calls from centrist and right-wing 
parties in Parliament that the reforms would mean that families had less choice in 
allocating leave between parents. At the time, the Liberal Party’s equality 
spokesperson, Fatma Øktem, said ‘it's great news because we think families should 
have the freedom to choose how to divide up their parental leave’. Whereas the Red-
Green Alliance MP Johanne Schmidt-Nielsen said ‘it is disappointing that 
Socialdemokraterne [Social Democrats] and Radikale [Radical Left] won't give 
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fathers the same parental leave rights as mothers’, stating that the policy U-turn was 
‘old-fashioned cowardice’ (CPHPost 2013). Where governments face 
Parliamentarians that are not sympathetic to progressive leave reforms, they can be 
forced to step back on passing legislation.   
 
There are also examples of rightist parties calling for retrenchments of leave 
entitlements for fathers. For example, in 2004, Iceland’s Parliament (which was 
dominated by the liberal-conservative Independence Party) passed a retrenchment 
of shared parental leave (Gíslason 2007). Parliamentarians called for a ceiling on 
payments and for average salaries to be calculated over a 24, rather than 12-month, 
window to cut the costs of the entitlement.   
 
In the Appendix, I also provide the results of an fsQCA analysis which includes the 
explanatory factor of the representation of women in parliament. Given the number 
of observations in this analysis (49), the number of explanatory factors for the fsQCA 
should not exceed five. Therefore, for this analysis I have recreated the full model but 
have removed the variable of the partisanship of the parliament due to the joint 
subsistence relationship (correlation) between the partisanship of the legislature and 
women's representation in parliament (Ragin, 2008a).  
 
Through this fsQCA analysis, I find that women's representation in parliament is not 
an essential condition for the presence of more progressive leave reforms. The 
complex solution for more progressive leave reforms is: the presence of women in 
the labour force and a female left-wing minister in a context with a high level of 
women's representation in parliament and progressive gender attitudes 
(WL•WM•LM•GA•WP). This pathway accounts for 24% of cases and has a 
consistency score of 0.94. This suggests that the presence of women in the 
legislature can also have an impact on the form of leave reforms, in a context with a 




Throughout this analysis, the economic context (as measured as GDP growth) is not 
found to be a necessary condition for reform, and the condition is not included in 
either sufficiency pathway. This is contrary to my theoretical expectation that the 
economic context would provide a hurdle which governments must pass for a reform 
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of father’s leave to follow the more gender-balanced model.  
 
Between 1980 and 2010 across the OECD countries, both the average duration and 
salary replacement rate of paid parental leave trebled (from 18 to 54 weeks, and 
11.3% to 33.2% respectively) (Daly & Ferragina, 2017, p. 9). This growth in 
expenditure on parental leave has taken place in a context of widespread welfare 
state retrenchment, where governments have been rolling back the welfare state and 
cutting spending on welfare assistance (for a review of the literature on this subject 
see: Starke 2006).  
 
On the other hand, even leftist ministers in countries with more traditional gender 
attitudes can struggle to reconcile the costs of these policies. In 2005, Spanish 
Socialist Party employment minister, Jesús Caldera, pledged that paternity leave 
would be introduced for new fathers, but that this would bear significant costs. Since 
1989, men had been entitled to some of the mother's leave, but this was the first 
proactive attempt to actively encourage men’s involvement in childcare (Escobedo et 
al. 2012). The minister said, the costs were ‘very high, almost €500 million in social 
security payments per week, bearing in mind that 420,000 babies are born each year 
in Spain’ (ThinkSpain 2002). Spanish public expenditure on these policies has never 
been above 0.33% of GDP (OECD 2017b).  
 
However, a number of reforms of paternity leave which fall outside these pathways 
have also taken place to adopt EU Directives in this area into national law. The EU 
has made two major interventions in this area. The 1996 EU Parental Leave Directive 
required that all workers be granted an individual right to parental leave for at least 
three months. In 2012, the EU Directive on parental leave (Council Directive 
2010/18/EU) granted all parents, men and women, a minimum unpaid leave period 
of four months. Not all countries have warmly embraced these changes. In 2016, 
Greek independent Labour Minister Zeta Emilianidou said ‘There is no doubt that it 
[the introduction of four weeks of paternity leave] must be done. It is also an EU 
requirement’. However, the minister said the rise in tax contributions needed to be 
increased to finance the €10 million reform would ‘create a huge problem’ (Psyllides 
2016). 
 
This fsQCA analysis also provides an insight into the types of reform government 
introduce when they choose to reform fathers’ leave. I find that women's engagement 
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in the labour force is a necessary feature for these reforms to follow the progressive 
model of father-specific leave. There are two pathways which are sufficient for the 
introduction of father-specific leave, women’s labour force participation and combined 
with either 1) a left-wing, female employment/labour minister and a left-wing 
parliament; or 2) a right-wing, male minister in countries with more progressive 
gender attitudes.  
 
Conclusion 
In this complex policy space, the steps governments take to incentivise or 
disincentivise fathers’ engagement in childcare in early parenthood can promote 
gender balance in family responsibilities more broadly (Kotsadam & Finseraas 2011). 
As the French Socialist Party Minister for Children, Segolene Royal, said of France’s 
2002 reform of leave for fathers: ‘This is almost as important as the day when women 
got the vote. We are going to abandon traditional patterns, which penalise men as 
well as women’ (Sage 2001). While the policy implications of these decisions are 
subject to extensive academic investigation, there has not been a cross-national 
comparison of what leads governments to enact the most progressive forms of 
parental leave which balance leave between mothers and fathers.  
 
This paper provides an insight into the conditions under which governments choose 
to promote a dual-earner/dual-carer family model. There is still substantial variation 
in the entitlements governments grant to new parents within their jurisdiction, and to 
new fathers in particular. Through investigating the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for reform of leave policies to follow a more progressive model, the fsQCA 
approach provides a tool to systematically compare and identify patterns in cases of 
reform of leave for fathers. 
 
I find that women's active role in the paid workforce is a necessary condition for 
governments to promote more gender balance between parents in caring and earning 
through leave entitlements, when they choose to implement reforms of fathers’ leave. 
This suggests that the role of women in the workforce plays an important part in 
setting the tone for expectations about men’s role in the family. Building on my 
theoretical expectations, this analysis demonstrates the importance of women’s 
engagement in paid work for shaping government approaches to leave policies. This 
analysis suggests that left-wing, female ministers will introduce more progressive 
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reforms, but that right-wing male ministers will also do so in contexts with more 
gender egalitarian public attitudes. I theorise that this is due to rightist parties’ 
motivation to promote the positive labour market impacts of shared parental models 
of leave and offer more choice to parents. For left-wing ministers, a left-wing 
parliament is also part of the pathway for shaping more progressive policy outcomes.  
 
This analysis has important implications for those who seek to see greater equality 
between parents in childcare – changing public attitudes may well make a difference, 
as will the election of a left-wing female minister and leftist Parliament. But critically, 
women need to be engaged in paid work for government to seek to make these 
reforms. This paper shows the value in considering when and why governments 
might seek to implement different forms of leave, not just the outcomes of those 
reforms.  Future analyses of government policy making can build on this analysis to 
use an fsQCA approach for other public policy outcomes, as well as testing the 
theoretical expectations of this paper on other policy decisions which affect and 
reflect government attitudes to gender issues. Given the complexity of this policy 
landscape, there is also scope for retrenchment in fathers’ leave. While these cases 
of retrenchment are not included in this analysis, further exploration of the 
circumstances under which leave entitlements are reduced could also provide a 
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Paper Three: Appendix 
All cases of extensions of leave for fathers  
20 European OECD countries, January 1990 to April 2016.  Extracted from OECD (2016) Detail of Change in Parental Leave by Country. 
 
 













Austria 1996 0 26 1 1/7/1996: One parent could use up to 18 months of parental leave. In practice, this implies an introduction 
of a six month father quota (Lalive and Zweimuller 2005; Prskawetz et al. 2008).  
Belgium 1998 0.6 13.6 1 1/1/1998: A three month, job-protected parental leave scheme was introduced (NATLEX). The scheme 
applied only to the private sector. The scheme was an individual based allowance, with each parent 
meeting the employment conditions being entitled to three months of paid leave. It was paid at a flat rate.  
2002 13.6 15 0 1/7/2002: Paternity leave was increased from three to ten days. Three days of paternal leave were 
mandatory. The payment was 100% of earnings for the first three days and then at 82% with a ceiling. 
2012 15 19.3 1 08/3/2012: The federal government has acted to implement the EU Directive 2010/18 on Parental Leave. 
A fourth month of Parental leave was set as an individual entitlement; the flat rate payment was also 




2007 0 156 1 1/1/2008: Introduction of flexibility in parental leave. Both parents could take leave until the third birthday 
of the child. Leave was an individual entitlement. Both parents could be on leave but income support 
could by paid out to only one parent. There were three payment options (from 1/1/2008): (i) a long option 
(after maternity or after birth if the person was not entitled to maternity benefit) at CZK 7600 monthly until 
the child was 21 months old and thereafter at CZK3800 monthly until the child was 48 months old; (ii) a 
mid-range option (only for parents entitled to maternity benefits) at CZK7600 monthly until the child was 
36 months old; (iii) a short option (only for parents entitled to maternity benefits) of CZK11400 monthly 
until the child was 24 months old (Moss and Korintus, 2008).  
Denmark 1992 2 28 0 7/1/1992: Introduction of a new childcare leave which was available to parents with children under eight 
years old (NATLEX). It entitled each working parent to 26 weeks of paid and job- protected leave, with a 
payment equal to 80% of the unemployment benefit (Pylkkänen and Smith, 2004). Parents who were in 
employment, self-employed, unemployed members of an unemployment insurance fund, or cash-benefit 
claimants were all eligible. If the child was over one year of age, the duration of leave was reduced to 13 
weeks in 1995 (Jensen, 2000). Childminding leave could be taken after the 10 weeks of parental leave 
and 14 weeks of maternal leave.  
1998 15 17 0 1/4/1998 (law of 29/12/1997): Parental leave was increased from 10 to 12 weeks after birth via the 
addition of two weeks of leave which must be taken by the father (NATLEX).  
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2002 17 34 0 27/3/2002: A new birth-related leave scheme was implemented for children born on or after 27th 
March2002. Parents of children born between 1st January and 26th March 2002 could choose to use 
the old or new child leave scheme. Under the new scheme, the childcare leave scheme was abolished. 
The two week father’s quota from 1998 was eliminated. The 4 pre-birth and 14 post-natal weeks of 
maternity leave remained. Parental leave was extended. The parental leave benefit is paid up to 32 
weeks per family, but parents could choose a longer option of 46 weeks with the payment for 32 weeks 
spread over the longer period (MISSOC). The other parent could take the same leave and extension of 
leave, but unpaid. Thus, parents were entitled to 52 weeks of paid leave (maternity leave plus paternity 
leave plus parental leave). The family could get a maximum of 112 weeks of job-protected leave. Of 
these 112 weeks, the mother could get a maximum of 64 weeks (18 maternity plus 46 parental leave 
weeks) and the father could get a maximum of 48 weeks (2 week paternity plus 46 week parental leave).  
Finland  1991 0 1 0 1/1/1991: Fathers got six days of paternity leave. 
1993 1 3 0 1/1/1993: Paternity leave becomes 18 days. 
2003 2 7 1 1/1/2003: Fathers were entitled to two extra weeks (12 days) of bonus paternity leave, if they took two 
weeks (12 days) of the parental leave.  
2011 7 9 1 2010: The father’s month was lengthened by two weeks, so fathers were entitled to four extra weeks of 
paid leave if they took the last two weeks of the sharable parental leave.  
France 2002 156 156 0 1/1/2002: Introduction of a maximum of 3 days of paternal birth leave and 11 consecutive days of 
paternity leave (to be taken during the four months after birth). This leave was job-protected and fully 
paid. 
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Germany 2007 0 8.6 1 1/1/2007: A new earnings-related parental leave benefit with floors and ceilings (Elterngeld, or “parental 
money”), replaced the means tested flat rate child-raising benefit (Erziehungsgeld). The child rearing 
benefit was targeted at low income families, while the new parental money was more universal in nature 
(Kluve and Tamm 2009). Duration of the job-protected parental leave remained up to three years 
following childbirth, but there was an overhaul of child rearing benefits. The payment became income 
related (at 67% of the parent’s average earnings during the 12 months preceding childbirth, with a ceiling 
of 1800EUR per month and a floor at 300EUR). An extra payment for fathers was introduced. The 
payment was for ten months plus two extra months for the father if he used at least two months of 
parental leave, resulting in a total of 14 available months of payment. The maternity leave payment was 
included in this period, reducing the actual Elterngeld payment period to 12 months. It was possible to 
extend leave up to 24 plus four months (if each parent takes at least four months), with a proportionate 
reduction in the monthly payment rate. The actual Elterngeld payment period was then 28 months less 
the two months maternity payment which were included in the child rearing benefit period, i.e. 26 months. 
There still was unpaid and job-protected leave up to 36 months following birth (Moss and Korintus 2008). 
Greece 1993 13 15.2 1 9/6/1993 (Day of the Act; retrospective application from 1/1/1993): The National General Collective 
Agreement extended the duration of unpaid job-protected parental leave from 3 to 3.5 months with the 
leave to be taken up to the point when the child reached the age of three years instead of two and a half 
years (from Parental leave in Greece: the impact of the framework agreement and the European 
Directive). Article 7 introduced 16 weeks maternity leave, of which eight pre-natal weeks were mandatory 
(Soumeli 1998). 
2000 15.2 15.6 0 23/5/2000: Two days of full paid paternity leave introduced. 
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2012 15.6 17.7 1 04/2012: A new law on parental leave was passed by the Greek Parliament in April 2012 (articles 48-54, 
Law 4075/12).The law incorporates the EU Directive 2010/18 on Parental leave in the national 
legislation. According to the provisions of the law, the following main changes were introduced that 
concern all working people in the public or private sector: 
o Parental leave is extended, so it can be taken until a child was 6 years old (instead of 3.5 years as in 
the past). 
o Parental leave lasts 4 months (instead of 31⁄2 months, as in the past 
o Requests for parental leave from parents of children with a disability or long-term 
illness or sudden illness and from single parents are dealt with as an absolute priority. 
o In the case of death of a parent or total removal of parental responsibility or non- recognition of the 
child, the other parent is entitled to receive the double amount of parental leave 
o Working people that adopt or foster a child that is less than 6 years of age, are entitled to parental 
leave which, under certain circumstances, could be extended until the child’s eighth birthday. 
o Special leave was introduced to cover the unplanned and serious needs of parents whose children 
suffered from serious illness needing regular therapy or hospitalisation. 
Hungary 2002 0 1 0 2002: Five days of job-protected and fully paid paternity leave were introduced. 
Iceland 1998 0 2 0 1/1/1998: With this amendment, all Icelandic fathers gained the right to a two-week paternity leave, which 
could be taken at any time during the first eight weeks after the birth or the arrival of the child at home  
2001 2 17.3 1 1/1/2001: Maternity leave was made three paid months, parental leave was made three shareable 
months, and paternity leave was made one month. The unpaid parental leave was 13 unpaid weeks per 
parent (Social Protection in the Nordic Countries, 1995-2005). Two post-natal weeks become mandatory 
as part of the maternity leave. 
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2002 17.3 21.7 1 1/1/2002: Paternity leave was increased by another month  
2003 21.7 26 1 1/1/2003: Paternity leave increased to three months (Social Protection in the Nordic Countries, 1995-
2005). The system worked as follows: maternity leave was three months (of which one month must be 
taken before birth). Two weeks after birth were mandatory. Paternity leave was three months. Parental 
leave was three months following birth which could be shared. The right to leave expires when the child 
was 18 months old. Payment, equal for all the three schemes, was 80% of earnings up to a ceiling for 
those who have been in the workforce during the preceding 24 months. Others (including students) 
received a flat-rate payment. There was an additional available 13 weeks of unpaid parental leave.  
2014 26 30.3 1 2014: The ceiling on leave payments was raised from ISK 350,000 to ISK 370,000.  
Ireland 1999 0 14 1 3/12/1998 (Parental Leave Act No. 30/1998): Introduction of 14 unpaid and job-protected weeks of 
parental leave per parent.15 
2013 14 18 1 08/03/2013: The length of parental leave was extended from 14 weeks to 18 weeks  
Italy 2000 0 21.6 1 14/3/2000 (Day after the publication on the Gazzetta, Law 8/03/2000 n. 53): Maternity leave remained 
mandatory but mothers could now choose to start leave one month instead of two months before birth. 
Fathers could take leave for three months after birth (payment as for maternity at 80% and job-protected) 
but only in some restricted cases such as the mother’s death, leave, or if the mother is ill. Six months 
parental leave per parent was introduced. If a father took three months, he was entitled to one additional 
month of parental leave (he could take a maximum leave of seven months). The total amount of the 
parental leave taken by two parents could not exceed 10 months, or 11 if the father takes at least three 
months. It could be used until the child was eight years old. 
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2013 21.6 21.9 0 January 2013: A one day period of compulsory paid paternity leave was introduced. Fathers could take 
two additional days if the mother agreed to transfer these days from her maternity leave.  
2016 21.9 22.1 0 January 2016: Compulsory paid paternity leave extended from one to two days.  
Luxembourg 1999 0.4 26.4 1 
 
1/1/1999 (law 3/2/1999, applicable for children born from the 1st of January): Parental leave at flat rate 
payment was introduced. It was an individual entitlement of six months if taken on full-time basis or 12 
months long if taken on part-time basis. The leave was job-protected (ILO Maternity protection 
database). Both parents cannot take full-time parental leave at the same time, but they were allowed to 
if they take it on a part-time basis. Once maternity or adoption leave ended, one of the parents could 
take parental leave, otherwise he/she will lose his/her right to this part of leave (this right was not 
transferable). The other parent could take parental leave until the child was five years old.  
Netherlands 1991 0 13 1 1/1/1991: Introduction of 26 weeks part-time (50%) unpaid job-protected parental leave. It was an 
individual right up to the child’s 4th birthday (Plantenga and Remery 2009).  
2001 13 13.4 0 1/12/2001: Fathers were entitled to two days of childbirth leave, fully paid and job-protected  
2009 13.4 26.4 1 1/1/2009: Parental leave was extended to six full-time months and the new saving scheme could be 
applied to the whole leave (a flat rate payment of EUR 667 per month) (Moss and Korintus, 2008). 
Norway 1993 54 58 1 1/4/1993: Parental leave was 52 weeks of which nine were for the mother (three pre- and six post-birth 
weeks, all mandatory), four weeks of father’s quota, and 39 “shareable” weeks. Parents could choose 
between a short option (42 weeks at 100%) and a long option (52 weeks at 80%) (Carneiro, Crawford, 
and Goodman 2007; Rønsen and Sundström 2002).  
2005 58 59 1 1/6/2005: Father’s quota was increased by a week. The long option of leave became 53 weeks, of which 
nine weeks were reserved for the mother, five for the father and 39 weeks to be shared, all paid at 80%. 
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The short and better paid option was 43 weeks paid at 100% (Moss and Korintus, 2008).  
2006 59 60 1 1/6/2006: The father’s quota became six weeks, so that the longest leave option became 54 weeks 
(Moss and Korintus, 2008).  
2009 60 64 1 01/7/2009: The father’s quota became ten weeks, so that the long option was 58 weeks and the short 
was 46 weeks. Eligibility of fathers was extended, but remained dependent on both parents being 
employed six of the last ten months prior to childbirth and earning half the basic amount.  
2011 64 66 1 01/7/2011: The parental payment period was extended to 47/57 weeks with 100/80 % of earnings for the 
short/long leave. Of these, the father’s quota consists of 12 weeks. Fathers who were eligible for parental 
money may take parental leave for 12 weeks if the mother received a disability benefit and thus was 
unable to return to work or education after the birth.  
2014 66 68 1 01/07/2014: Length of the mother and father quotas reduced from 14 to 10 weeks, and the shared period 
increased to 26/36 weeks.  
Poland 2010 0 1 0 1/1/2010:  Paternity leave was granted to fathers for one week and from January 1st 2012 for two weeks.  
2012 1 2 0 1/1/2012:  Paternity leave was granted to fathers for two weeks.  
2013 2 6.3 1 2013: Introduction of one-month mother and father quotas for the old three-year parental leave scheme. 
The leave period is still 36 months, but one moth is reserved for the mother and one month for the father. 
The remaining 34 months are a sharable family entitlement.  
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Portugal 1995 0 0.4 0 9/6/1995: two unpaid days of paternity leave. 
1999 0.4 17 1 30/9/1999: Two measures for father were introduced: five full paid working days of paternity leave and 
15 sequential days fully paid to be taken immediately after maternity leave or after the five days of 
paternity leave.   
2009 17 21.3 1 05/2009: Parental leave was set at 120 days (30 days could be used pre- or post-birth) paid at 100%, or 
150 days paid at 80% of previous earnings. Mothers had to take at least six weeks leave after the birth. 
The rest could be transferred to the father. A bonus of 30 days applied if the father took at least 30 
continuous days or two periods of 15 days alone without the mother. The qualifying condition was six 
months of insurance contributions. Each parent was also entitled to three additional months of additional 
leave paid at 25% of the average earnings for three months, but only if taken immediately after the initial 
parental leave; payment could only be made to one parent at a time. Paternity leave was made 
mandatory for 10 working days, paid at 100% of earnings and to be used within the first month following 
childbirth. Additional parental leave was three months per parent.  
2016 21.3 22.3 0 03/2016: Paternity leave was extended from 20 to 25 working days, with 15 working days now 
mandatory. Five of the fifteen mandatory days must be taken consecutively immediately after birth, and 
the other ten days must be taken during the first month after birth. The remaining ten optional days must 
be taken while the mother is on Initial Parental leave. 
Slovakia        No paternity leave 
Spain 2007 52.4 54.1 0 24/3/2007: 15 full paid days of paternity leave were introduced, of which two days were paid by the 
employer and the remainder by social security. The 2007 legislation includes a commitment to a four 
weeks Paternity leave by 2012. 
Sweden        No reforms in time period 
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Switzerland        No paternity leave 
United 
Kingdom 
2000 0 13 1 15/12/1999: Fathers and mothers with children under five years of age were each entitled to up to 13 
weeks of unpaid leave. Where individual employers have not chosen to negotiate their own 
arrangements with employees, leave allowed within one calendar year was limited to 4 weeks. The 
minimum length of parental leave allowed was one week. 
2003 13 15 0 6/4/2003: Paternity leave was introduced around the birth of a child for two weeks at a flat rate payment.  




Variable calibration and data sources 
 
Variable Description Calibration Calibration Justification  Data Source 












    
Father-specific 
parental leave (FS) 
Any weeks of 
employment-protected 
parental or home care 
leave that can be used 
only by the father (or 
‘other parent’) 







female (% of female 
population ages 15+) 
(modelled ILO estimate) 
30 40 50 The calibration of the female labour force 
participation rate (WL) is based on conditions 
set out by non-governmental organisations 
as targets for women's engagement in paid 
work (OECD 2015). The threshold for full 
membership is 50% of women over aged 15 
engaged in paid work, which is seen as an 
international standard for women's 
engagement in the labour force. The 
threshold for full non-membership is 30%, 






Economic context  
(EC) 
GDP per capita growth 
(annual %) 






1 - (Weighted score of 
respondents who agree 
with the statement that 
0.7 0.8 0.9 As identified in the paper’s data and 
methodology section, this measure of gender 
attitudes is an annual measure of the 
European Values 
Study and World 
Values Survey 
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'when jobs are scarce, 
men should have more 
right to a job than 
women'.) 
weighted percentage of respondents within 
each country who agreed to the statement 
‘c001- When jobs are scarce, men have more 
right to a job than women’. In this measure, a 
score of 0.90 means that 10% of respondents 
in that country in that survey wave responded 
that men should have more of a right to a job 
than women. Cases of membership of the 
category therefore are country-years with 




Gender of social 
spending minister 









5 0 -5 In the Comparative Manifestos Project, the 
time-variant ‘rile’ indicator ranges from –100 
(the whole manifesto is devoted to ‘left’ 
categories) to +100 (the whole manifesto is 
devoted to ‘right’ categories)’ (Mölder 2013, 
3). However, the range for governing parties 
is much smaller, across all governing parties 
in Europe between 1990 and 2014, the range 
for governing parties was between –58 and 
82 (Goddard 2018). These low thresholds 
identify where the parties ministers below to 
can be identified as left or right wing. 10 of the 
49 cases in this analysis have a score 










or left-wing dominance 
in Parliament and 
Government 





Proportion of seats held 
by women in the single 
or lower chamber of the 
national parliament 
20 25 30 In feminist institutionalist studies of politics, 
30% is identified to be a threshold for a  
‘critical mass’ for women's representation to 
shape political outcomes and policy choices 




Party family (PF) Left-wing party family 
membership for the  
party of the social 
spending/labour 
minister 
0  1 Coding with party families identifying if the 
party is from the socialist or social democratic 
party families.  
 
Coding:  
Ecological parties = 0 
Socialist parties = 1 
Social democratic parties = 1 
Liberal parties = 0 
Christian democratic parties = 0 
Conservative parties = 0 
Nationalist parties = 0 
Agrarian parties = 0 
Ethnic and regional parties = 0 
Special issue parties = 0 
Electoral alliances of diverse origin without 









































1 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 1 1 0 3 1 0.964497 0.964497 0.964497 
0 0 1 1 1 0 4 1 0.928962 0.928962 0.928962 
1 0 1 1 1 1 2 0 0.840764 0.840764 0.840764 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.819277 0.819277 0.819277 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.785714 0.785714 0.785714 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.72093 0.72093 0.72093 
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.663507 0.663507 0.663507 
0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 0.612613 0.612613 0.612613 
0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 0.606557 0.606557 0.606557 
0 0 1 1 1 1 5 0 0.599558 0.599558 0.599558 
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0 1 1 0 1 0 4 0 0.560224 0.560224 0.560224 
0 1 1 1 1 1 3 0 0.410188 0.410188 0.410188 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.401099 0.401099 0.401099 
0 0 1 0 1 1 3 0 0.340164 0.340164 0.340164 
0 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 0.337989 0.337989 0.337989 
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.169725 0.169725 0.169725 
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.047619 0.047619 0.047619 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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FsQCA output: Main analysis 
Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis 3.0 software (Ragin & Davey, 2016) 
 
Analysis of Necessary Conditions 
 
Outcome variable: dfatherspecificparleave 
 
Conditions tested: 
      Consistency    Coverage 




*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS* 
********************** 
 
Model: dfatherspecificparleave = f(wm, lp, ec, ga, wl, lm) 
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey 
 
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION --- 
frequency cutoff: 1 
consistency cutoff: 0.928962 
 
                                            raw          unique               
                                      coverage    coverage   consistency  
                                        ----------     ----------    ----------   
wm*lp*wl*lm                   0.230625    0.230625    1            
~wm*~lp*ga*wl*~lm       0.199062    0.199062    0.960784     
solution coverage: 0.429688 




Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term wm*lp*wl*lm: Norway2009 (1,1),  
  Norway2011 (1,1), Portugal2009 (0.99,1), Finland2003 (0.99,1),  
  Finland2011 (0.99,1), Norway1993 (0.99,1), Denmark1998 (0.81,1),  
  Belgium1998 (0.61,1) 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~wm*~lp*ga*wl*~lm: Denmark2002 
(0.99,1),  
  Norway2014 (0.98,1), Denmark1992 (0.94,1), UnitedKingdom2013 (0.92,1),  




Model: dfatherspecificparleave = f(wm, lp, ec, ga, wl, lm) 
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey 
 
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION --- 
frequency cutoff: 1 
consistency cutoff: 0.928962 
        
                      raw          unique               
                 coverage    coverage   consistency  
                 ----------        ----------      ----------   
ga*~lm      0.224375   0.218438    0.841735     
wm*lp        0.25           0.244063    1            
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solution coverage: 0.468438 
solution consistency: 0.917381 
 
 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ga*~lm: Denmark2002 (0.99,1),  
  Norway2014 (0.98,1), Denmark1992 (0.94,1), UnitedKingdom2013 (0.92,1),  
  Netherlands2009 (0.92,1), Ireland1999 (0.82,1), CzechRepublic2007 (0.65,1) 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term wm*lp: Belgium1998 (1,1),  
  Portugal2009 (1,1), Finland2003 (1,1), Finland2011 (1,1),  
  Norway1993 (1,1), Norway2009 (1,1), Norway2011 (1,1),  




Model: dfatherspecificparleave = f(wm, lp, ec, ga, wl, lm) 
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey 
 
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION --- 
 
frequency cutoff: 1 








                              raw           unique               
                          coverage    coverage   consistency  
                           ----------      ----------       ----------   
ga*wl*~lm        0.224375   0.218438    0.841735     
wm*lp*wl*lm    0.230625    0.224688    1            
solution coverage: 0.449063 
solution consistency: 0.914122 
 
 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ga*wl*~lm: Denmark2002 (0.99,1),  
  Norway2014 (0.98,1), Denmark1992 (0.94,1), UnitedKingdom2013 (0.92,1),  
  Netherlands2009 (0.92,1), Ireland1999 (0.82,1), CzechRepublic2007 (0.65,1) 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term wm*lp*wl*lm: Norway2009 (1,1),  
  Norway2011 (1,1), Portugal2009 (0.99,1), Finland2003 (0.99,1),  
  Finland2011 (0.99,1), Norway1993 (0.99,1), Denmark1998 (0.81,1),  






FsQCA output: Analysis including women’s representation in parliament  
********************** 
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS* 
********************** 
 
Model: dfatherspecificparleave = f(wm, ec, ga, wl, lm, wp) 
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey 
 
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION --- 
frequency cutoff: 1 
consistency cutoff: 0.921053 
                             raw       unique               
                           coverage    coverage   consistency  
                          ----------  ----------  ----------   
wm*ga*wl*lm*wp        0.241935    0.241935    0.949367     
solution coverage: 0.241935 




Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term wm*ga*wl*lm*wp: Finland2011 (0.99,1),  
  Norway2009 (0.99,1), Norway2011 (0.99,1), Iceland2014 (0.99,1),  
  Finland2003 (0.95,1), Denmark1998 (0.81,1), Norway1993 (0.77,1),  
  Belgium2012 (0.57,1) 
********************** 
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS* 
********************** 
Model: dfatherspecificparleave = f(wm, ec, ga, wl, lm, wp) 
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey 
 
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION --- 
frequency cutoff: 1 
consistency cutoff: 0.921053 
                      raw       unique               
                   coverage    coverage   consistency  
                  ----------  ----------  ----------   
wm*ga*wp         0.246129    0.246129    0.950187     
solution coverage: 0.246129 




Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term wm*ga*wp: Finland2011 (0.99,1),  
  Norway2009 (0.99,1), Norway2011 (0.99,1), Iceland2014 (0.99,1),  
  Finland2003 (0.95,1), Denmark1998 (0.94,1), Norway1993 (0.77,1),  
  Belgium2012 (0.57,1) 
********************** 
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS* 
********************** 
 
Model: dfatherspecificparleave = f(wm, ec, ga, wl, lm, wp) 
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey 
 
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION --- 
frequency cutoff: 1 








wp (present)   
                          raw       unique               
                         coverage    coverage   consistency  
                       ----------  ----------  ----------   
wm*ga*wl*lm*wp      0.241935    0.241935    0.949367     
solution coverage: 0.241935 
solution consistency: 0.949367 
 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term wm*ga*wl*lm*wp: Finland2011 (0.99,1),  
  Norway2009 (0.99,1), Norway2011 (0.99,1), Iceland2014 (0.99,1),  
  Finland2003 (0.95,1), Denmark1998 (0.81,1), Norway1993 (0.77,1),  
  Belgium2012 (0.57,1) 
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FsQCA output: Analysis including party families  
 
********************** 
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS* 
********************** 
 
Model: dfatherspecificparleave = f(wm, lp, ec, ga, wl, pf) 
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey 
 
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION --- 
frequency cutoff: 1 
consistency cutoff: 0.90411 
                                 raw       unique               
                               coverage    coverage   consistency  
                              ----------  ----------  ----------   
wm*lp*wl*pf                0.244194    0.142258    1            
wm*ec*ga*wl*pf           0.144516    0.0425806   0.969697     
~wm*~lp*ec*ga*wl*~pf     0.115161    0.115161    0.92487      
solution coverage: 0.401935 




Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term wm*lp*wl*pf: Norway2009 (1,1),  
  Norway2011 (1,1), Denmark1998 (1,1), Portugal2009 (0.99,1),  
  Finland2003 (0.99,1), Finland2011 (0.99,1), Norway1993 (0.99,1),  
  Belgium1998 (0.61,1) 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term wm*ec*ga*wl*pf: Finland2011 
(0.84,1),  
  Denmark1998 (0.78,1), Norway1993 (0.77,1), Finland2003 (0.75,1),  
  Ireland2013 (0.64,1), Iceland2014 (0.53,1) 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~wm*~lp*ec*ga*wl*~pf: Ireland1999 
(0.82,1),  
  Denmark1992 (0.72,1), CzechRepublic2007 (0.65,1), UnitedKingdom2013 (0.64,1) 
********************** 
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS* 
********************** 
 
Model: dfatherspecificparleave = f(wm, lp, ec, ga, wl, pf) 
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey 
 
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION --- 
frequency cutoff: 1 
consistency cutoff: 0.90411 
                       raw       unique               
                     coverage    coverage   consistency  
                    ----------  ----------  ----------   
wm*lp               0.258065    0.133226    1            
ec*ga*~pf        0.115161    0.115161    0.68         
wm*ec*wl*pf     0.178387    0.0535484   0.975309     
solution coverage: 0.426774 




Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term wm*lp: Belgium1998 (1,1),  
  Portugal2009 (1,1), Finland2003 (1,1), Finland2011 (1,1),  
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  Norway1993 (1,1), Norway2009 (1,1), Norway2011 (1,1),  
  Denmark1998 (1,1) 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ec*ga*~pf: Ireland1999 (0.82,1),  
  Denmark1992 (0.72,1), CzechRepublic2007 (0.65,1), UnitedKingdom2013 (0.64,1) 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term wm*ec*wl*pf: Norway1993 (0.87,1),  
  Finland2011 (0.84,1), Denmark1998 (0.78,1), Finland2003 (0.75,1),  
  Ireland2013 (0.64,1), Belgium1998 (0.61,1), Iceland2014 (0.53,1) 
********************** 
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS* 
********************** 
 
Model: dfatherspecificparleave = f(wm, lp, ec, ga, wl, pf) 
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey 
 
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION --- 
frequency cutoff: 1 








                         raw       unique               
                       coverage    coverage   consistency  
                      ----------  ----------  ----------   
ec*ga*wl*~pf     0.115161    0.115161    0.68         
wm*ec*ga*wl       0.144516    0.0425806   0.947146     
wm*lp*wl*pf        0.244194    0.142258    1            
solution coverage: 0.401935 




Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ec*ga*wl*~pf: Ireland1999 (0.82,1),  
  Denmark1992 (0.72,1), CzechRepublic2007 (0.65,1), UnitedKingdom2013 (0.64,1) 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term wm*ec*ga*wl: Finland2011 (0.84,1),  
  Denmark1998 (0.78,1), Norway1993 (0.77,1), Finland2003 (0.75,1),  
  Ireland2013 (0.64,1), Iceland2014 (0.53,1) 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term wm*lp*wl*pf: Norway2009 (1,1),  
  Norway2011 (1,1), Denmark1998 (1,1), Portugal2009 (0.99,1),  
  Finland2003 (0.99,1), Finland2011 (0.99,1), Norway1993 (0.99,1),  
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